Market Based Approaches for Dynamic Spectrum Assignment

Abstract—Much of the technical literature on spectrum sharing has been on developing technologies and systems for non-cooperative) opportunistic use. In this paper, we situate this approach to secondary spectrum use in a broader context, one that includes cooperative approaches to Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA). In this paper, we introduce readers to this broader approach to DSA by contrasting it with non-cooperative sharing (opportunistic use), surveying relevant literature, and suggesting future directions for researc

Survey of Spectrum Sharing for Inter-Technology Coexistence

Increasing capacity demands in emerging wireless technologies are expected to be met by network densification and spectrum bands open to multiple technologies. These will, in turn, increase the level of interference and also result in more complex inter-technology interactions, which will need to be managed through spectrum sharing mechanisms. Consequently, novel spectrum sharing mechanisms should be designed to allow spectrum access for multiple technologies, while efficiently utilizing the spectrum resources overall. Importantly, it is not trivial to design such efficient mechanisms, not only due to technical aspects, but also due to regulatory and business model constraints. In this survey we address spectrum sharing mechanisms for wireless inter-technology coexistence by means of a technology circle that incorporates in a unified, system-level view the technical and non-technical aspects. We thus systematically explore the spectrum sharing design space consisting of parameters at different layers. Using this framework, we present a literature review on inter-technology coexistence with a focus on wireless technologies with equal spectrum access rights, i.e. (i) primary/primary, (ii) secondary/secondary, and (iii) technologies operating in a spectrum commons. Moreover, we reflect on our literature review to identify possible spectrum sharing design solutions and performance evaluation approaches useful for future coexistence cases. Finally, we discuss spectrum sharing design challenges and suggest future research directions

Enforcement and Spectrum Sharing: Case Studies of Federal-Commercial Sharing

To promote economic growth and unleash the potential of wireless broadband, there is a need to introduce more spectrally efficient technologies and spectrum management regimes. That led to an environment where commercial wireless broadband need to share spectrum with the federal and non-federal operations. Implementing sharing regimes on a non-opportunistic basis means that sharing agreements must be implemented. To have meaning, those agreements must be enforceable.\ud \ud With the significant exception of license-free wireless systems, commercial wireless services are based on exclusive use. With the policy change facilitating spectrum sharing, it becomes necessary to consider how sharing might take place in practice. Beyond the technical aspects of sharing, that must be resolved lie questions about how usage rights are appropriately determined and enforced. This paper is reasoning about enforcement in a particular spectrum bands (1695-1710 MHz and 3.5 GHz) that are currently being proposed for sharing between commercial services and incumbent spectrum users in the US. We examine three enforcement approaches, exclusion zones, protection zones and pure ex post and consider their implications in terms of cost elements, opportunity cost, and their adaptability

Coopetition spectrum trading in cognitive radio networks

Spectrum trading is a promising method to improve spectrum usage efficiency. Several issues must be addressed, however, to enable spectrum trading that goes beyond conservative trading idle bands and achieve cooperation between primary and secondary users. In this paper, we argue that spectrum holes should be explicitly endogenous and negotiated by spectrum trading participants. To this end, we proposed an a Vickery auction based, coopetive framework to foster cooperation, while allowing competition for spectrum sharing. Incentive schemes and penalty for revocable spectrum are proposed to increase the spectrum access opportunities for SUs while protecting PUs spectrum value. A simultation study shows that the proposed framework outperforms conservative trading approaches, in a variety of scenarios with different levels of cooperation and bidding strategies. © 2013 IEEE

Comprehensive survey on quality of service provisioning approaches in cognitive radio networks : part one

Much interest in Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs) has been raised recently by enabling unlicensed (secondary) users to utilize the unused portions of the licensed spectrum. CRN utilization of residual spectrum bands of Primary (licensed) Networks (PNs) must avoid harmful interference to the users of PNs and other overlapping CRNs. The coexisting of CRNs depends on four components: Spectrum Sensing, Spectrum Decision, Spectrum Sharing, and Spectrum Mobility. Various approaches have been proposed to improve Quality of Service (QoS) provisioning in CRNs within fluctuating spectrum availability. However, CRN implementation poses many technical challenges due to a sporadic usage of licensed spectrum bands, which will be increased after deploying CRNs. Unlike traditional surveys of CRNs, this paper addresses QoS provisioning approaches of CRN components and provides an up-to-date comprehensive survey of the recent improvement in these approaches. Major features of the open research challenges of each approach are investigated. Due to the extensive nature of the topic, this paper is the first part of the survey which investigates QoS approaches on spectrum sensing and decision components respectively. The remaining approaches of spectrum sharing and mobility components will be investigated in the next part

Matching Markets for Spectrum Sharing

Next generation networks are designed to improve connectivity and capacity, adding to the current range of available services and expanding their reachability. For these systems to work, they need to be compatible with legacy technologies in addition to making use of (limited) available spectrum resources. This is one of the reasons why spectrum sharing has been at the forefront of the list of enablers for such systems. From federal commercial sharing to finding opportunities in millimeter-wave spectrum, we have witnessed the formulation of multiple approaches to making spectrum sharing happen. Existing work on spectrum sharing is wide ranging and includes technical as well as market-based approaches. The study of spectrum markets is of particular interest, as it merges a market approach with the technical limitations inherent to electromagnetic spectrum. In this manner, spectrum markets settings have called for different definitions of spectrum-related resources as a means to increase market thickness and thus improve the opportunities for market success. In a similar vein, we find proposals of network models which aim at adapting technical definitions of spectrum resources, such as those that are the product of virtualization. In this work, we adopt a market perspective for spectrum sharing within the context of more comprehensive network definitions such as those envisioned for next generation networks. To this end, we explore matching market concepts and middleman theory in order to shed light on factors that may impact the performance and, ultimately, the success of spectrum markets

A Game-Theoretic Framework to Regulate Freeriding in Inter-Provider Spectrum Sharing

Primary-secondary spectrum sharing is limited in terms of design space, and may not be sufficient to meet the ever-increasing demand of connectivity and high signal quality. The next step to increase spectrum sharing efficiency is to design markets where sharing takes place among primary providers rather than leaving it to the limited case where the primary licensee is idle. Attaining contractual spectrum sharing among primary providers, a.k.a. co-primary or inter-provider sharing, involves additional costs for the users, e.g., roaming fee. Co-primary spectrum sharing without additional charge to the users poses two major challenges: a) regulatory approaches must be introduced to incentivize providers to share spectrum resources, and b) small providers in co-primary spectrum sharing markets may freeride on large providers’ networks as the customers of the small providers may be using the spectrum and infrastructure resources of large providers. Such freeriding opportunities must be minimized to realize the benefits of primary-level sharing. We consider a subsidy-based spectrum sharing (SBSS) market to facilitate co-primary spectrum sharing where providers are explicitly incentivized to share spectrum resources. We focus on minimizing freeriding in SBSS markets and introduce a game-theoretic model to regulate the freeriding. We use the model to explore operational regimes with minimal freeriding