A Geometric Proof of Calibration

We provide yet another proof of the existence of calibrated forecasters; it has two merits. First, it is valid for an arbitrary finite number of outcomes. Second, it is short and simple and it follows from a direct application of Blackwell's approachability theorem to carefully chosen vector-valued payoff function and convex target set. Our proof captures the essence of existing proofs based on approachability (e.g., the proof by Foster, 1999 in case of binary outcomes) and highlights the intrinsic connection between approachability and calibration

A Positive Touch: C-tactile afferent targeted skin stimulation carries an appetitive motivational value.

The rewarding sensation of touch in affiliative interactions is hypothesised to be underpinned by an unmyelinated system of nerve fibres called C-tactile afferents (CTs). CTs are velocity tuned, responding optimally to slow, gentle touch, typical of a caress. Here we used evaluative conditioning to examine whether CT activation carries a positive affective value. A set of neutral faces were paired with robotically delivered touch to the forearm. With half the faces touch was delivered at a CT optimal velocity of 3cm/s (CT touch) and with the other half at a faster, Non-CT optimal velocity of 30cm/s (Control touch). Heart-rate and skin conductance responses (SCRs) were recorded throughout. Whilst rated equally approachable pre-conditioning, post-conditioning faces paired with CT touch were judged significantly more approachable than those paired with Control touch. CT touch also elicited significantly greater heart-rate deceleration and lower amplitude SCRs than Control touch. The results indicate CT touch carries a positive affective value, which can be acquired by socially relevant stimuli it is associated with

Approachability in Stackelberg Stochastic Games with Vector Costs

The notion of approachability was introduced by Blackwell [1] in the context of vector-valued repeated games. The famous Blackwell's approachability theorem prescribes a strategy for approachability, i.e., for `steering' the average cost of a given agent towards a given target set, irrespective of the strategies of the other agents. In this paper, motivated by the multi-objective optimization/decision making problems in dynamically changing environments, we address the approachability problem in Stackelberg stochastic games with vector valued cost functions. We make two main contributions. Firstly, we give a simple and computationally tractable strategy for approachability for Stackelberg stochastic games along the lines of Blackwell's. Secondly, we give a reinforcement learning algorithm for learning the approachable strategy when the transition kernel is unknown. We also recover as a by-product Blackwell's necessary and sufficient condition for approachability for convex sets in this set up and thus a complete characterization. We also give sufficient conditions for non-convex sets.Comment: 18 Pages, Submitted to Dynamic Games and Application

Approachability in Stackelberg Stochastic Games with Vector Costs

The notion of approachability was introduced by Blackwell [1] in the context of vector-valued repeated games. The famous Blackwell's approachability theorem prescribes a strategy for approachability, i.e., for `steering' the average cost of a given agent towards a given target set, irrespective of the strategies of the other agents. In this paper, motivated by the multi-objective optimization/decision making problems in dynamically changing environments, we address the approachability problem in Stackelberg stochastic games with vector valued cost functions. We make two main contributions. Firstly, we give a simple and computationally tractable strategy for approachability for Stackelberg stochastic games along the lines of Blackwell's. Secondly, we give a reinforcement learning algorithm for learning the approachable strategy when the transition kernel is unknown. We also recover as a by-product Blackwell's necessary and sufficient condition for approachability for convex sets in this set up and thus a complete characterization. We also give sufficient conditions for non-convex sets.Comment: 18 Pages, Submitted to Dynamic Games and Application