Accept & Reject Statement-Based Uncertainty Models

We develop a framework for modelling and reasoning with uncertainty based on accept and reject statements about gambles. It generalises the frameworks found in the literature based on statements of acceptability, desirability, or favourability and clarifies their relative position. Next to the statement-based formulation, we also provide a translation in terms of preference relations, discuss---as a bridge to existing frameworks---a number of simplified variants, and show the relationship with prevision-based uncertainty models. We furthermore provide an application to modelling symmetry judgements.Comment: 35 pages, 17 figure

Modelling default and likelihood reasoning as probabilistic

A probabilistic analysis of plausible reasoning about defaults and about likelihood is presented. 'Likely' and 'by default' are in fact treated as duals in the same sense as 'possibility' and 'necessity'. To model these four forms probabilistically, a logic QDP and its quantitative counterpart DP are derived that allow qualitative and corresponding quantitative reasoning. Consistency and consequence results for subsets of the logics are given that require at most a quadratic number of satisfiability tests in the underlying propositional logic. The quantitative logic shows how to track the propagation error inherent in these reasoning forms. The methodology and sound framework of the system highlights their approximate nature, the dualities, and the need for complementary reasoning about relevance

Inadequacy of Modal Logic in Quantum Settings

We test the principles of classical modal logic in fully quantum settings. Modal logic models our reasoning in multi-agent problems, and allows us to solve puzzles like the muddy children paradox. The Frauchiger-Renner thought experiment highlighted fundamental problems in applying classical reasoning when quantum agents are involved; we take it as a guiding example to test the axioms of classical modal logic. In doing so, we find a problem in the original formulation of the Frauchiger-Renner theorem: a missing assumption about unitarity of evolution is necessary to derive a contradiction and prove the theorem. Adding this assumption clarifies how different interpretations of quantum theory fit in, i.e., which properties they violate. Finally, we show how most of the axioms of classical modal logic break down in quantum settings, and attempt to generalize them. Namely, we introduce constructions of trust and context, which highlight the importance of an exact structure of trust relations between agents. We propose a challenge to the community: to find conditions for the validity of trust relations, strong enough to exorcise the paradox and weak enough to still recover classical logic.Comment: In Proceedings QPL 2018, arXiv:1901.0947

Axiom System and Completeness Expression for Quantum Mechanics

The standard axiomatization of quantum mechanics (QM) is not fully explicit about the role of the time-parameter. Especially, the time reference within the probability algorithm (the Born Rule, BR) is unclear. Using a plausible principle P1, about the role of probability in a physical theory, and a second principle P2 affording a most natural way to make BR precise, a logical conflict with the standard expression for the completeness of QM can be derived. Rejecting P1 is implausible. Rejecting P2 leads to unphysical results and to a conflict with a generalization of P2, a principle P3. It is thus made plausible that the standard expression of QM completeness must be revised. An absolutely explicit form of the axioms is provided, including a precise form of the projection postulate. An appropriate expression for QM completeness, reflecting the restrictions of the Gleason and Kochen-Specker theorems is proposed.Comment: 20 pages, no figure

Clause-Type, Force, and Normative Judgment in the Semantics of Imperatives

I argue that imperatives express contents that are both cognitively and semantically related to, but nevertheless distinct from, modal propositions. Imperatives, on this analysis, semantically encode features of planning that are modally specified. Uttering an imperative amounts to tokening this feature in discourse, and thereby proffering it for adoption by the audience. This analysis deals smoothly with the problems afflicting Portner's Dynamic Pragmatic account and Kaufmann's Modal account. It also suggests an appealing reorientation of clause-type theorizing, in which the cognitive act of updating on a typed sentence plays a central role in theorizing about both its semantics and role in discourse