20,008 research outputs found
On imitation dynamics in potential population games
Imitation dynamics for population games are studied and their asymptotic
properties analyzed. In the considered class of imitation dynamics - that
encompass the replicator equation as well as other models previously considered
in evolutionary biology - players have no global information about the game
structure, and all they know is their own current utility and the one of fellow
players contacted through pairwise interactions. For potential population
games, global asymptotic stability of the set of Nash equilibria of the
sub-game restricted to the support of the initial population configuration is
proved. These results strengthen (from local to global asymptotic stability)
existing ones and generalize them to a broader class of dynamics. The developed
techniques highlight a certain structure of the problem and suggest possible
generalizations from the fully mixed population case to imitation dynamics
whereby agents interact on complex communication networks.Comment: 7 pages, 3 figures. Accepted at CDC 201
Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Heterogeneous Games
We generalise and extend the work of Inarra and Laruelle (2011) by studying two person symmetric evolutionary games with two strategies, a heterogeneous population with two possible types of individuals and incomplete information. Comparing such games with their classic homogeneous version with complete information found in the literature, we show that for the class of anti-coordination games the only evolutionarily stable strategy vanishes. Instead, we find infinite neutrally stable strategies. We also model the evolutionary process using two different replicator dynamics setups, each with a different inheritance rule, and we show that both lead to the same results with respect to stability.
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