353 research outputs found
Anonymity and Information Hiding in Multiagent Systems
We provide a framework for reasoning about information-hiding requirements in
multiagent systems and for reasoning about anonymity in particular. Our
framework employs the modal logic of knowledge within the context of the runs
and systems framework, much in the spirit of our earlier work on secrecy
[Halpern and O'Neill 2002]. We give several definitions of anonymity with
respect to agents, actions, and observers in multiagent systems, and we relate
our definitions of anonymity to other definitions of information hiding, such
as secrecy. We also give probabilistic definitions of anonymity that are able
to quantify an observer s uncertainty about the state of the system. Finally,
we relate our definitions of anonymity to other formalizations of anonymity and
information hiding, including definitions of anonymity in the process algebra
CSP and definitions of information hiding using function views.Comment: Replacement. 36 pages. Full version of CSFW '03 paper, submitted to
JCS. Made substantial changes to Section 6; added references throughou
Trust in Crowds: probabilistic behaviour in anonymity protocols
The existing analysis of the Crowds anonymity protocol assumes that a participating member is either ‘honest’ or ‘corrupted’. This paper generalises this analysis so that each member is assumed to maliciously disclose the identity of other nodes with a probability determined by her vulnerability to corruption. Within this model, the trust in a principal is defined to be the probability that she behaves honestly. We investigate the effect of such a probabilistic behaviour on the anonymity of the principals participating in the protocol, and formulate the necessary conditions to achieve ‘probable innocence’. Using these conditions, we propose a generalised Crowds-Trust protocol which uses trust information to achieves ‘probable innocence’ for principals exhibiting probabilistic behaviour
How to Work with Honest but Curious Judges? (Preliminary Report)
The three-judges protocol, recently advocated by Mclver and Morgan as an
example of stepwise refinement of security protocols, studies how to securely
compute the majority function to reach a final verdict without revealing each
individual judge's decision. We extend their protocol in two different ways for
an arbitrary number of 2n+1 judges. The first generalisation is inherently
centralised, in the sense that it requires a judge as a leader who collects
information from others, computes the majority function, and announces the
final result. A different approach can be obtained by slightly modifying the
well-known dining cryptographers protocol, however it reveals the number of
votes rather than the final verdict. We define a notion of conditional
anonymity in order to analyse these two solutions. Both of them have been
checked in the model checker MCMAS
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