Metacognition of Inferential Transitions

A reasoning process is more than an unfolding causal chain. Although some thoughts cause others in virtue of their contents, paradigmatic cases of personal level inference involve something more, some appreciation that the conclusion follows from the premises. Both first-order processes and second-order beliefs have proven problematic or inadequate to account for the phenomenon. Thus, here I argue for an intermediate position, according to which an epistemic feeling, a form of procedural metacognition, plays this role. Extensive psychological research has shown that epistemic feelings are involved in monitoring many kinds of cognitive process, affecting how the processes unfold. Inferences may be no different. Inferences are also plausibly accompanied by an epistemic feeling, in particular a feeling of reliability or unreliability. Such a feeling accounts for the phenomenological datum. It can also play a significant epistemic role for the thinker

Habitual Ethics?

What if data-intensive technologies’ ability to mould habits with unprecedented precision is also capable of triggering some mass disability of profound consequences? What if we become incapable of modifying the deeply-rooted habits that stem from our increased technological dependence? On an impoverished understanding of habit, the above questions are easily shrugged off. Habits are deemed rigid by definition: ‘as long as our deliberative selves remain capable of steering the design of data-intensive technologies, we’ll be fine’. To question this assumption, this open access book first articulates the way in which the habitual stretches all the way from unconscious tics to purposive, intentionally acquired habits. It also highlights the extent to which our habit-reliant, pre-reflective intelligence normally supports our deliberative selves. It is when habit rigidification sets in that this complementarity breaks down. The book moves from a philosophical inquiry into the ‘double edge’ of habit — its empowering and compromising sides — to consideration of individual and collective strategies to keep habits at the service of our ethical life. Allowing the norms that structure our forms of life to be cotton-wooled in abstract reasoning is but one of the factors that can compromise ongoing social and moral transformations. Systems designed to simplify our practical reasoning can also make us ‘sheep-like’. Drawing a parallel between the moral risk inherent in both legal and algorithmic systems, the book concludes with concrete interventions designed to revive the scope for normative experimentation. It will appeal to any reader concerned with our retaining an ability to trigger change within the practices that shape our ethical sensibility. The eBook editions of this book are available open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence on bloomsburycollections.com. Open access was funded by the Mozilla Foundation

Extending metacognition : an account of how procedural and analytic metacognitive processes interact with extended cognition : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Psychology at Massey University, Manawatū, New Zealand

This thesis examines the relationship between extended cognition and metacognition by way of three interlocking proposals. First of all, both extended cognition and metacognition should be conceptualised as sub-personal-level explanations that are implemented in the brain and environment and in cultural practices that inform individual skill. Secondly, the procedural metacognition norm of fluency, analytic metacognition, and cognitive skill mutually reinforce and enrich each other when dealing with cognitive obstacles. Finally, my third claim, builds on and refines claims one and two when I examine the involvement of metacognition in relation to expertise; specifically, I focus on the skilled interplay of automaticity and metacognitive control when confronted with cognitive obstacles. To this end, I build on hybrid accounts of skilled cognitive performance to provide a framework that isolates cases of metacognitive extension. This thesis concludes that metacognition, rather than being viewed as wholly internal, can be partially externalised across the environment when the individual exhibits high levels of automaticity and control when using an artefact

Habitual Ethics?

What if data-intensive technologies’ ability to mould habits with unprecedented precision is also capable of triggering some mass disability of profound consequences? What if we become incapable of modifying the deeply-rooted habits that stem from our increased technological dependence? On an impoverished understanding of habit, the above questions are easily shrugged off. Habits are deemed rigid by definition: ‘as long as our deliberative selves remain capable of steering the design of data-intensive technologies, we’ll be fine’. To question this assumption, this open access book first articulates the way in which the habitual stretches all the way from unconscious tics to purposive, intentionally acquired habits. It also highlights the extent to which our habit-reliant, pre-reflective intelligence normally supports our deliberative selves. It is when habit rigidification sets in that this complementarity breaks down. The book moves from a philosophical inquiry into the ‘double edge’ of habit — its empowering and compromising sides — to consideration of individual and collective strategies to keep habits at the service of our ethical life. Allowing the norms that structure our forms of life to be cotton-wooled in abstract reasoning is but one of the factors that can compromise ongoing social and moral transformations. Systems designed to simplify our practical reasoning can also make us ‘sheep-like’. Drawing a parallel between the moral risk inherent in both legal and algorithmic systems, the book concludes with concrete interventions designed to revive the scope for normative experimentation. It will appeal to any reader concerned with our retaining an ability to trigger change within the practices that shape our ethical sensibility. The eBook editions of this book are available open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence on bloomsburycollections.com. Open access was funded by the Mozilla Foundation

Hearing morse, music, mountains and heart beats : a sociology of sensory knowing

We rely on our senses to make judgements and perform roles, whether these are mundane aspects of life such as road crossing, or the more specialised tasks of music-making and paediatric surgery. Taking the example of hearing, this thesis argues that it is useful to consider the senses as a form of knowledge, adopting Fredrik Barth's position that knowledges are avenues through which people actively engage with their worlds. In defining knowledge and the senses in these terms, this research is an exploratory contribution to both sensory studies and sociologies of knowledge. Based on participant observation and interviews with 92 musicians, doctors, adventurers and Morse code operators, the thesis begins by examining each epistemic community's underlying knowledge base, before exploring their learning methods and the conditions that support the development of aural acuity. It then explores the role of the senses in expert practices, illustrating their value in decision-making,particularly in critical contexts. This thesis argues that the senses are a dynamic and active form of knowledge that needs to be examined at the micro- and macro-sociological level, as well as across careers and lifespans. It illustrates how the senses are learnt, interactive, responsive and personal

Everyday Criticality : Questioning, Expertise, and the Embodiment of Critical Judgment

The development of critical disposition, and particularly the disposition to question assertions, has long been viewed as an essential goal of education. Its importance is expressed not only in numerous normative educational visions, but by contemporary policy documents, studies of teacher attitudes, and even popular educational literature. Indeed, the movement to educate for higher-order, critical thinking that has developed over the past four decades views questioning as perhaps the central activity of skilled cognition. As such, the disposition to question assertions – or what I have come to call “criticality” - transcends both the classroom and any specific academic or vocational discipline. It is essential to all good thinking, whether such thinking concerns scientific research, workplace decision making, or the navigation of everyday life. While there has been little conceptual analysis of criticality per se, there exists a substantial and relevant literature concerning the nature of critical disposition. In this dissertation, I analyze the two dominant conceptions in the literature as they relate to criticality, evaluating them with regard to both our held critical ideal of appropriate questioning, as well as a paradox that arises from the nature of the critical act itself – what I call the paradox of criticality. I argue that both conceptions fail to justify our critical ideal and offer little insight into how we can end the iterative questioning of critical behavior without paradoxically engaging in an “acritical” act. I propose that any understanding of criticality capable of supporting a commitment to appropriate questioning must view critical behavior as a form of judgment. With this in mind, I incorporate Hubert Dreyfus’ theory of expertise into a phenomenological analysis of critical recognition to develop a conception of criticality that views such recognition as an act of judgment that itself relies on the embodiment of previous judgment. I then turn to the literature on neurocognition and consciousness for empirical backing of this conception, arguing that both dual cognition and global workspace theory provide substantial justification for a commitment to it. I conclude with a discussion of the educational ramifications of the expertise conception and the role that didactic philosophy might play in an education for criticality

EDUCATING FOR THE KNOWLEDGE AGE: A COLLECTIVE CASE STUDY OF TEACHERS’ BELIEFS IN A PROBLEM BASED LEARNING ENVIRONMENT

There is a growing trend in the business literature; education is not preparing students for the Knowledge Age. The literature further states the foundation of a successful Knowledge Economy and the production of its knowledge workers is education. Considering that the school system is a foundation for learning, it is a startling revelation that education reform has not focused more explicitly on knowledge work. If we expect to be successful in the Knowledge Age, a new conception of knowledge and learning is necessary, and will aid in the development of new knowledge workers. This further necessitates a more in depth understanding of what epistemological beliefs, and corresponding pedagogical practices would foster students who can work successfully in the Knowledge Age. This collective case study explored four teachers’ understanding of knowledge and pedagogy using an adaptation (Keefer & Ruffus, 2004) of the Approach to Knowledge Scheme (ATKS) (Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1998) and the Principles of Knowledge Building (Scardamalia, 2003). Data collected from the study of two English/Communication Arts teachers and two Science teachers included unit plans, pre-observation interviews, observations and post-observation interviews. Thematic analysis was used to examine teachers’ epistemological beliefs and pedagogical practices, and revealed major themes by both sets of teachers. These themes were useful in understanding how the ideas of the Knowledge Age and knowledge workers can be implemented in schools. Content Analysis demonstrated the ATKS was a useful tool to use with teachers, with modifications. By using this theory and scheme it was possible to see how these teachers’ views impact what knowledge they found valuable; in so doing, provided an opportunity to see how knowledge work could be translated into education

Listening and Normative Entanglement: A Pragmatic Foundation for Conversational Ethics

People care very much about being listened to. In everyday talk, we make moral-sounding judgements of people as listeners: praising a doctor who listens well even if she does not have a ready solution, or blaming a boss who does not listen even if the employee manages to get her situation addressed. In this sense, listening is a normative behaviour: that is, we ought to be good listeners. Whilst several disciplines have addressed the normative importance of interpersonal listening—particularly in sociology, psychology, media and culture studies—analytic philosophy does not have a framework for dealing with listening as a normative interpersonal behaviour. Listening usually gets reduced mere speech-parsing (in philosophy of language), or into a matter of belief and trust in the testimony of credible knowers (in social epistemology). My preliminary task is to analyse why this reductive view is taken for granted in the discipline; to diagnose the problem behind the reduction and propose a more useful alternative approach. The central task of my work is to give an account of listening which captures its distinctively normative quality as an interpersonal way of relating to someone: one listens not because the speaker is an epistemic expert, but because the speaker is a person, worthy of recognition and care. I created a framework which accomplishes this by deploying the conceptual resources of conversation sociology and psycholinguistics, in counterpoint to the standing philosophical work on the ethics and politics of speech and silencing, to create a practical ethics of listening to people