Syndicated loans, lending relationships and the business cycle

The syndicated loan market, as a hybrid between public and private debt markets, comprises financial institutions with access to valuable private information about borrowers as a result of close bank-borrower relationships. In this paper, we seek empirical evidence for the costs of these relationships in a sample of UK syndicated loan contracts for the time period 1996 through 2005. Using detailed financial data for both borrowers (private and public companies) and for financial institutions, we find that undercapitalized banks charge higher loan spreads for loans to opaque borrowers using various measures for borrower opaqueness and controlling for bank, borrower and loan characteristics. We further analyze this hold-up effect over the business cycle and find that it only prevails during recessions. In expansion phases, however, we do not find evidence for banks exploiting their information monopoly. This finding is consistent with theories on bank reputation in bank loan commitments. Ambiguity about borrower financial health, which induces the information monopoly in the first place, also gives banks the discretion to exploit or not exploit informational captured borrowers. Our findings are both statistically and economically significant and robust to alternative bank and macroeconomic risk proxies. We address potential concerns about unobserved borrower heterogeneity exploiting the panel data nature of our sample. Using firm-bank fixed effect regressions, we find supporting evidence for our theoretical framework. JEL Classifications: G14, G21, G22, G23, G24 Keywords: Syndicated loans; Hold-up; Lending relationships; Business cycl

"Debt, Price Flexibility and Aggregate Stability"

In conventional macroeconomic thought, price flexibility stabilizes thc economy. The more quickly prices fall (or inflation decreases) in a demand-induced recession, the faster output returns to its full-employment level. An alternative tradition, however, suggests that price flexibility can be destabilizing. If a recession reduces expectations of Jitlzre prices, this can raise current real interest rates and dampen aggregate demand. In addition, as actual current prices fall in a recession, real debt burdens rise which can reduce aggregate demand due to financial distress or the response of capital markets. This paper presents simulations from a dynamic macroeconomic model designed to examine the empirical effects of price flexibility. Our results show that, for credible specifications and parameter values7 the destabilizing effects of greater price flexibility can be larger than the conventional stabilizing channels. Therefore, it is possible that greater price flexibility magnifies the severity of economic contractions initiated by negative demand shocks.

The Democratic Peace Unraveled: It’s the Economy

Recent research indicates that the democratic peace—the observation that democratic nations rarely fight each other—is spurious: that advanced capitalism accounts for both democracy and the democratic peace (Mousseau 2009). This is not a trivial prospect: if economic conditions explain the democratic peace, then a great deal of research on governing institutions and foreign policy is probably obsolete. This study addresses all the recent defenses of the democratic peace and reports new results using a new measure that directly gauges the causal mechanism of contract flows dependent on third-party enforcement. Analyses of most nations from 1961 to 2001 show contract-intensive "impersonal" economy to be the second most powerful variable in international conflict—following only contiguity—and, once considered, there is no evidence of causation from democracy to peace. It is impersonal economy, not democracy or unfettered markets, which appears to explain the democratic peace..

Domain-independent exception handling services that increase robustness in open multi-agent systems

Title from cover. "May 2000."Includes bibliographical references (p. 17-23).Mark Klein and Chrysanthos Dellarocas

Fiscal sustainability in a new Keynesian model

Recent work on optimal monetary and fiscal policy in New Keynesian models suggests that it is optimal to allow steady-state debt to follow a random walk. In this paper we consider the nature of the time inconsistency involved in such a policy and its implication for discretionary policymaking. We show that governments are tempted, given inflationary expectations, to utilize their monetary and fiscal instruments in the initial period to change the ultimate debt burden they need to service. We demonstrate that this temptation is only eliminated if following shocks, the new steady-state debt is equal to the original (efficient) debt level even though there is no explicit debt target in the government's objective function. Analytically and in a series of numerical simulations we show which instrument is used to stabilize the debt depends crucially on the degree of nominal inertia and the size of the debt stock. We also show that the welfare consequences of introducing debt are negligible for precommitment policies, but can be significant for discretionary policy. Finally, we assess the credibility of commitment policy by considering a quasi-commitment policy, which allows for different probabilities of reneging on past promises

Flexible Labor and Innovation Performance: Evidence from Longitudinal Firm-Level Data

Firms with high shares of workers on fixed-term contracts have significantly higher sales of imitative new products but perform significantly worse on sales of inno¬va¬tive new products (“first on the marketâ€). High functional flexibility in “insider-outsider†la¬bor markets enhances a firm’s new product sales, as do training efforts and highly edu¬ca¬¬ted personnel. We find weak evidence that larger and older firms have higher new pro¬duct sales than do younger and smaller firms. Our findings should be food for thought to eco-nomists making unqualified pleas for the deregulation of labor markets.J5;M5;O15;O31;OSA longitudinal dataset;SMEs;innovation performance;new product sales;numerical flexibility

Bank balance sheets and the transmission of financial shocks to borrowers: evidence from the 2007-2008 crisis

We use Italian data on bank lending to firms to study the transmission of shocks affecting bank balance sheets to the volume and cost of credit granted to business borrowers and to the probability of banks accepting loan applications from new borrowers during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The identification of the credit-supply effect is based on a difference-in-difference approach because: a large number of firms in Italy borrow from more than one bank; the shocks to the wholesale funding market were exogenous to Italian banks; and Italian banks were affected to a varying extent by the crisis depending on their funding structure. Results indicate that supply conditions worsened most for the banks that were most exposed to the interbank market and for those that made the most use of securitization. While the initial capital position of banks did not significantly affect their lending, the deterioration of bank capitalization as proxied by charge-offs and profitability had a significant impact. Furthermore, our results suggest that bank capital influenced lending indirectly, with higher capital reducing the elasticity of lending to the shocks on the funding side.bank balance sheet, transmission of shocks, credit supply, financial crisis

Easing the Pain of Adjustment? Preferential Trading Agreements, Foreign Aid, and Credible Commitment to Economic Reform

In this article, we propose that wealthy donors give foreign aid to developing countries to facilitate political adjustment, such as compensation for losers and side payments to influential elite constituencies, towards mutually profitable economic reform. Only democratic developing countries can credibly commit to using fungible revenue in ways that benefit the donor, so the adjustment effect only applies to democracies. A quantitative test against data on preferential trading agreements lends strong support to the theory. Strikingly, fully democratic developing countries that form a preferential trading agreement obtain a threefold increase in foreign aid in the short run. Additional tests show that this increase is not driven by macroeconomic difficulties and that the beneficial effect on foreign aid is temporary. Both findings are consistent with the theory. An important implication of these results is that if foreign aid facilitates economic reform through preferential trading agreements, previous research could have underestimated the benefits thereof

Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments - An experimental study

We study the effects of communication in an experimental tournament between teams. When teams, rather than individuals, compete for a prize there is a need for intra-team coordination in order to win the inter-team competition. Introducing communication in such situations may have ambiguous effects on effort choices. Communication within teams may promote higher efforts by mitigating the internal free-rider problem. Communication between competing teams may lead to collusion, thereby reducing efforts. In our experiment we control the channels of communication by letting subjects communicate through an electronic chat. We find, indeed, that communication within teams increases efforts and communication between teams reduces efforts. We use team members’ dialogues to explain these effects of communication, and check the robustness of our results