Network segregation in a model of misinformation and fact checking

Misinformation under the form of rumor, hoaxes, and conspiracy theories spreads on social media at alarming rates. One hypothesis is that, since social media are shaped by homophily, belief in misinformation may be more likely to thrive on those social circles that are segregated from the rest of the network. One possible antidote is fact checking which, in some cases, is known to stop rumors from spreading further. However, fact checking may also backfire and reinforce the belief in a hoax. Here we take into account the combination of network segregation, finite memory and attention, and fact-checking efforts. We consider a compartmental model of two interacting epidemic processes over a network that is segregated between gullible and skeptic users. Extensive simulation and mean-field analysis show that a more segregated network facilitates the spread of a hoax only at low forgetting rates, but has no effect when agents forget at faster rates. This finding may inform the development of mitigation techniques and overall inform on the risks of uncontrolled misinformation online

Hipsters on Networks: How a Small Group of Individuals Can Lead to an Anti-Establishment Majority

The spread of opinions, memes, diseases, and "alternative facts" in a population depends both on the details of the spreading process and on the structure of the social and communication networks on which they spread. In this paper, we explore how \textit{anti-establishment} nodes (e.g., \textit{hipsters}) influence the spreading dynamics of two competing products. We consider a model in which spreading follows a deterministic rule for updating node states (which describe which product has been adopted) in which an adjustable fraction $p_{\rm Hip}$ of the nodes in a network are hipsters, who choose to adopt the product that they believe is the less popular of the two. The remaining nodes are conformists, who choose which product to adopt by considering which products their immediate neighbors have adopted. We simulate our model on both synthetic and real networks, and we show that the hipsters have a major effect on the final fraction of people who adopt each product: even when only one of the two products exists at the beginning of the simulations, a very small fraction of hipsters in a network can still cause the other product to eventually become the more popular one. To account for this behavior, we construct an approximation for the steady-state adoption fraction on $k$-regular trees in the limit of few hipsters. Additionally, our simulations demonstrate that a time delay $\tau$ in the knowledge of the product distribution in a population, as compared to immediate knowledge of product adoption among nearest neighbors, can have a large effect on the final distribution of product adoptions. Our simple model and analysis may help shed light on the road to success for anti-establishment choices in elections, as such success can arise rather generically in our model from a small number of anti-establishment individuals and ordinary processes of social influence on normal individuals.Comment: Extensively revised, with much new analysis and numerics The abstract on arXiv is a shortened version of the full abstract because of space limit