A model of distributed key generation for industrial control systems

11th International Workshop on Discrete Event Systems, WODES 2012; Guadalajara, Jalisco; Mexico; 3 October 2012 through 5 October 2012The cyber-security of industrial control systems (ICS) is gaining high relevance due to the impact of industrial system failures on the citizen life. There is an urgent need for the consideration of security in their design, and for the analysis of the related vulnerabilities and potential threats. The high exposure of industrial critical infrastructure to cyber-threats is mainly due to the intrinsic weakness of the communication protocols used to control the process network. The peculiarities of the industrial protocols (low computational power, large geographical distribution, near to real-time constraints) make hard the effective use of traditional cryptographic schemes and in particular the implementation of an effective key management infrastructure supporting a cryptographic layer. In this paper, we describe a "model of distributed key generation for industrial control systems" we have recently implemented. The model is based on a known Distributed Key Generator protocol we have adapted to an industrial control system environment and to the related communication protocol (Modbus). To validate in a formal way selected security properties of the model, we introduced a Petri Nets representation. This representation allows for modeling attacks against the protocol and understanding some potential weaknesses of its implementation in the industrial control system environment

Beyond Physical Threats: Cyber-attacks on Critical Infrastructure as a Challenge of Changing Security Environment – Overview of Cyber-security legislation and implementation in SEE Countries

States, organizations and individuals are becoming targets of both individual and state-sponsored cyber-attacks, by those who recognize the impact of disrupting security systems and effect to people and governments. The energy sector is seen as one of the main targets of cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure, but transport, public sector services, telecommunications and critical (manufacturing) industries are also very vulnerable. One of most used example of cyber-attack is the Ukraine power grid attack in 2015 that left 230,000 people without power for up to 6 hours. Another most high profile example of a cyber-attack against critical infrastructure is the Stuxnet computer virus (first used on Iranian nuclear facility) which could be adapted to attack the SCADA systems (industrial control systems) used by many critical infrastructures in Europe.Wide range of critical infrastructure sectors are reliant on industrial control systems for monitoring processes and controlling physical devices (sensors, pumps, etc.) and for that reason, physical connected devices that support industrial processes are becoming more vulnerable. Not all critical infrastructure operators in all sectors are adequately prepared to manage protection (and raise resilience) effectively across both cyber and physical environments. Additionally there are few challenges in implementation of protection measures, such as lack of collaboration between private and public sector and low levels of awareness on existence of national key legislation.From supranational aspect, in relation to this papers topic, the European Union has took first step in defense to cyber threats in 2016 with „Directive on security of network and information systems“ (NIS Directive) by prescribing member states to adopt more rigid cyber-security standards. The aim of directive is to improve the deterrent and increase the EU’s defenses and reactions to cyber attacks by expanding the cyber security capacity, increasing collaboration at an EU level and introducing measures to prevent risk and handle cyber incidents. There are lot of other „supporting tools“ for Member States countries, such as European Union Agency for Network and Information Security – ENISA (which organize regular cyber security exercises at an EU level, including a large and comprehensive exercise every two years, raising preparedness of EU states); Network of National Coordination Centers and the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre; and Coordinated response to major cyber security incidents and crises (Blueprint) with aim to ensure a rapid and coordinated response to large-scale cyber attacks by setting out suitable processes within the EU.Yet, not all Member States share the same capacities for achieving the highest level of cyber-security. They need to continuously work on enhancing the capability of defense against cyber threats as increased risk to state institutions information and communication systems but also the critical infrastructure objects. In Southeast Europe there are few additional challenges – some countries even don\u27t have designated critical infrastructures (lower level of protection; lack of „clear vision“ of criticality) and critical infrastructures are only perceived through physical prism; non-EU countries are not obligated to follow requirements of European Union and its legislation, and there are interdependencies and transboundary cross-sector effects that needs to be taken in consideration. Critical infrastructure Protection (CIP) is the primary area of action, and for some of SEE countries (like the Republic of Croatia) the implementation of cyber security provisions just complements comprehensive activities which are focused on physical protection.This paper will analyze few segments of how SEE countries cope with new security challenges and on which level are they prepared for cyber-attacks and threats: 1. Which security mechanisms they use; 2. The existing legislation (Acts, Strategies, Plan of Action, etc.) related to cyber threats in correlation with strategic critical infrastructure protection documents. Analysis will have two perspectives: from EU member states and from non-EU member states point of view. Additionally, for EU member states it will be analyzed if there were any cyber security legislation before NIS directive that meets same aims. The aim of research is to have an overall picture of efforts in region regarding cyber-security as possibility for improvement thorough cooperation, organizational measures, etc. providing also some recommendations to reduce the gap in the level of cyber-security development with other regions of EU.</p

On the role of latent design conditions in cyber-physical systems security

As cyber-physical systems (CPS) become prevalent in everyday life, it is critical to understand the factors that may impact the security of such systems. In this paper, we present insights from an initial study of historical security incidents to analyse such factors for a particular class of CPS: industrial control systems (ICS). Our study challenges the usual tendency to blame human fallibility or resort to simple explanations for what are often complex issues that lead to a security incident. We highlight that (i) perception errors are key in such incidents (ii) latent design conditions -- e.g., improper specifications of a system's borders and capabilities -- play a fundamental role in shaping perceptions, leading to security issues. Such design-time considerations are particularly critical for ICS, the life-cycle of which is usually measured in decades. Based on this analysis, we discuss how key characteristics of future smart CPS in such industrial settings can pose further challenges with regards to tackling latent design flaws

Cyber Security of Critical Infrastructures

Critical infrastructures are vital assets for public safety, economic welfare, and the national security of countries. The vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures have increased with the widespread use of information technologies. As Critical National Infrastructures are becoming more vulnerable to cyber-attacks, their protection becomes a significant issue for organizations as well as nations. The risks to continued operations, from failing to upgrade aging infrastructure or not meeting mandated regulatory regimes, are considered highly significant, given the demonstrable impact of such circumstances. Due to the rapid increase of sophisticated cyber threats targeting critical infrastructures with significant destructive effects, the cybersecurity of critical infrastructures has become an agenda item for academics, practitioners, and policy makers. A holistic view which covers technical, policy, human, and behavioural aspects is essential to handle cyber security of critical infrastructures effectively. Moreover, the ability to attribute crimes to criminals is a vital element of avoiding impunity in cyberspace. In this book, both research and practical aspects of cyber security considerations in critical infrastructures are presented. Aligned with the interdisciplinary nature of cyber security, authors from academia, government, and industry have contributed 13 chapters. The issues that are discussed and analysed include cybersecurity training, maturity assessment frameworks, malware analysis techniques, ransomware attacks, security solutions for industrial control systems, and privacy preservation methods

A Review of Testbeds on SCADA Systems with Malware Analysis

Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are among the major types of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and are responsible for monitoring and controlling essential infrastructures such as power generation, water treatment, and transportation. Very common and with high added-value, these systems have malware as one of their main threats, and due to their characteristics, it is practically impossible to test the security of a system without compromising it, requiring simulated test platforms to verify their cyber resilience. This review will discuss the most recent studies on ICS testbeds with a focus on cybersecurity and malware impact analysis

Cyber Security Audit of Industrial Control Systems in Organization

Tato práce se zabývá analýzou zabezpečení řídících systémů. Zaměřuje se na audit kybernetické bezpečnosti řídících systémů organizace působící v průmyslovém odvětví. Bakalářská práce je rozdělena na část teoretickou a praktickou. V teoretické části se zaobírá popisem řídících systémů, architekturou zabezpečení, hrozbami, auditem a auditem kybernetické bezpečnosti. V praktické části pojednává o fungování organizace, na kterou je audit zaměřen, je proveden výčet zabezpečení systémů v organizaci a popsány požadavky na zdokonalení zabezpečení. Závěrečná sekce se věnuje vyhodnocení hrozeb kybernetické bezpečnosti a návrhem zabezpečení proti nejčastějším hrozbám.This thesis deals with analysis of the security of Industrial Control Systems. It is focused on auditing cyber security of Industrial Control System inside organisation which operates in industrial production. Bachelor’s thesis is divided into two parts, theoretical and practical parts. The theoretical part focuses on description of Industrial Control Systems, architecture of security, threats, audit, and cyber security audit. Practical part of the bachelor’s thesis describes functioning of the company, list of security measures existing in the organisation is composed and requirements for improving of cybersecurity are set. Final section focuses on evaluation of threats and design of security measures against the most common threats.155 - Katedra aplikované informatikyvýborn

The industrial internet of things (IIoT) : an analysis framework

Historically, Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS) were largely isolated from conventional digital networks such as enterprise ICT environments. Where connectivity was required, a zoned architecture was adopted, with firewalls and/or demilitarized zones used to protect the core control system components. The adoption and deployment of ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT) technologies is leading to architectural changes to IACS, including greater connectivity to industrial systems. This paper reviews what is meant by Industrial IoT (IIoT) and relationships to concepts such as cyber-physical systems and Industry 4.0. The paper develops a definition of IIoT and analyses related partial IoT taxonomies. It develops an analysis framework for IIoT that can be used to enumerate and characterise IIoT devices when studying system architectures and analysing security threats and vulnerabilities. The paper concludes by identifying some gaps in the literature