151,111 research outputs found
An Authentication Protocol for Future Sensor Networks
Authentication is one of the essential security services in Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSNs) for ensuring secure data sessions. Sensor node authentication
ensures the confidentiality and validity of data collected by the sensor node,
whereas user authentication guarantees that only legitimate users can access
the sensor data. In a mobile WSN, sensor and user nodes move across the network
and exchange data with multiple nodes, thus experiencing the authentication
process multiple times. The integration of WSNs with Internet of Things (IoT)
brings forth a new kind of WSN architecture along with stricter security
requirements; for instance, a sensor node or a user node may need to establish
multiple concurrent secure data sessions. With concurrent data sessions, the
frequency of the re-authentication process increases in proportion to the
number of concurrent connections, which makes the security issue even more
challenging. The currently available authentication protocols were designed for
the autonomous WSN and do not account for the above requirements. In this
paper, we present a novel, lightweight and efficient key exchange and
authentication protocol suite called the Secure Mobile Sensor Network (SMSN)
Authentication Protocol. In the SMSN a mobile node goes through an initial
authentication procedure and receives a re-authentication ticket from the base
station. Later a mobile node can use this re-authentication ticket when
establishing multiple data exchange sessions and/or when moving across the
network. This scheme reduces the communication and computational complexity of
the authentication process. We proved the strength of our protocol with
rigorous security analysis and simulated the SMSN and previously proposed
schemes in an automated protocol verifier tool. Finally, we compared the
computational complexity and communication cost against well-known
authentication protocols.Comment: This article is accepted for the publication in "Sensors" journal. 29
pages, 15 figure
A Formal Analysis of 5G Authentication
Mobile communication networks connect much of the world's population. The
security of users' calls, SMSs, and mobile data depends on the guarantees
provided by the Authenticated Key Exchange protocols used. For the
next-generation network (5G), the 3GPP group has standardized the 5G AKA
protocol for this purpose. We provide the first comprehensive formal model of a
protocol from the AKA family: 5G AKA. We also extract precise requirements from
the 3GPP standards defining 5G and we identify missing security goals. Using
the security protocol verification tool Tamarin, we conduct a full, systematic,
security evaluation of the model with respect to the 5G security goals. Our
automated analysis identifies the minimal security assumptions required for
each security goal and we find that some critical security goals are not met,
except under additional assumptions missing from the standard. Finally, we make
explicit recommendations with provably secure fixes for the attacks and
weaknesses we found.Comment: Categories (ACM class 2012): Security and privacy - Formal methods
and theory of security -- Security requirements -- Formal security models --
Logic and verification; Network protocols - Protocol correctness -- Formal
specifications; Security and privacy - Network security -- Mobile and
wireless security - Security services -- Privacy-preserving protocol
Patrol Detection for Replica Attacks on Wireless Sensor Networks
Replica attack is a critical concern in the security of wireless sensor networks. We employ mobile nodes as patrollers to detect replicas distributed in different zones in a network, in which a basic patrol detection protocol and two detection algorithms for stationary and mobile modes are presented. Then we perform security analysis to discuss the defense strategies against the possible attacks on the proposed detection protocol. Moreover, we show the advantages of the proposed protocol by discussing and comparing the communication cost and detection probability with some existing methods
Detailed specifications of a security architecture for OLSR
In Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs), mobile nodes use wireless devices to create spontaneously a larger network, larger than the one hop radio range, in which communication with each other is made possible by the means of routing. The goal of this document is the study of security issue related to integrity of an ad hoc network. We only consider ad hoc networks using the OLSR routing protocol. In a previous research report we have carried out a theoretical analysis of this issue. In this document we aim at precising a detailed security using the OLSR routing protocol. We also validate this This security architecture at the CELAR
Quantifying pervasive authentication: the case of the Hancke-Kuhn protocol
As mobile devices pervade physical space, the familiar authentication
patterns are becoming insufficient: besides entity authentication, many
applications require, e.g., location authentication. Many interesting protocols
have been proposed and implemented to provide such strengthened forms of
authentication, but there are very few proofs that such protocols satisfy the
required security properties. The logical formalisms, devised for reasoning
about security protocols on standard computer networks, turn out to be
difficult to adapt for reasoning about hybrid protocols, used in pervasive and
heterogenous networks.
We refine the Dolev-Yao-style algebraic method for protocol analysis by a
probabilistic model of guessing, needed to analyze protocols that mix weak
cryptography with physical properties of nonstandard communication channels.
Applying this model, we provide a precise security proof for a proximity
authentication protocol, due to Hancke and Kuhn, that uses a subtle form of
probabilistic reasoning to achieve its goals.Comment: 31 pages, 2 figures; short version of this paper appeared in the
Proceedings of MFPS 201
Security Analysis of the Consumer Remote SIM Provisioning Protocol
Remote SIM provisioning (RSP) for consumer devices is the protocol specified
by the GSM Association for downloading SIM profiles into a secure element in a
mobile device. The process is commonly known as eSIM, and it is expected to
replace removable SIM cards. The security of the protocol is critical because
the profile includes the credentials with which the mobile device will
authenticate to the mobile network. In this paper, we present a formal security
analysis of the consumer RSP protocol. We model the multi-party protocol in
applied pi calculus, define formal security goals, and verify them in ProVerif.
The analysis shows that the consumer RSP protocol protects against a network
adversary when all the intended participants are honest. However, we also model
the protocol in realistic partial compromise scenarios where the adversary
controls a legitimate participant or communication channel. The security
failures in the partial compromise scenarios reveal weaknesses in the protocol
design. The most important observation is that the security of RSP depends
unnecessarily on it being encapsulated in a TLS tunnel. Also, the lack of
pre-established identifiers means that a compromised download server anywhere
in the world or a compromised secure element can be used for attacks against
RSP between honest participants. Additionally, the lack of reliable methods for
verifying user intent can lead to serious security failures. Based on the
findings, we recommend practical improvements to RSP implementations, to future
versions of the specification, and to mobile operator processes to increase the
robustness of eSIM security.Comment: 33 pages, 8 figures, Associated ProVerif model files located at
https://github.com/peltona/rsp_mode
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BVPSMS: A Batch Verification Protocol for End-to-End Secure SMS for Mobile Users
Short Message Service (SMS) is a widely used communication medium for mobile applications, such as banking, social networking, and e-commerce. Applications of SMS services also include real-time broadcasting messages, such as notification of natural disasters and terrorist attacks, and sharing the current whereabouts to other users, such as notifying urgent business meeting information, transmitting quick information in the battlefield to multiple users, notifying current location to our friends, and sharing market information. However, traditional SMS is not designed with security in mind (e.g. messages are not securely sent). In this paper, we introduce a batch verification Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol, BVPSMS, which provides end-to-end message security over an insecure communication channel between different Mobile Subscribers (MSs). Specifically, the proposed protocol securely transmits SMS from one MS to multiple MS simultaneously. We then evaluate the performance of the BVPSMS protocol in terms of communication and computation overheads, protocol execution time, and batch and re-batch verification times. The impacts of the user mobility, and the time, space, and cost complexity analysis are also discussed. We present a formal proof of the proposed protocol. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first provably-secure batch verification AKA protocol, which provides end-to-end security to the SMS using symmetric keys
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