8,997 research outputs found
An Optimal Game Theoretical Framework for Mobility Aware Routing in Mobile Ad hoc Networks
Selfish behaviors are common in self-organized Mobile Ad hoc Networks
(MANETs) where nodes belong to different authorities. Since cooperation of
nodes is essential for routing protocols, various methods have been proposed to
stimulate cooperation among selfish nodes. In order to provide sufficient
incentives, most of these methods pay nodes a premium over their actual costs
of participation. However, they lead to considerably large overpayments.
Moreover, existing methods ignore mobility of nodes, for simplicity. However,
owing to the mobile nature of MANETs, this assumption seems unrealistic. In
this paper, we propose an optimal game theoretical framework to ensure the
proper cooperation in mobility aware routing for MANETs. The proposed method is
based on the multi-dimensional optimal auctions which allows us to consider
path durations, in addition to the route costs. Path duration is a metric that
best reflects changes in topology caused by mobility of nodes and, it is widely
used in mobility aware routing protocols. Furthermore, the proposed mechanism
is optimal in that it minimizes the total expected payments. We provide
theoretical analysis to support our claims. In addition, simulation results
show significant improvements in terms of payments compared to the most popular
existing methods
Stability of Service under Time-of-Use Pricing
We consider "time-of-use" pricing as a technique for matching supply and
demand of temporal resources with the goal of maximizing social welfare.
Relevant examples include energy, computing resources on a cloud computing
platform, and charging stations for electric vehicles, among many others. A
client/job in this setting has a window of time during which he needs service,
and a particular value for obtaining it. We assume a stochastic model for
demand, where each job materializes with some probability via an independent
Bernoulli trial. Given a per-time-unit pricing of resources, any realized job
will first try to get served by the cheapest available resource in its window
and, failing that, will try to find service at the next cheapest available
resource, and so on. Thus, the natural stochastic fluctuations in demand have
the potential to lead to cascading overload events. Our main result shows that
setting prices so as to optimally handle the {\em expected} demand works well:
with high probability, when the actual demand is instantiated, the system is
stable and the expected value of the jobs served is very close to that of the
optimal offline algorithm.Comment: To appear in STOC'1
Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey
A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for
players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to
static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one
period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for multiple periods;
and thus the players become aware of other players' past behaviors and their
future benefits, and will adapt their behavior accordingly. In wireless
networks, conflicts among wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors,
resulting in poor network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In
this paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different wireless
networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of repeated games to
encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby improving network performances
and avoiding network disruption due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various
problems in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models together
with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this survey. Finally, we
outline some open issues and future research directions.Comment: 32 pages, 15 figures, 5 tables, 168 reference
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