Evolutionary Robotics: a new scientific tool for studying cognition

We survey developments in Artificial Neural Networks, in Behaviour-based Robotics and Evolutionary Algorithms that set the stage for Evolutionary Robotics in the 1990s. We examine the motivations for using ER as a scientific tool for studying minimal models of cognition, with the advantage of being capable of generating integrated sensorimotor systems with minimal (or controllable) prejudices. These systems must act as a whole in close coupling with their environments which is an essential aspect of real cognition that is often either bypassed or modelled poorly in other disciplines. We demonstrate with three example studies: homeostasis under visual inversion; the origins of learning; and the ontogenetic acquisition of entrainment

Ultrastable neuroendocrine robot controller

The work of a simulated neuroendocrine controller with ultrastable neurons and glands is sketched and tested in terms of stability and adaptability. The artificial neurons connect to each other and to motors, while hormones produced by behaviour-related glands regulate their output. The ultrastable nature of the cells allows them to maintain their homeostasis by random reconfiguration of their connections and parameters without reference to the global goal of the system. Interactions of these ultrastable components cause individual robot behaviours to emerge to certain extents. The pre- sented results show that the controller as a whole is capable of not only configuring itself to perform random walk, obstacle avoidance, mineral collection and recharging, but also to stay robust or adapt to a number of environmental and body perturbations without a need for a body model

Learning to perceive in the sensor motor approach: Piaget's theory of equilibration interpreted dynamically

Learning to perceive is faced with a classical paradox: if understanding is required for perception, how can we learn to perceive something new, something we do not yet understand? According to the sensorimotor approach, perception involves mastery of regular sensorimotor co-variations that depend on the agent and the environment, also known as the "laws" of sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs). In this sense, perception involves enacting relevant sensorimotor skills in each situation. It is important for this proposal that such skills can be learned and refined with experience and yet up to this date, the sensorimotor approach has had no explicit theory of perceptual learning. The situation is made more complex if we acknowledge the open-ended nature of human learning. In this paper we propose Piaget's theory of equilibration as a potential candidate to fulfill this role. This theory highlights the importance of intrinsic sensorimotor norms, in terms of the closure of sensorimotor schemes. It also explains how the equilibration of a sensorimotor organization faced with novelty or breakdowns proceeds by re-shaping pre-existing structures in coupling with dynamical regularities of the world. This way learning to perceive is guided by the equilibration of emerging forms of skillful coping with the world. We demonstrate the compatibility between Piaget's theory and the sensorimotor approach by providing a dynamical formalization of equilibration to give an explicit micro-genetic account of sensorimotor learning and, by extension, of how we learn to perceive. This allows us to draw important lessons in the form of general principles for open-ended sensorimotor learning, including the need for an intrinsic normative evaluation by the agent itself. We also explore implications of our micro-genetic account at the personal level.Thanks to Leonardo Bich, Marieke Rohde, and John Stewart useful comments on earlier versions of this article, This work is funded by the eSMCs: Extending Sensorimotor Contingencies to Cognition project, FP7-ICT-2009-6 no: 270212. Thanks also to IAS-Research group funding IT590-13 from the Basque Government

Behavior control in the sensorimotor loop with short-term synaptic dynamics induced by self-regulating neurons

The behavior and skills of living systems depend on the distributed control provided by specialized and highly recurrent neural networks. Learning and memory in these systems is mediated by a set of adaptation mechanisms, known collectively as neuronal plasticity. Translating principles of recurrent neural control and plasticity to artificial agents has seen major strides, but is usually hampered by the complex interactions between the agent's body and its environment. One of the important standing issues is for the agent to support multiple stable states of behavior, so that its behavioral repertoire matches the requirements imposed by these interactions. The agent also must have the capacity to switch between these states in time scales that are comparable to those by which sensory stimulation varies. Achieving this requires a mechanism of short-term memory that allows the neurocontroller to keep track of the recent history of its input, which finds its biological counterpart in short-term synaptic plasticity. This issue is approached here by deriving synaptic dynamics in recurrent neural networks. Neurons are introduced as self-regulating units with a rich repertoire of dynamics. They exhibit homeostatic properties for certain parameter domains, which result in a set of stable states and the required short-term memory. They can also operate as oscillators, which allow them to surpass the level of activity imposed by their homeostatic operation conditions. Neural systems endowed with the derived synaptic dynamics can be utilized for the neural behavior control of autonomous mobile agents. The resulting behavior depends also on the underlying network structure, which is either engineered or developed by evolutionary techniques. The effectiveness of these self-regulating units is demonstrated by controlling locomotion of a hexapod with 18 degrees of freedom, and obstacle-avoidance of a wheel-driven robot. © 2014 Toutounji and Pasemann

Interaction dynamics and autonomy in cognitive systems

The concept of autonomy is of crucial importance for understanding life and cognition. Whereas cellular and organismic autonomy is based in the self-production of the material infrastructure sustaining the existence of living beings as such, we are interested in how biological autonomy can be expanded into forms of autonomous agency, where autonomy as a form of organization is extended into the behaviour of an agent in interaction with its environment (and not its material self-production). In this thesis, we focus on the development of operational models of sensorimotor agency, exploring the construction of a domain of interactions creating a dynamical interface between agent and environment. We present two main contributions to the study of autonomous agency: First, we contribute to the development of a modelling route for testing, comparing and validating hypotheses about neurocognitive autonomy. Through the design and analysis of specific neurodynamical models embedded in robotic agents, we explore how an agent is constituted in a sensorimotor space as an autonomous entity able to adaptively sustain its own organization. Using two simulation models and different dynamical analysis and measurement of complex patterns in their behaviour, we are able to tackle some theoretical obstacles preventing the understanding of sensorimotor autonomy, and to generate new predictions about the nature of autonomous agency in the neurocognitive domain. Second, we explore the extension of sensorimotor forms of autonomy into the social realm. We analyse two cases from an experimental perspective: the constitution of a collective subject in a sensorimotor social interactive task, and the emergence of an autonomous social identity in a large-scale technologically-mediated social system. Through the analysis of coordination mechanisms and emergent complex patterns, we are able to gather experimental evidence indicating that in some cases social autonomy might emerge based on mechanisms of coordinated sensorimotor activity and interaction, constituting forms of collective autonomous agency

The Past, Present, and Future of Artificial Life

For millennia people have wondered what makes the living different from the non-living. Beginning in the mid-1980s, artificial life has studied living systems using a synthetic approach: build life in order to understand it better, be it by means of software, hardware, or wetware. This review provides a summary of the advances that led to the development of artificial life, its current research topics, and open problems and opportunities. We classify artificial life research into fourteen themes: origins of life, autonomy, self-organization, adaptation (including evolution, development, and learning), ecology, artificial societies, behavior, computational biology, artificial chemistries, information, living technology, art, and philosophy. Being interdisciplinary, artificial life seems to be losing its boundaries and merging with other fields

Cognition Without Neural Representation: Dynamics of a Complex System

This paper proposes an account of neurocognitive activity without leveraging the notion of neural representation. Neural representation is a concept that results from assuming that the properties of the models used in computational cognitive neuroscience (e.g., information, representation, etc.) must literally exist the system being modelled (e.g., the brain). Computational models are important tools to test a theory about how the collected data (e.g., behavioural or neuroimaging) has been generated. While the usefulness of computational models is unquestionable, it does not follow that neurocognitive activity should literally entail the properties construed in the model (e.g., information, representation). While this is an assumption present in computationalist accounts, it is not held across the board in neuroscience. In the last section, the paper offers a dynamical account of neurocognitive activity with Dynamical Causal Modelling (DCM) that combines dynamical systems theory (DST) mathematical formalisms with the theoretical contextualisation provided by Embodied and Enactive Cognitive Science (EECS).Peer Reviewe

First principles in the life sciences: The free-energy principle, organicism, and mechanism

The free-energy principle claims that biological systems behave adaptively maintaining their physical integrity only if they minimize the free energy of their sensory states. Originally proposed to account for perception, learning, and action, the free-energy principle has been applied to the evolution, development, morphology, and function of the brain, and has been called a “postulate,” a “mandatory principle,” and an “imperative.” While it might afford a theoretical foundation for understanding the complex relationship between physical environment, life, and mind, its epistemic status and scope are unclear. Also unclear is how the free-energy principle relates to prominent theoretical approaches to life science phenomena, such as organicism and mechanicism. This paper clarifies both issues, and identifies limits and prospects for the free-energy principle as a first principle in the life sciences

Adaptive networks for robotics and the emergence of reward anticipatory circuits

Currently the central challenge facing evolutionary robotics is to determine how best to extend the range and complexity of behaviour supported by evolved neural systems. Implicit in the work described in this thesis is the idea that this might best be achieved through devising neural circuits (tractable to evolutionary exploration) that exhibit complementary functional characteristics. We concentrate on two problem domains; locomotion and sequence learning. For locomotion we compare the use of GasNets and other adaptive networks. For sequence learning we introduce a novel connectionist model inspired by the role of dopamine in the basal ganglia (commonly interpreted as a form of reinforcement learning). This connectionist approach relies upon a new neuron model inspired by notions of energy efficient signalling. Two reward adaptive circuit variants were investigated. These were applied respectively to two learning problems; where action sequences are required to take place in a strict order, and secondly, where action sequences are robust to intermediate arbitrary states. We conclude the thesis by proposing a formal model of functional integration, encompassing locomotion and sequence learning, extending ideas proposed by W. Ross Ashby. A general model of the adaptive replicator is presented, incoporating subsystems that are tuned to continuous variation and discrete or conditional events. Comparisons are made with Ross W. Ashby's model of ultrastability and his ideas on adaptive behaviour. This model is intended to support our assertion that, GasNets (and similar networks) and reward adaptive circuits of the type presented here, are intrinsically complementary. In conclusion we present some ideas on how the co-evolution of GasNet and reward adaptive circuits might lead us to significant improvements in the synthesis of agents capable of exhibiting complex adaptive behaviour

Towards new concepts for a biological neuroscience of consciousness

In the search for a sound model of consciousness, we aim at introducing new concepts: closure, compositionality, biobranes and autobranes. This is important to overcome reductionism and to bring life back into the neuroscience of consciousness. Using these definitions, we conjecture that consciousness co-arises with the non-trivial composition of biological closure in the form of biobranes and autobranes: conscious processes generate closed activity at various levels and are, in turn, themselves, supported by biobranes and autobranes. This approach leads to a non-reductionist biological and simultaneously phenomenological theory of conscious experience, giving new perspectives for a science of consciousness. Future works will implement experimental definitions and computational simulations to characterize these dynamical biobranes interacting