Analysis and design of a capsule landing system and surface vehicle control system for Mars exploration

Problems related to the design and control of a mobile planetary vehicle to implement a systematic plan for the exploration of Mars are reported. Problem areas include: vehicle configuration, control, dynamics, systems and propulsion; systems analysis, terrain modeling and path selection; and chemical analysis of specimens. These tasks are summarized: vehicle model design, mathematical model of vehicle dynamics, experimental vehicle dynamics, obstacle negotiation, electrochemical controls, remote control, collapsibility and deployment, construction of a wheel tester, wheel analysis, payload design, system design optimization, effect of design assumptions, accessory optimal design, on-board computer subsystem, laser range measurement, discrete obstacle detection, obstacle detection systems, terrain modeling, path selection system simulation and evaluation, gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer system concepts, and chromatograph model evaluation and improvement

Self-Enforcing Climate Change Treaties: A Generalized Differential Game Approach with Applications

Based on recent proposals on non cooperative dynamic games for analysing climate negotiation outcomes, such as Dutta and Radner (2004, 2006a), we generalize a specific framework for modelling differential games of this type and describe the set of conditions for the existence of closed loop dynamics and its relation to adaptive evolutionary dynamics. We then show that the Dutta and Radner (2004, 2006a) discrete time dynamic setup is a specific case of that generalization and describe the dynamics both analytically and numerically for closed loop feedback and perfect state patterns. Our discussion is completed with the introduction of a cooperative differential framework for welfare analysis purposes, within our non cooperative proposal for climate negotiations.Differential Game Theory, Environmental Economics, Evolutionary Dynamics, Climate Change Treaties

The Bail-Out! Positive Political Economics of Greek-type Crises in the EMU

The Greek bail-out was highly controversial. An oft-heard assessment is that i) the bail-out was a mistake, ii) the political haggling over it was irrational and iii) the bail-out will create a moral hazard problem. Contrary to this view, our analysis suggests that, given EMU’s present political-economic set-up, i) the bail-out was unavoidable, ii) the lengthy process of political haggling leading to it was understandable, and iii) the bail-out does not have to be necessarily associated with a future moral hazard problem. Based on our analysis, we suggest that the EMU’s institutional design could be improved by establishing ‘exit rules’ and that bail-outs should be made rule-based. We have based our analysis on a political-economic, game-theoretic model that helps to understand why and how the parties involved in the Greek crisis arrived at the bail-out and on what conditions the final solution depended. The model allows tracing analytically the dynamics of the negotiation processes as well as the conditions and parameters on which the scope and limits of fiscal redistribution in EMU depends. In doing so, we formally take account of the ‘negative externality’ problem that has been central to policy debates related to the EMU’s institutional design and has played an important role in the Greek crisis. However, contrary to the existing literature, we do not only focus on the economic aspects of such negative externality, but also look at where they emanate from and interact with political factors, in particular the dynamics of the political negotiation process within the EMU.Greek crisis, bail-out, negative externality, political economics, game theory, euro, EMU

Lawyer\u27s Skills in Negotiations: Justice in Unseen Hands

The purpose of this article is to identify and explore the processes and dynamics of lawyer negotiation at the skill level. Part I, Operational Skills in Preparation for Negotiation, examines processes and subprocesses of negotiation to develop a background for understanding the potential areas of lawyer skill involved in the operation of negotiation in Section A. Section B explores the preparation skills involved including the analysis and development of a negotiation theory of the case which requires an understanding of the substance of the negotiation, norms, precedent and power combined with fact management and effective characterization of the facts of the case. Section C examines the comparative values of negotiation as an alternative dispute resolution process prefatory to a discussion of skilled lawyer-client decision making, collaboration and counseling in Section D. Part II examines operational skills in a negotiation including communication skills in persuasion and reasoned arguments in Section A. Section B examines skilled use of language for learning, the exchange of information, concessions and questioning in negotiation. Management of the psychology of negotiation is assayed in Section C and Section D examines the issues in the ethics of negotiation. Section E looks at drafting and other skills in the process of closure of the agreement

Consensus problems in networks of agents with switching topology and time-delays

In this paper, we discuss consensus problems for networks of dynamic agents with fixed and switching topologies. We analyze three cases: 1) directed networks with fixed topology; 2) directed networks with switching topology; and 3) undirected networks with communication time-delays and fixed topology. We introduce two consensus protocols for networks with and without time-delays and provide a convergence analysis in all three cases. We establish a direct connection between the algebraic connectivity (or Fiedler eigenvalue) of the network and the performance (or negotiation speed) of a linear consensus protocol. This required the generalization of the notion of algebraic connectivity of undirected graphs to digraphs. It turns out that balanced digraphs play a key role in addressing average-consensus problems. We introduce disagreement functions for convergence analysis of consensus protocols. A disagreement function is a Lyapunov function for the disagreement network dynamics. We proposed a simple disagreement function that is a common Lyapunov function for the disagreement dynamics of a directed network with switching topology. A distinctive feature of this work is to address consensus problems for networks with directed information flow. We provide analytical tools that rely on algebraic graph theory, matrix theory, and control theory. Simulations are provided that demonstrate the effectiveness of our theoretical results

Building theory on the negotiation capability of the firm: evidence from Ryanair

Purpose: In an attempt to build upon existing theory, this paper investigates the potentially reciprocal relationship between negotiation and strategy, and strives to contribute towards a better understanding of the ways in which organizations negotiate. Design/methodology/approach: Built upon the integration of two different bodies of literature, negotiation and strategy, and on the analysis of the case of Ryanair, this paper argues for an integrated approach to negotiation and organizational capabilities. Findings: The case study allows for a clearer understanding of how negotiation capability can play a significant role in supporting the creation and sustainment of competitive advantage, even under unfavorable industry settings. Originality/value: The paper contributes to theoretical development by offering new and insightful explanations of firms’ behavior, moving beyond the classic interpretation of industry dynamics, such as bargaining power. This study has implications for both practice and research, as it offers a better and more holistic understanding of the strategy making process and the foundations of its success

Clash of Cultures: Epistemic Communities, Negotiation Theory, and International Lawmaking

This Article seeks to illuminate a number of truths about the current deliberations at UNCITRAL by applying the concept of epistemic communities to the UNCITRAL negotiation process. This analysis will help various participants, including state delegates, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), appreciate the dynamics at issue in the treaty deliberations and thereby improve negotiation techniques and outcomes.\u27 In particular, this Article considers how disparities between different epistemic communities involved in the UNCITRAL process could affect the shape and future of the proposed convention and whether the clash of cultures could prove fatal to the development of a new international instrument in this area of law

Diplomacy's Value

What is the value of diplomacy? How does it affect the course of foreign affairs independent of the distribution of power and foreign policy interests? Theories of international relations too often implicitly reduce the dynamics and outcomes of diplomacy to structural factors rather than the subtle qualities of negotiation. If diplomacy is an independent effect on the conduct of world politics, it has to add value, and we have to be able to show what that value is. In Diplomacy’s Value, Brian C. Rathbun sets forth a comprehensive theory of diplomacy, based on his understanding that political leaders have distinct diplomatic styles: coercive bargaining, reasoned dialogue, and pragmatic statecraft. Drawing on work in the psychology of negotiation, Rathbun explains how diplomatic styles are a function of the psychological attributes of leaders and the party coalitions they represent. The combination of these styles creates a certain spirit of negotiation that facilitates or obstructs agreement. Rathbun applies the argument to relations among France, Germany, and Great Britain during the 1920s as well as Palestinian–Israeli negotiations since the 1990s. His analysis, based on an intensive analysis of primary documents, shows how different diplomatic styles can successfully resolve apparently intractable dilemmas and equally, how they can thwart agreements that were seemingly within reach.What is the value of diplomacy? How does it affect the course of foreign affairs independent of the distribution of power and foreign policy interests? Theories of international relations too often implicitly reduce the dynamics and outcomes of diplomacy to structural factors rather than the subtle qualities of negotiation. If diplomacy is an independent effect on the conduct of world politics, it has to add value, and we have to be able to show what that value is. In Diplomacy's Value, Brian C. Rathbun sets forth a comprehensive theory of diplomacy, based on his understanding that political leaders have distinct diplomatic styles—coercive bargaining, reasoned dialogue, and pragmatic statecraft.Drawing on work in the psychology of negotiation, Rathbun explains how diplomatic styles are a function of the psychological attributes of leaders and the party coalitions they represent. The combination of these styles creates a certain spirit of negotiation that facilitates or obstructs agreement. Rathbun applies the argument to relations among France, Germany, and Great Britain during the 1920s as well as Palestinian-Israeli negotiations since the 1990s. His analysis, based on an intensive analysis of primary documents, shows how different diplomatic styles can successfully resolve apparently intractable dilemmas and equally, how they can thwart agreements that were seemingly within reach

Multi-agent Q-Learning of Channel Selection in Multi-user Cognitive Radio Systems: A Two by Two Case

Resource allocation is an important issue in cognitive radio systems. It can be done by carrying out negotiation among secondary users. However, significant overhead may be incurred by the negotiation since the negotiation needs to be done frequently due to the rapid change of primary users' activity. In this paper, a channel selection scheme without negotiation is considered for multi-user and multi-channel cognitive radio systems. To avoid collision incurred by non-coordination, each user secondary learns how to select channels according to its experience. Multi-agent reinforcement leaning (MARL) is applied in the framework of Q-learning by considering the opponent secondary users as a part of the environment. The dynamics of the Q-learning are illustrated using Metrick-Polak plot. A rigorous proof of the convergence of Q-learning is provided via the similarity between the Q-learning and Robinson-Monro algorithm, as well as the analysis of convergence of the corresponding ordinary differential equation (via Lyapunov function). Examples are illustrated and the performance of learning is evaluated by numerical simulations.Comment: submitted to 2009 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics; the results of general n by m case will be published soo