1,036 research outputs found
Learning from past bids to participate strategically in day-ahead electricity markets
We consider the process of bidding by electricity suppliers in a day-ahead market context, where each supplier bids a linear non-decreasing function of her generating capacity with the goal of maximizing her individual profit given other competing suppliers' bids. Based on the submitted bids, the market operator schedules suppliers to meet demand during each hour and determines hourly market clearing prices. Eventually, this game-theoretic process reaches a Nash equilibrium when no supplier is motivated to modify her bid. However, solving the individual profit maximization problem requires information of rivals' bids, which are typically not available. To address this issue, we develop an inverse optimization approach for estimating rivals' production cost functions given historical market clearing prices and production levels. We then use these functions to bid strategically and compute Nash equilibrium bids. We present numerical experiments illustrating our methodology, showing good agreement between bids based on the estimated production cost functions with the bids based on the true cost functions. We discuss an extension of our approach that takes into account network congestion resulting in location-dependent pricesFirst author draf
Learning from Past Bids to Participate Strategically in Day-Ahead Electricity Markets
We consider the process of bidding by electricity suppliers in a day-ahead
market context where each supplier bids a linear non-decreasing function of her
generating capacity with the goal of maximizing her individual profit given
other competing suppliers' bids. Based on the submitted bids, the market
operator schedules suppliers to meet demand during each hour and determines
hourly market clearing prices. Eventually, this game-theoretic process reaches
a Nash equilibrium when no supplier is motivated to modify her bid. However,
solving the individual profit maximization problem requires information of
rivals' bids, which are typically not available. To address this issue, we
develop an inverse optimization approach for estimating rivals' production cost
functions given historical market clearing prices and production levels. We
then use these functions to bid strategically and compute Nash equilibrium
bids. We present numerical experiments illustrating our methodology, showing
good agreement between bids based on the estimated production cost functions
with the bids based on the true cost functions. We discuss an extension of our
approach that takes into account network congestion resulting in
location-dependent prices
Cross-layer optimization in TCP/IP networks
TCP-AQM can be interpreted as distributed primal-dual algorithms to maximize aggregate utility over source rates. We show that an equilibrium of TCP/IP, if exists, maximizes aggregate utility over both source rates and routes, provided congestion prices are used as link costs. An equilibrium exists if and only if this utility maximization problem and its Lagrangian dual have no duality gap. In this case, TCP/IP incurs no penalty in not splitting traffic across multiple paths. Such an equilibrium, however, can be unstable. It can be stabilized by adding a static component to link cost, but at the expense of a reduced utility in equilibrium. If link capacities are optimally provisioned, however, pure static routing, which is necessarily stable, is sufficient to maximize utility. Moreover single-path routing again achieves the same utility as multipath routing at optimality
Dynamic Service Rate Control for a Single Server Queue with Markov Modulated Arrivals
We consider the problem of service rate control of a single server queueing
system with a finite-state Markov-modulated Poisson arrival process. We show
that the optimal service rate is non-decreasing in the number of customers in
the system; higher congestion rates warrant higher service rates. On the
contrary, however, we show that the optimal service rate is not necessarily
monotone in the current arrival rate. If the modulating process satisfies a
stochastic monotonicity property the monotonicity is recovered. We examine
several heuristics and show where heuristics are reasonable substitutes for the
optimal control. None of the heuristics perform well in all the regimes.
Secondly, we discuss when the Markov-modulated Poisson process with service
rate control can act as a heuristic itself to approximate the control of a
system with a periodic non-homogeneous Poisson arrival process. Not only is the
current model of interest in the control of Internet or mobile networks with
bursty traffic, but it is also useful in providing a tractable alternative for
the control of service centers with non-stationary arrival rates.Comment: 32 Pages, 7 Figure
Controlled Matching Game for Resource Allocation and User Association in WLANs
In multi-rate IEEE 802.11 WLANs, the traditional user association based on
the strongest received signal and the well known anomaly of the MAC protocol
can lead to overloaded Access Points (APs), and poor or heterogeneous
performance. Our goal is to propose an alternative game-theoretic approach for
association. We model the joint resource allocation and user association as a
matching game with complementarities and peer effects consisting of selfish
players solely interested in their individual throughputs. Using recent
game-theoretic results we first show that various resource sharing protocols
actually fall in the scope of the set of stability-inducing resource allocation
schemes. The game makes an extensive use of the Nash bargaining and some of its
related properties that allow to control the incentives of the players. We show
that the proposed mechanism can greatly improve the efficiency of 802.11 with
heterogeneous nodes and reduce the negative impact of peer effects such as its
MAC anomaly. The mechanism can be implemented as a virtual connectivity
management layer to achieve efficient APs-user associations without
modification of the MAC layer
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