A Blockchain-Based Mutual Authentication Method to Secure the Electric Vehicles’ TPMS

Despite the widespread use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) and wireless connectivity such as Near Field Communication (NFC) in electric vehicles, their security and privacy implications in Ad-Hoc networks have not been well explored. This paper provides a data protection assessment of radio frequency electronic system in the Tire Pressure Monitoring System (TPMS). It is demonstrated that eavesdropping is completely feasible from a passing car, at an approximate distance up to 50 meters. Furthermore, our reverse analysis shows that the static n -bit signatures and messaging can be eavesdropped from a relatively far distance, raising privacy concerns as a vehicles' movements can be tracked by using the unique IDs of tire pressure sensors. Unfortunately, current protocols do not use authentication, and automobile technologies hardly follow routine message confirmation so sensor messages may be spoofed remotely. To improve the security of TPMS, we suggest a novel ultra-lightweight mutual authentication for the TPMS registry process in the automotive network. Our experimental results confirm the effectiveness and security of the proposed method in TPMS.©2023 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.fi=vertaisarvioitu|en=peerReviewed

Survey: An overview of lightweight RFID authentication protocols suitable for the maritime internet of things

The maritime sector employs the Internet of Things (IoT) to exploit many of its benefits to maintain a competitive advantage and keep up with the growing demands of the global economy. The maritime IoT (MIoT) not only inherits similar security threats as the general IoT, it also faces cyber threats that do not exist in the traditional IoT due to factors such as the support for long-distance communication and low-bandwidth connectivity. Therefore, the MIoT presents a significant concern for the sustainability and security of the maritime industry, as a successful cyber attack can be detrimental to national security and have a flow-on effect on the global economy. A common component of maritime IoT systems is Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology. It has been revealed in previous studies that current RFID authentication protocols are insecure against a number of attacks. This paper provides an overview of vulnerabilities relating to maritime RFID systems and systematically reviews lightweight RFID authentication protocols and their impacts if they were to be used in the maritime sector. Specifically, this paper investigates the capabilities of lightweight RFID authentication protocols that could be used in a maritime environment by evaluating those authentication protocols in terms of the encryption system, authentication method, and resistance to various wireless attacks

Toward designing a secure authentication protocol for IoT environments

Authentication protocol is a critical part of any application to manage the access control in many applications. A former research recently proposed a lightweight authentication scheme to transmit data in an IoT subsystem securely. Although the designers presented the first security analysis of the proposed protocol, that protocol has not been independently analyzed by third-party researchers, to the best of our knowledge. On the other hand, it is generally agreed that no cryptosystem should be used in a practical application unless its security has been verified through security analysis by third parties extensively, which is addressed in this paper. Although it is an efficient protocol by design compared to other related schemes, our security analysis identifies the non-ideal properties of this protocol. More specifically, we show that this protocol does not provide perfect forward secrecy. In addition, we show that it is vulnerable to an insider attacker, and an active insider adversary can successfully recover the shared keys between the protocol’s entities. In addition, such an adversary can impersonate the remote server to the user and vice versa. Next, the adversary can trace the target user using the extracted information. Finally, we redesign the protocol such that the enhanced protocol can withstand all the aforementioned attacks. The overhead of the proposed protocol compared to its predecessor is only 15.5% in terms of computational cost

Secured authentication of radio-frequency identification system using PRESENT block cipher

The internet of things (IoT) is an emerging and robust technology to interconnect billions of objects or devices via the internet to communicate smartly. The radio frequency identification (RFID) system plays a significant role in IoT systems, providing most features like mutual establishment, key establishment, and data confidentiality. This manuscript designed secure authentication of IoT-based RFID systems using the light-weight PRESENT algorithm on the hardware platform. The PRESENT-256 block cipher is considered in this work, and it supports 64-bit data with a 256-key length. The PRESENT-80/128 cipher is also designed along with PRESENT-256 at electronic codebook (ECB) mode for Secured mutual authentication between RFID tag and reader for IoT applications. The secured authentication is established in two stages: Tag recognition from reader, mutual authentication between tag and reader using PRESENT-80/128/256 cipher modules. The complete secured authentication of IoT-based RFID system simulation results is verified using the chip-scope tool with field-programmable gate array (FPGA) results. The comparative results for PRESENT block cipher with existing PRESENT ciphers and other light-weight algorithms are analyzed with resource improvements. The proposed secured authentication work is compared with similar RFID-mutual authentication (MA) approaches with better chip area and frequency improvements

Privacy in rfid and mobile objects

Los sistemas RFID permiten la identificación rápida y automática de etiquetas RFID a través de un canal de comunicación inalámbrico. Dichas etiquetas son dispositivos con cierto poder de cómputo y capacidad de almacenamiento de información. Es por ello que los objetos que contienen una etiqueta RFID adherida permiten la lectura de una cantidad rica y variada de datos que los describen y caracterizan, por ejemplo, un código único de identificación, el nombre, el modelo o la fecha de expiración. Además, esta información puede ser leída sin la necesidad de un contacto visual entre el lector y la etiqueta, lo cual agiliza considerablemente los procesos de inventariado, identificación, o control automático. Para que el uso de la tecnología RFID se generalice con éxito, es conveniente cumplir con varios objetivos: eficiencia, seguridad y protección de la privacidad. Sin embargo, el diseño de protocolos de identificación seguros, privados, y escalables es un reto difícil de abordar dada las restricciones computacionales de las etiquetas RFID y su naturaleza inalámbrica. Es por ello que, en la presente tesis, partimos de protocolos de identificación seguros y privados, y mostramos cómo se puede lograr escalabilidad mediante una arquitectura distribuida y colaborativa. De este modo, la seguridad y la privacidad se alcanzan mediante el propio protocolo de identificación, mientras que la escalabilidad se logra por medio de novedosos métodos colaborativos que consideran la posición espacial y temporal de las etiquetas RFID. Independientemente de los avances en protocolos inalámbricos de identificación, existen ataques que pueden superar exitosamente cualquiera de estos protocolos sin necesidad de conocer o descubrir claves secretas válidas ni de encontrar vulnerabilidades en sus implementaciones criptográficas. La idea de estos ataques, conocidos como ataques de “relay”, consiste en crear inadvertidamente un puente de comunicación entre una etiqueta legítima y un lector legítimo. De este modo, el adversario usa los derechos de la etiqueta legítima para pasar el protocolo de autenticación usado por el lector. Nótese que, dada la naturaleza inalámbrica de los protocolos RFID, este tipo de ataques representa una amenaza importante a la seguridad en sistemas RFID. En esta tesis proponemos un nuevo protocolo que además de autenticación realiza un chequeo de la distancia a la cual se encuentran el lector y la etiqueta. Este tipo de protocolos se conocen como protocolos de acotación de distancia, los cuales no impiden este tipo de ataques, pero sí pueden frustrarlos con alta probabilidad. Por último, afrontamos los problemas de privacidad asociados con la publicación de información recogida a través de sistemas RFID. En particular, nos concentramos en datos de movilidad que también pueden ser proporcionados por otros sistemas ampliamente usados tales como el sistema de posicionamiento global (GPS) y el sistema global de comunicaciones móviles. Nuestra solución se basa en la conocida noción de k-anonimato, alcanzada mediante permutaciones y microagregación. Para este fin, definimos una novedosa función de distancia entre trayectorias con la cual desarrollamos dos métodos diferentes de anonimización de trayectorias.Els sistemes RFID permeten la identificació ràpida i automàtica d’etiquetes RFID a través d’un canal de comunicació sense fils. Aquestes etiquetes són dispositius amb cert poder de còmput i amb capacitat d’emmagatzematge de informació. Es per això que els objectes que porten una etiqueta RFID adherida permeten la lectura d’una quantitat rica i variada de dades que els descriuen i caracteritzen, com per exemple un codi únic d’identificació, el nom, el model o la data d’expiració. A més, aquesta informació pot ser llegida sense la necessitat d’un contacte visual entre el lector i l’etiqueta, la qual cosa agilitza considerablement els processos d’inventariat, identificació o control automàtic. Per a que l’ús de la tecnologia RFID es generalitzi amb èxit, es convenient complir amb diversos objectius: eficiència, seguretat i protecció de la privacitat. No obstant això, el disseny de protocols d’identificació segurs, privats i escalables, es un repte difícil d’abordar dades les restriccions computacionals de les etiquetes RFID i la seva naturalesa sense fils. Es per això que, en la present tesi, partim de protocols d’identificació segurs i privats, i mostrem com es pot aconseguir escalabilitat mitjançant una arquitectura distribuïda i col•laborativa. D’aquesta manera, la seguretat i la privacitat s’aconsegueixen mitjançant el propi protocol d’identificació, mentre que l’escalabilitat s’aconsegueix per mitjà de nous protocols col•laboratius que consideren la posició espacial i temporal de les etiquetes RFID. Independentment dels avenços en protocols d’identificació sense fils, existeixen atacs que poden passar exitosament qualsevol d’aquests protocols sense necessitat de conèixer o descobrir claus secretes vàlides, ni de trobar vulnerabilitats a les seves implantacions criptogràfiques. La idea d’aquestos atacs, coneguts com atacs de “relay”, consisteix en crear inadvertidament un pont de comunicació entre una etiqueta legítima i un lector legítim. D’aquesta manera, l’adversari utilitza els drets de l’etiqueta legítima per passar el protocol d’autentificació utilitzat pel lector. Es important tindre en compte que, dada la naturalesa sense fils dels protocols RFID, aquests tipus d’atacs representen una amenaça important a la seguretat en sistemes RFID. En aquesta dissertació proposem un nou protocol que, a més d’autentificació, realitza una revisió de la distància a la qual es troben el lector i l’etiqueta. Aquests tipus de protocols es coneixen com a “distance-boulding protocols”, els quals no prevenen aquests tipus d’atacs, però si que poden frustrar-los amb alta probabilitat. Per últim, afrontem els problemes de privacitat associats amb la publicació de informació recol•lectada a través de sistemes RFID. En concret, ens concentrem en dades de mobilitat, que també poden ser proveïdes per altres sistemes àmpliament utilitzats tals com el sistema de posicionament global (GPS) i el sistema global de comunicacions mòbils. La nostra solució es basa en la coneguda noció de privacitat “k-anonymity” i parcialment en micro-agregació. Per a aquesta finalitat, definim una nova funció de distància entre trajectòries amb la qual desenvolupen dos mètodes diferents d’anonimització de trajectòries.Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a technology aimed at efficiently identifying and tracking goods and assets. Such identification may be performed without requiring line-of-sight alignment or physical contact between the RFID tag and the RFID reader, whilst tracking is naturally achieved due to the short interrogation field of RFID readers. That is why the reduction in price of the RFID tags has been accompanied with an increasing attention paid to this technology. However, since tags are resource-constrained devices sending identification data wirelessly, designing secure and private RFID identification protocols is a challenging task. This scenario is even more complex when scalability must be met by those protocols. Assuming the existence of a lightweight, secure, private and scalable RFID identification protocol, there exist other concerns surrounding the RFID technology. Some of them arise from the technology itself, such as distance checking, but others are related to the potential of RFID systems to gather huge amount of tracking data. Publishing and mining such moving objects data is essential to improve efficiency of supervisory control, assets management and localisation, transportation, etc. However, obvious privacy threats arise if an individual can be linked with some of those published trajectories. The present dissertation contributes to the design of algorithms and protocols aimed at dealing with the issues explained above. First, we propose a set of protocols and heuristics based on a distributed architecture that improve the efficiency of the identification process without compromising privacy or security. Moreover, we present a novel distance-bounding protocol based on graphs that is extremely low-resource consuming. Finally, we present two trajectory anonymisation methods aimed at preserving the individuals' privacy when their trajectories are released

Mutual Authentication Protocol Model For Low-Cost RFID Systems Based On Shelled Random Value

Designing a reliable secure low-cost protocol for radio-frequency identification (RFID) is difficult, standard cryptographic primitives can become a limitation for low-cost tags due to their costly large requirements in terms of circuit size, power consumption, and memory size. Therefore, ultralightweight cryptography in designing low-cost RFID protocols capable of executing data communication sessions efficiently and effectively are needed to solve database loading, passive attacks, desynchronization and high computational cost problems