Analysis of Technological Portfolios for CO2 stabilizations and Effects of Technological Changes

In this study, cost-effective technological options to stabilize CO2 concentrations at 550, 500, and 450 ppmv are evaluated using a world energy systems model of linear programming with a high regional resolution. This model treats technological change endogenously for wind power, photovoltaics, and fuel-cell vehicles, which are technologies of mass production and are considered to follow the “learning by doing” process. Technological changes induced by climate policies are evaluated by maintaining the technological changes at the levels of the base case wherein there is no climate policy. The results achieved through model analyses include 1) cost-effective technological portfolios, including carbon capture and storage, marginal CO2 reduction costs, and increases in energy system cost for three levels of stabilization and 2) the effect of the induced technological change on the above mentioned factors. A sensitivity analysis is conducted with respect to the learning rate.Energy systems model, Global warming, Technological portfolios, Technological changes

CONTRACT INCENTIVES AND EXCESSIVE NITROGEN USE IN AGRICULTURE

This study examines incentives for input use under tournament contracts. We analyze implications of contract design for nitrate-based environmental externalities generated by agricultural producers. Outcomes are compared from contracts awarded by tournament to those from fixed-payment contracts. Our findings show contract insecurity can distort input use. The model developed in this analysis is applied to a region of the U.S. where tournament-based production is prevalent and groundwater contamination is a problem. We find contract insecurity increases nitrogen use by about 12%, resulting in a 17% increase in nitrate leaching. Implications for contract modification to reduce environmental externalities while maintaining contract incentives are discussed.Crop Production/Industries,

An Evaluation of Overseas Oil Investment Projects under Uncertainty Using a Real Options Based Simulation Model

This paper applies real options theory to establish an overseas oil investment evaluation model that is based on Monte Carlo simulation and is solved by the Least Squares Monte-Carlo method. To better reflect the reality of overseas oil investment, our model has incorporated not only the uncertainties of oil price and investment cost but also the uncertainties of exchange rate and investment environment. These unique features have enabled our model to be best equipped to evaluate the value of oil overseas investment projects of three oil field sizes (large, medium, small) and under different resource tax systems (royalty tax and production sharing contracts). In our empirical setting, we have selected China as an investor country and Indonesia as an investee country as a case study. Our results show that the investment risks and project values of small sized oil fields are more sensitive to changes in the uncertainty factors than the large and medium sized oil fields. Furthermore, among the uncertainty factors considered in the model, the investment risk of overseas oil investment may be underestimated if no consideration is given of the impacts of exchange rate and investment environment. Finally, as there is an important trade-off between oil resource investee country and overseas oil investor, in medium and small sized oil investment negotiation the oil company should try to increase the cost oil limit in production sharing contract and avoid the term of a windfall profits tax to reduce the investment risk of overseas oil fields.Overseas Oil Investment, Project Value, Real Options, Least Squares Monte-Carlo

Economic and legal aspects of international environmental agreements: The case of enforcing and stabilising an international CO 2 agreement

The protection of the global environment is impeded by multilateral externalities which the international community attempts to bring under control by entering into international agreements. International agreements, however, can suffer from non-compliance and free-riding behaviour by sovereign states and must therefore be enforced and stabilised internationally. This paper describes instruments for the enforcement and stabilisation of an international CO2 agreement and evaluates them in the light of economic and legal theory. Economic instruments build on repetition and use utility transfers, economic sanctions and flexible treaty adjustments. Important legal instruments are reciprocal obligations and cooperation duties, international funding and transfer rules, treaty suspension, retorsions and reprisals, treaty revision, and monitoring. The paper shows that economic and legal instruments are compatible to a considerable extent. It develops proposals for the enforcement and stabilisation of a global CO2 agreement and other multilateral treaties.International environmental agreements,international cooperation,non-compliance,enforcement,global warming,international law

Hands-off, artificial construction, or penalty? How to deal with the increasingly polluted coastal wetland ecosystem in China

As the destruction of coastal wetlands in China becomes more and more serious, the government needs to strengthen the management of the wetland ecosystem. Considering that pollution is an important factor in the destruction of coastal wetlands in China, the government can deal with the problem of wetland pollution through three modes: hands-off, artificial construction, and penalty. In this article, the differential game model is constructed under these three modes. The balanced social benefits of the government and polluting enterprises under the three modes are obtained, and the applicable conditions of various wetland treatment paths are compared. The results show that when the revenue generated by taxation and the indirect income generated by artificial construction are small, the government will choose the laissez-faire mode. However, with the gradual increase of indirect income generated by artificial construction, the government will be inclined to choose the artificial construction mode. When the income from government fines is small, the social benefits of polluters in the hands-off mode are greater than those in the penalty mode. With the increase of fines, the social benefits of polluting enterprises will first decrease and then increase, which will eventually be greater than the social benefits under the hands-off mode

Exiting Treaties

This Article analyzes the under-explored phenomenon of unilateral exit from international agreements and intergovernmental organizations. Although clauses authorizing denunciation and withdrawal from treaties are pervasive, international legal scholars and international relations theorists have largely ignored them. This Article draws upon new empirical evidence to provide a comprehensive interdisciplinary framework for understanding treaty exit. It examines when and why states abandon their treaty commitments and explains how exit helps to resolve certain theoretical and doctrinal puzzles that have long troubled scholars of international affairs

Firm compliance to regulatory enforcement of industrial wastewater standards in Kenya

Regulatory enforcement and industrial non-compliance are very familiar issues in environmental protectlon and water resource management. Current thinking recognizes the insufficiency of the traditional regulatory enforcement structures that are based orthodox deterrence theory. There are, therefore increasing shlfts among some industrialized countrles towards "new regulatory reglmes" that focus on management styles, and forms of selfregulation, based on innovatlve and incentive devlce. However, the orthodox instruments remain the principie means for regulatory enforcement among many developing countries. Our goal in this paper ¡s to examine the effects of these (traditional) regulatory enforcement instruments on firm' compliance to wastewater standards in Kenya. We (i) examine the state of wastewater regulatory compliance and infractlons; (ii) construct and estímate a model of enforcement incidence based on monitorlng, inspections, warning letters, and court prosecutions; and (iii) discuss the linkages in the enforcement framework, and behaviour of firms). We use primary and secondary data from 53 industrial plants across 5 urban areas. The results of our model help us to identify flaws In the existing regulatory and enforcement "reglme"

Policy framework and systems management of global climate change

Climate change is representative of a general class of environmental issues where decisions have to be taken under controversies. The policy framework for these kinds of decisions is defined by three important traits: scientific ignorance, mediatization and the need for innovation. Scientific ignorance is an issue here because decisions must be taken before the end of scientific controversies about the predictability of future climate. Mediatization is key because agents can't have a sensible experience of the global climate change, and some interest-holders (future generations, distant countries) cannot participate directly in the decision. Third, the need for innovation is crucial because today's technology offers the only alternative between fossil fuels and nuclear power as a main primary energy source.In the case of climate change, the institutional context is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The making of global environmental policy is framed not upon a hypothetical code of international law (there is no such a thing), but upon a body of doctrine arising from consistent reference to a given set of principles. The key principles are sustainability (satisfying the need of present generations without preventing future generations to satisfy theirs), precaution (ignorance is not an excuse for inaction), the common but differentiated responsibility (developed countries take the lead in action against climate change), and economic efficiency (which lead to prefer flexible instruments over blind regulation).Given the scientific controversies and the fuzziness of guiding principles, no clear-cut demonstration could justify the choice of a theoretically optimum course of action, even in the short term. Historically, climate negotiations can be seen as an oscillation between two regulation modes. On one side is coordinated policies and measures, where countries adopt an uniform international rate of carbon tax. On the other side is emission trading, where a defined emission reduction target is allocated to each country.changement climatique; Protocole de Kyoto

International Treaty Enforcement as a Public Good: Institutional Deterrent Sanctions in International Environmental Agreements

The problem of compliance with treaty obligations has been an area of active study in international environmental law because of its importance to the effectiveness of environmental treaties. This paper examines the problem of enforcement as an important and distinct component of compliance. First, the paper describes the general nature of the problem and the theoretical approaches that have been put forward as alternatives. Second, the paper then locates a key difficulty of environmental treaty enforcement in its public good characteristics. The paper specifically examines the “public good” functions of enforcement as well as the difficulties of generating this “good.” The paper concludes by suggesting three general approaches to overcoming these difficulties and provides a critique of the recently adopted non-compliance mechanism of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Change Convention