Use of Ecolabels in Promoting Exports from Developing Countries to Developed Countries: Lessons from the Indian LeatherFootwear Industry

This paper tries to understand whether importers in the North are able to push exporters in the South towards sustainable production, with the help of a case study of the Indian leather industry. After providing a short description of the global leather footwear industry, the first section provides insights into the competitive advantages of different countries, characteristics of developing country exporters and the difference between large and small European buyers of Indian leather footwear. The subsequent section provides an insight into the different chains of influence that exist in trying to make international trade more sustainable with the help of a broad understanding of the means, their effectiveness, their constraints and a few examples of such chains of influence. Section four studies whether ecolabels are in a position to be suitable indicators of sustainability. Further it delves into understanding the perspectives of consumers, producers and regulators on whether ecolabels are useful in promoting sustainable exports. The explanation of how ecolabels conflict with brand dynamics is quite interesting. The policy measures provide clear options for targeting sustainable production. Suggestions include use of eco-elasticity indicator, toolbox approach to environment policy, introducing comprehensive sustainability labels, maintaining a level of mandatory legislations as well as a constructive effort to increase transparency in supply chains. The annexure include the research methodology adopted for the paper, the reason for choosing Europe as destination for the research, a brief overview about types of ecolabels and a small description of integrated product policies.Ecolabels, Export promotion, Leather footwear, Market access

Communication Efficient Self-Stabilizing Leader Election

This paper presents a randomized self-stabilizing algorithm that elects a leader r in a general n-node undirected graph and constructs a spanning tree T rooted at r. The algorithm works under the synchronous message passing network model, assuming that the nodes know a linear upper bound on n and that each edge has a unique ID known to both its endpoints (or, alternatively, assuming the KT? model). The highlight of this algorithm is its superior communication efficiency: It is guaranteed to send a total of O? (n) messages, each of constant size, till stabilization, while stabilizing in O? (n) rounds, in expectation and with high probability. After stabilization, the algorithm sends at most one constant size message per round while communicating only over the (n - 1) edges of T. In all these aspects, the communication overhead of the new algorithm is far smaller than that of the existing (mostly deterministic) self-stabilizing leader election algorithms. The algorithm is relatively simple and relies mostly on known modules that are common in the fault free leader election literature; these modules are enhanced in various subtle ways in order to assemble them into a communication efficient self-stabilizing algorithm

Still the Spectre at the Feast: Comparisons between Peacekeeping and Imperialism in Peacekeeping Studies Today

The sheer ambition and scale of UN peacebuilding today inevitably invokes comparison with historic practices of colonialism and imperialism, from critics and supporters of peacebuilding alike. The legitimacy of post-settlement peacebuilding is often seen to hinge on the question of the extent to which it transcends historic practices of imperialism. This article offers a critique of how these comparisons are made in the extant scholarship, and argues that supporters of peacekeeping deploy an under-theorized and historically one-sided view of imperialism. The article argues that the attempt to flatter peacebuilding by comparison with imperialism fails, and that the theory and history of imperialism still provide a rich resource for both the critique and conceptualization of peacekeeping practice. The article concludes by suggesting how new forms of imperial power can be projected through peacebuilding

Policy harmonization in MERCOSUR

Despite its general character, the harmonization of economic policies presents two problems that need to be considered. One is the initial degree of uniformity in the behavior of the economies involved in the economic integration process. The other, the way the policies have to be implemented in the view of the whole. This paper provides a brief overview of both problems in MERCOSUR

A comparative analysis of different business ethics in the perspective of the Common Good

The paper concerns the connection between different tipologies of business ethics (kantian, utilitarian, aristotelic) and the alternative vision of economic development, company’s organizational and managerial context together with interest in Common Good more or less associated to profit to which they have given rise. In this comparison virtue ethics stands out for its capacity of creating, specially through the business virtue of generosity, social capital so precious to economic development at every level, for its capability of increasing people’s well-being, and for its capacity to make the production of relational goods (among which Common Good), on which people’s happiness depends, easier. Gift’s paradigm recovery can also be helpful to prevent other financial and economic crisis like the actual one which has had, like less striking but deepest cause, the triumph of avarice’s vice on the virtues of giving (generosity and justice).Business Ethics, Gift’s Economy, Generosity, Charity, Mercy, Social Capital, Relational Goods, Common Good

The Reality and Masquerade behind Bargaining over Welfare Pie Sizing, Delivery and Slicing.

The present analysis addresses the apparently critical issue of circulation of wealth in society. Three actors play the game of welfare-related taxation. The first actor, in the role of Negotiator No.1, stands up for citizens’ legal and moral rights to primary needs. The second actor, in the role of Negotiator No.2, proceeds in response to public will for the provision and delivery of public goods. Quite the opposite, the third actor, hereinafter named the Voter, who represents the taxpayers, prefers personal consumption to moral understanding and public activity. In fact, backed by electoral maneuvering, the Voter emanates a risk to break down negotiations. The result of the simulation provides an evidence for the claim that a 50% median income is close enough to be considered a realistic choice of poverty line within the variety or rules of the alternating-offers bargaining game and conditions for unanimous consent of voter-citizens.bargaining; policy; public goods; simulation; taxation; voting

The Political Economy of Budget Deficits

This paper provides a critical survey of the literature on politico-institutional determinants of the government budget. We organize our discussion around two questions: Why did certain OECD countries, but not others, accumulate large public debts? Why did these fiscal imbalances appear in the last twenty years rather than before? We begin by discussing the 'tax smoothing' model and conclude that this approach alone cannot provide complete answers to these questions. We will then proceed to a discussion of political economy models, which we organize in six groups: i) Models based upon opportunistic policy makers and naive voters with 'fiscal illusion'; ii) Models of intergenerational redistributions; iii) Models of debt as a strategic variable, linking the current government with the next one; iv) Models of coalition governments; v) Models of geographically dispersed interests; vi) Models emphasizing the effects of budgetary institutions.

The New Political Macroeconomics in Modern Macroeconomics and Its Appliance to Transition Processes in Serbia

This study deals with important issues related to the new political macroeconomics and its appliance to the economic movements in Serbia, which is a country of “new democracy” as well as with transition economy. In political macroeconomics, it is a known fact that the economic policy instruments can be used for political purposes – simulated improvement of economic indicators to win the elections. These options assume specific features in transition economies, such as the Serbian economy. The political instability in Serbia, reflected in frequent elections, as well as in the diversity in political and economic goals of the key political parties leading to increasing political uncertainty in both the pre-election and post-election periods, weakened the economic system. Simultaneously, using the economic policy for political purposes to support the “pro-democratic” and “pro-European” parties proved to be paradoxically justified.Political macroeconomics, New democracy, Fiscal manipulation, Political instability

Privatization in Austria: Some theoretical reasons and performance measures

The issues of privatization (and sometimes deregulation) have been reviewed in a large literature on the various aspects of privatization, that has emphasized the potential efficiency gains. Hence, we provide some theoretical reasoning why privatization is useful as well as profitable for an economy and empirically present the extent of privatization in Austria and other European Union countries. In order to assess the impact of privatization in Austria on economic performance, we observe cash flows, the employment performance, and the stock-exchange ratings of the privatized formerly state-owned enterprises.Austria; Performance Measures; Privatization; Profitability; State-owned Enterprises