Effort and synergies in network formation

The aim of this paper is to understand the interactions between productive effort and the creation of synergies that are the sources of technological collaboration agreements, agglomeration, social stratification, etc. We model this interaction in a way that allows us to characterize how agents devote resources to both activities. This permits a fullfledged equilibrium/welfare analysis of network formation with endogenous investment efforts and to derive unambiguous comparative statics results. In spite of its parsimony that ensures tractability, the model retains enough richness to replicate a (relatively) broad range of empirical regularities displayed by social and economic networks, and is directly estimable to recover is structural parameters

Effort and synergies in network formation

The aim of this paper is to understand the interactions between productive effort and the creation of synergies that are the sources of technological collaboration agreements, agglomeration, social stratification, etc. We model this interaction in a way that allows us to characterize how agents devote resources to both activities. This permits a fullfledged equilibrium/welfare analysis of network formation with endogenous investment efforts and to derive unambiguous comparative statics results. In spite of its parsimony that ensures tractability, the model retains enough richness to replicate a (relatively) broad range of empirical regularities displayed by social and economic networks, and is directly estimable to recover is structural parameters.

Consensus, Cohesion and Connectivity

Social life clusters into groups held together by ties that also transmit information. When collective problems occur, group members use their ties to discuss what to do and to establish an agreement, to be reached quick enough to prevent discounting the value of the group decision. The speed at which a group reaches consensus can be predicted by the algebraic connectivity of the network, which also imposes a lower bound on the group's cohesion. This specific measure of connectivity is put to the test by re-using experimental data, which confirm the prediction

Neural networks as a learning paradigm for general normal form games

This paper addresses how neural networks learn to play one-shot normal form games through experience in an environment of randomly generated game payoffs and randomly selected opponents. This agent based computational approach allows the modeling of learning all strategic types of normal form games, irregardless of the number of pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria that they exhibit. This is a more realistic model of learning than the oft used models in the game theory learning literature which are usually restricted either to repeated games against the same opponent (or games with different payoffs but belonging to the same strategic class). The neural network agents were found to approximate human behavior in experimental one-shot games very well as the Spearman correlation coefficients between their behavior and that of human subjects ranged from 0.49 to 0.8857 across numerous experimental studies. Also, they exhibited the endogenous emergence of heuristics that have been found effective in describing human behavior in one-shot games. The notion of bounded rationality is explored by varying the topologies of the neural networks, which indirectly affects their ability to act as universal approximators of any function. The neural networks' behavior was assessed across various dimensions such as convergence to Nash equilibria, equilibrium selection and adherence to principles of iterated dominance

Resilience and Controllability of Dynamic Collective Behaviors

The network paradigm is used to gain insight into the structural root causes of the resilience of consensus in dynamic collective behaviors, and to analyze the controllability of the swarm dynamics. Here we devise the dynamic signaling network which is the information transfer channel underpinning the swarm dynamics of the directed interagent connectivity based on a topological neighborhood of interactions. The study of the connectedness of the swarm signaling network reveals the profound relationship between group size and number of interacting neighbors, which is found to be in good agreement with field observations on flock of starlings [Ballerini et al. (2008) Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 105: 1232]. Using a dynamical model, we generate dynamic collective behaviors enabling us to uncover that the swarm signaling network is a homogeneous clustered small-world network, thus facilitating emergent outcomes if connectedness is maintained. Resilience of the emergent consensus is tested by introducing exogenous environmental noise, which ultimately stresses how deeply intertwined are the swarm dynamics in the physical and network spaces. The availability of the signaling network allows us to analytically establish for the first time the number of driver agents necessary to fully control the swarm dynamics

A General Model of Opinion Dynamics with Tunable Sensitivity

We introduce a general model of continuous-time opinion dynamics for an arbitrary number of agents that communicate over a network and form real-valued opinions about an arbitrary number of options. Drawing inspiration from models in biology, physics, and social psychology, we apply a sigmoidal saturating function to inter-agent and intra-agent exchanges of opinions. The saturating function is the only nonlinearity in the model, yet we prove how it yields rapid and reliable formation of consensus, dissensus, and opinion cascades as a function of just a few parameters. We further show how the network opinion dynamics exhibit both robustness to disturbance and ultrasensitivity to inputs. We design feedback dynamics for system parameters that enable active tuning of implicit thresholds in opinion formation for sensitivity to inputs, robustness to changes in input, opinion cascades, and flexible transitions between consensus and dissensus. The general model can be used for systematic control design in a range of engineering problems including network systems, multi-robot coordination, task allocation, and decision making for spatial navigation. It can also be used for systematic examination of questions in biology and social science ranging from cognitive control and networks in the brain, to resilience in collective animal behavior to changing environmental conditions, to information spreading and political polarization in social networks

The influence of topology and information diffusion on networked game dynamics

This thesis studies the influence of topology and information diffusion on the strategic interactions of agents in a population. It shows that there exists a reciprocal relationship between the topology, information diffusion and the strategic interactions of a population of players. In order to evaluate the influence of topology and information flow on networked game dynamics, strategic games are simulated on populations of players where the players are distributed in a non-homogeneous spatial arrangement. The initial component of this research consists of a study of evolution of the coordination of strategic players, where the topology or the structure of the population is shown to be critical in defining the coordination among the players. Next, the effect of network topology on the evolutionary stability of strategies is studied in detail. Based on the results obtained, it is shown that network topology plays a key role in determining the evolutionary stability of a particular strategy in a population of players. Then, the effect of network topology on the optimum placement of strategies is studied. Using genetic optimisation, it is shown that the placement of strategies in a spatially distributed population of players is crucial in maximising the collective payoff of the population. Exploring further the effect of network topology and information diffusion on networked games, the non-optimal or bounded rationality of players is modelled using topological and directed information flow of the network. Based on the topologically distributed bounded rationality model, it is shown that the scale-free and small-world networks emerge in randomly connected populations of sub-optimal players. Thus, the topological and information theoretic interpretations of bounded rationality suggest the topology, information diffusion and the strategic interactions of socio-economical structures are cyclically interdependent

The influence of topology and information diffusion on networked game dynamics

This thesis studies the influence of topology and information diffusion on the strategic interactions of agents in a population. It shows that there exists a reciprocal relationship between the topology, information diffusion and the strategic interactions of a population of players. In order to evaluate the influence of topology and information flow on networked game dynamics, strategic games are simulated on populations of players where the players are distributed in a non-homogeneous spatial arrangement. The initial component of this research consists of a study of evolution of the coordination of strategic players, where the topology or the structure of the population is shown to be critical in defining the coordination among the players. Next, the effect of network topology on the evolutionary stability of strategies is studied in detail. Based on the results obtained, it is shown that network topology plays a key role in determining the evolutionary stability of a particular strategy in a population of players. Then, the effect of network topology on the optimum placement of strategies is studied. Using genetic optimisation, it is shown that the placement of strategies in a spatially distributed population of players is crucial in maximising the collective payoff of the population. Exploring further the effect of network topology and information diffusion on networked games, the non-optimal or bounded rationality of players is modelled using topological and directed information flow of the network. Based on the topologically distributed bounded rationality model, it is shown that the scale-free and small-world networks emerge in randomly connected populations of sub-optimal players. Thus, the topological and information theoretic interpretations of bounded rationality suggest the topology, information diffusion and the strategic interactions of socio-economical structures are cyclically interdependent

Beyond Condorcet: Optimal Aggregation Rules Using Voting Records

In certain judgmental situations where a “correct” decision is presumed to exist, optimal decision making requires evaluation of the decision-maker's capabilities and the selection of the appropriate aggregation rule. The major and so far unresolved difficulty is the former necessity. This paper presents the optimal aggregation rule that simultaneously satisfies these two interdependent necessary requirements. In our setting, some record of the voters' past decisions is available, but the correct decisions are not known. We observe that any arbitrary evaluation of the decision-maker's capabilities as probabilities yields some optimal aggregation rule that, in turn, yields a maximum-likelihood estimation of decisional skills. Thus, a skill-evaluation equilibrium can be defined as an evaluation of decisional skills that yields itself as a maximum-likelihood estimation of decisional skills. We show that such equilibrium exists and offer a procedure for finding one. The obtained equilibrium is locally optimal and is shown empirically to generally be globally optimal in terms of the correctness of the resulting collective decisions. Interestingly, under minimally competent (almost symmetric) skill distributions that allow unskilled decision makers, the optimal rule considerably outperforms the common simple majority rule (SMR). Furthermore, a sufficient record of past decisions ensures that the collective probability of making a correct decision converges to 1, as opposed to accuracy of about 0.7 under SMR. Our proposed optimal voting procedure relaxes the fundamental (and sometimes unrealistic) assumptions in Condorcet celebrated theorem and its extensions, such as sufficiently high decision-making quality, skill homogeneity or existence of a sufficiently large group of decision makers.

Chimera states: Coexistence of coherence and incoherence in networks of coupled oscillators

A chimera state is a spatio-temporal pattern in a network of identical coupled oscillators in which synchronous and asynchronous oscillation coexist. This state of broken symmetry, which usually coexists with a stable spatially symmetric state, has intrigued the nonlinear dynamics community since its discovery in the early 2000s. Recent experiments have led to increasing interest in the origin and dynamics of these states. Here we review the history of research on chimera states and highlight major advances in understanding their behaviour.Comment: 26 pages, 3 figure