Profiling is Politically \u27Correct\u27: Agent-Based Modeling of Ethno-Political Conflict

A holy grail for military, diplomatic, and intelligence analysis is a valid set of software agent models that act as the desired ethno-political factions so that one can test the effects that may arise from alternative courses of action in different lands. This article enumerates the challenges of such a testbed and describes best-of-breed leader and follower profiling models implemented to improve the realism and validity of the agent. Realistic, \u27descriptive\u27 agents are contrasted to rational actor theory in terms of the different equilibria one would expect to emerge in conflict games. These predictions are examined in two real world cases (Iraq and SE Asia) where the agent models are subjected to validity tests and a policy experiment is then run. We conclude by arguing that substantial effort on game realism, best-of-breed social science models, and agent validation efforts is essential if analytic experiments are to effectively explore conflicts and alternative ways to influence outcomes. Such efforts are likely to improve behavioral game theory as well

StateSim: Lessons Learned from 20 Years of A Country Modeling and Simulation Toolset

A holy grail for military, diplomatic, and intelligence analysis is a valid set of software agent models that act as the desired ethno-political factions so that one can test the effects of alternative courses of action in different countries. This article explains StateSim, a country modeling approach that synthesizes best-of-breed theories from across the social sciences and that has helped numerous organizations over 20 years to study insurgents, gray zone actors, and other societal instabilities. The country modeling literature is summarized (Sect 1.1) and synthetic inquiry is contrasted with scientific inquiry (Sect. 1.2 and 2). Section 2 also explains many fielded StateSim applications and 100s of past acceptability tests and validity assessments. Section 3 then describes how users now construct and run ‘first pass’ country models within hours due to the StateSim Generator, while Section 4 offers two country analyses that illustrate this approach. The conclusions explain lessons learned

Revisiting the form and function of conflict: Neurobiological, psychological, and cultural mechanisms for attack and defense within and between groups

Conflict can profoundly affect individuals and their groups. Oftentimes, conflict involves a clash between one side seeking change and increased gains through victory and the other side defending the status quo and protecting against loss and defeat. However, theory and empirical research largely neglected these conflicts between attackers and defenders, and the strategic, social, and psychological consequences of attack and defense remain poorly understood. To fill this void, we model (1) the clashing of attack and defense as games of strategy and reveal that (2) attack benefits from mismatching its target's level of defense, whereas defense benefits from matching the attacker's competitiveness. This suggests that (3) attack recruits neuroendocrine pathways underlying behavioral activation and overconfidence, whereas defense invokes neural networks for behavioral inhibition, vigilant scanning, and hostile attributions; and that (4) people invest less in attack than defense, and attack often fails. Finally, we propose that (5) in intergroup conflict, out-group attack needs institutional arrangements that motivate and coordinate collective action, whereas in-group defense benefits from endogenously emerging in-group identification. We discuss how games of attack and defense may have shaped human capacities for prosociality and aggression, and how third parties can regulate such conflicts and reduce their waste. Keywords: behavioral game theory; biobehavioral approach–avoidance; coevolution of prosociality and aggression; conflict; conflict intervention; cultural institutions; intergroup relations; psychological adaptations

Antecedents and behavioural consequences of violence in Indonesia

Indonesia has a long history of conflict that has often led to violence. Even today, small-scale violence persists. Existing studies on Indonesia have identified ethnic grievances, economic motives and institutional changes as some of the main drivers of conflict. While such studies are important to understand the antecedents of conflict at the macro level, there is a need to dig deeper into the consequences of conflict at the micro-level to understand its effect on individual behaviour. Thus, the objective of this thesis is first to further investigate the antecedents of violence in post-conflict Indonesia and, second, to examine the effect of the conflict experience on individual behaviour. To achieve these objectives, this study conducted a secondary data analysis at the sub-national level and a lab-in-the-field experiment in Aceh, where the last large conflict in Indonesia ended in 2005. The sub-national analysis of secondary data uses ethnolinguistic fractionalisation weighted by linguistic similarities to objectively measure ethno-cultural diversity. The analysis finds this variable to have a curvilinear (inverted-U shape) relationship with violence---a result that is robust to different measures of violence and fractionalisation, as well as to the use of instrumental variable method and additional covariates. This finding aligns with past studies on ethnic grievances and conflict, although the relationship is non-linear, rather than linear. Most Indonesian districts have levels of diversity lower than the turning point on the inverted-U; hence, ethno-cultural diversity currently has negative effects in the country. Experimental studies on the effect of conflict on individual behaviour have mostly focused on the prosocial. However, the research agenda is now turning to antisocial behaviour to capture the dark side of human nature. In the lab-in-the-field experiment, this study used an antisocial behaviour game to examine out-group bias between Acehnese and Javanese participants, as the Aceh conflict witnessed inter-ethnic violence between these two groups. In the game, participants could choose to pay to destroy other participants¿ payoffs (for no reason other than spite). The study found that one in four participants destroyed in general, with the Acehnese destroying more against the Javanese. Interestingly, such antisocial behaviour was higher among women who experienced conflict, which aligns with previous studies¿ findings that women experience the worst stress symptoms from conflict. Prior to the field research in Aceh, the same experiment was conducted with Indonesian migrants in Melbourne, Australia, to identify the antecedents of this sort of antisocial behaviour among Indonesians who have not experienced conflict. Here, the study did not find differential behaviour against out-group members, but found antisocial behaviour to be strongly associated with negative beliefs about the other. These findings have important policy implications, including suggesting potential avenues for improvements in conflict management by promoting intercultural dialogues. They also highlight the need to fully address the grievances of both women and ethnic minorities to ensure lasting peace

Modeling Factions for \u27Effects Based Operations\u27: Part II Behavioral Game Theory

Military, diplomatic, and intelligence analysts are increasingly interested in having a valid system of models that span the social sciences and interoperate so that one can determine the effects that may arise from alternative operations (courses of action) in different lands. Part I of this article concentrated on internal validity of the components of such a synthetic framework – a world diplomacy game as well as the agent architecture for modeling leaders and followers in different conflicts. But how valid are such model collections once they are integrated together and used out-of-sample (see Section 1)? Section 2 compares these realistic, descriptive agents to normative rational actor theory and offers equilibria insights for conflict games. Sections 3 and 4 offer two real world cases (Iraq and SE Asia) where the agent models are subjected to validity tests and an EBO experiment is then run for each case. We conclude by arguing that substantial effort on game realism, best-of-breed social science models, and agent validation efforts is essential if analytic experiments are to effectively explore conflicts and alternative ways to influence outcomes. Such efforts are likely to improve behavioral game theory as well

Lewis Fry Richardson: His Intellectual Legacy and Influence in the Social Sciences

This is an open access book. Lewis F Richardson (1981-1953), a physicist by training, was a pioneer in meteorology and peace research and remains a towering presence in both fields. This edited volume reviews his work and assesses its influence in the social sciences, notably his work on arms races and their consequences, mathematical models, the size distribution of wars, and geographical features of conflict. It contains brief bibliographies of his main publications and of articles and books written about Richardson and his work and discusses his continuing influence in peace research and international relations as well as his attitude to the ethical responsibilities of a scientist. It will be of interest to a wide range of scholars. This book includes 11 chapters written by Nils Petter Gleditsch, Dina A Zinnes, Ron Smith, Paul F Diehl, Kelly Kadera, Mark Crescenzi, Michael D Ward, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Nils B Weidmann, Jürgen Scheffran, Niall MacKay, Aaron Clauset, Michael Spagat and Stijn van Weezel. Lewis F Richardson occupied an important position in two academic fields as different as meteorology and peace research, with academic prizes awarded in both disciplines. In peace research, he pioneered the use of mathematical models and the meticulous compilation of databases for empirical research. As a quaker and pacifist, he refused to work in preparations for war, paid a heavy prize in terms of his career, and (at least in the social sciences) was fully recognized as a pioneering scholar only posthumously with the publication of two major books. Lewis Fry Richardson is one of the 20th century’s greatest but least appreciated thinkers—a creative physicist, psychologist, meteorologist, applied mathematician, historian, pacifist, statistician, and witty stylist. If you’ve heard of weather prediction, chaos, fractals, cliometrics, peace science, big data, thick tails, or black swans, then you have benefited from Richardson’s prescience in bringing unruly phenomena into the ambit of scientific understanding. Richardson’s ideas continue to be relevant today, and this collection is a superb retrospective on this brilliant and lovable man. Steven Pinker, Johnstone Professor, Harvard University, and the author of The Better Angels of Our Nature and Enlightenment No

Making Autocrats Accountable: Interests, Priorities, and Cooperation for Regime Change

In nearly all authoritarian regimes, democratization finds significant societal support and a number of organized opposition groups struggle for regime change. In some cases—such as in Iran in 1979— opposition groups are able to cooperate with one another and bring down authoritarianism. In others—such as the Assad regime in Syria—groups are not able to cooperate, and the ruler remains in place. Studies that apply cooperation theory on regimes predict that shared grievances about the current government and common interests in changing the existing regime foster cooperation among challengers. Yet, evidence suggests the contrary. This study examines the conditions under which diverse challengers, despite persistent divergence in their ideological preferences, are able to achieve a level of long-term cooperation that can transform the status quo. It uses the case studies of the Ottoman transition to constitutional monarchy (1876–1908) and the French transition to constitutional monarchy (1814–1830), paired according to the least similar systems design, in combination with network theory. Using this methodology, this study analyzes the effect of preferences on ideological issues (how the new regime should look like) and on strategic issues (how regime change should be carried out) to explain temporal dynamics of cooperation for regime change among challengers. This study conducts historiographical and archival work to identify the relevant actors and relevant issue dimensions and track preferences on these issues over time. It applies these findings on longitudinal network models (known as temporal exponential random graph models) to measure the extent to which preference alignment on an issue dimension, strategic or ideological, bring challengers to cooperate. Also, this study introduces two concepts. The first concept is “de-prioritization,” the process whereby challengers postpone the resolution of certain ideological disagreements to form sustainable cooperation against the regime. The second concept is “preference revision,” the process whereby challengers pragmatically replace their strategic preferences with more effective ones in response to past failures and environmental changes. Together these concepts emphasize that challengers become more likely to cooperate for regime change if they converge on a particular strategy of transition and sideline their ideological differences (if any). Convergence of preferences on strategic issues and the de-prioritization of ideological disagreements (if any) prepares the rise of a coherent oppositional coalition that is capable of signaling unity and coherence, hence potential to overthrow the regime if necessary or extract considerable concessions form an oppositional coalition that is capable of signaling unity and coherence, hence potential to overthrow the regime if necessary or extract considerable concessions. Findings suggest that without preference-revision and de-prioritization, challengers remain divided and heterogeneous in their approach, at best achieving temporary gains that are later reversed in the course of authoritarian retrenchment. This study further shows that the oppositional coalition tends to form around a core actor who has been committed to effective strategies and attracts others (peripheral actors) who agree with the core on the strategies but not necessarily on the ideologies. The implication of these findings are twofold: By taking dynamics of cooperation among challengers into account, we can distinguish between the cases where the regime is strong enough and takes on challengers and those where the government is weak but surviving because opposition groups are unable to assume power. Also, there is a link between the rise of an oppositional coalition and the likelihood of regime change happening

Modeling Factions for ‘Effects Based Operations’: Part II – Behavioral Game Theory

Military, diplomatic, and intelligence analysts are increasingly interested in having a valid system of models that span the social sciences and interoperate so that one can determine the effects that may arise from alternative operations (courses of action) in different lands. Part I of this article concentrated on internal validity of the components of such a synthetic framework – a world diplomacy game as well as the agent architecture for modeling leaders and followers in different conflicts. But how valid are such model collections once they are integrated together and used out-of-sample (see Section 1)? Section 2 compares these realistic, descriptive agents to normative rational actor theory and offers equilibria insights for conflict games. Sections 3 and 4 offer two real world cases (Iraq and SE Asia) where the agent models are subjected to validity tests and an EBO experiment is then run for each case. We conclude by arguing that substantial effort on game realism, best-of-breed social science models, and agent validation efforts is essential if analytic experiments are to effectively explore conflicts and alternative ways to influence outcomes. Such efforts are likely to improve behavioral game theory as well