Persediaan kerjaya pelajar tahun akhir diploma akauntansi Politeknik dalam melahirkan K-Workes : satu tinjauan

This research was conducted to identify Polytechnic's Diploma in Accountancy final year students' career preparation before enter the working environment to be k-workers. The sample in this study consisted of 48 final year students of Diploma in Accountancy Politeknik Sultan Haji Ahmad Shah (POLISAS), Kuantan. Questionnaire has been chosen as an instrument to get the data. The data was analyzed by using the Statistical Package For Social Sciences (SPSS) package to derive the percentages and mean. The results revealed the Diploma of Accountancy final year students are quite prepared to enter the working environment. Although the students performed very well for their career preparation, there are still dissatisfaction in other two aspects i.e. they lack of information career opportunity and communication in English. Therefore, the career guideline have been proposed to give an exposure for the students to be k-workers in their career in the future

Electricity transmission: an overview of the current debate

Electricity transmission has emerged as critical for successfully liberalising powermarkets. This paper surveys the issues currently under discussion and provides a framework for the remaining papers in this issue. We conclude that signalling the efficient location of generation investment might require even a competitive LMP system to be complemented with deep connection charges. Although a Europe-wide LMP system is desirable, it appears politically problematic, so an integrated system of market coupling, possibly evolving by voluntary participation, should have high priority. Merchant investors may be able to increase interconnector capacity, although this is not unproblematic and raises new regulatory issues. A key issue that needs further research is how to better incentivize TSOs, especially with respect to cross-border issues

Allocation, incentives and distortions: the impact of EU ETS emissions allowance allocations to the electricity sector

The allowance allocation under the European Emission trading schemes differs fundamentally from earlier cap and trade programs, like SO2 and NOx in the USA. Because of the iterative nature of negotiations of the overall budget, the allocation also has to follow an iterative process. If power generators anticipate that their current behaviour will affect future allowance allocation, then this can distort today’s decisions. Furthermore, the National Allocation Plans (NAPs) contain multiple provisions dealing with existing installations, what happens to allocation when they close, and allocations to new entrants. We provide a framework to assess the economic incentives and distortions that provisions in NAPs can have on market prices, operation and investment decisions. To this end, we use both analytic models to illustrate the incentives effects and results from numerical simulation runs that estimate the magnitude of impacts from different allocation rules

A Tracing Method for Pricing Inter-Area Electricity Trades

In the context of liberalisation of electricity markets world wide, the need for agreed protocols for electricity trades between systems with different charges poses a special challenge. System operators need to know how much a given trade uses the network, in order to allocate an appropriate portion of their costs to that trade. This paper discusses a technique, tracing, for determining how much each of a number of trades uses different parts of the electricity network. The scheme is based on the assumption that at any network node, inflows are shared proportionally between outflows (and vice versa). The paper outlines the technique and shows how it could be applied to the problem of charging cross-border trades. The paper goes on to demonstrate that the technique has a game theoretic rationale, in that it produces the Shapley value solution to a game equivalent to this allocation problem

Flow-based analysis of storage usage in a low-carbon European electricity scenario

The application of the flow tracing method to power flows in and out of storage units allows to analyse the usage of this technology option in large-scale interconnected electricity systems. We apply this method to a data-driven model of the European electricity network, which uses a techno-economic optimisation to determine generation and storage capacities and dispatch, assuming a 95% reduction of CO2 emission compared to 1990 levels. A flow-based analysis of the power inflow into the different storage technologies confirms the intuition that longer-term hydrogen storage is mainly utilised for wind, whereas short-term battery storage mostly receives inflow from solar power generation. The usage of storage technologies in general shows a local-but-global behaviour: Whereas on average the power outflow from these capacities is predominantly consumed locally inside the same node, when exported it is also transmitted over long distances as a global flexibility option for the entire system.Comment: 15th International Conference on the European Energy Market - EEM 201

A Typical Case of Weak Institutional Complementarity in Institution Building : The Design of Transmission Network Monopoly in Competitive Electricity Markets

In a “Weak institutional complementarity” type of institution building it is typically the less replaceable institutional characteristic which dictates the path of change for the institution as a whole. We will show it is exactly what explains the diversity and imperfection of actual transmission monopoly designs in competitive electricity markets. Firstly we argue that transmission monopoly in competitive electricity markets has to be analysed within an industry modular frame. Transmission is a set of several modules which have to be distinguished and separated in any design analysis and comparison. At least three modules make the core of transmission design: 1° the short run management of network externality; 2° the short run management of cross border trade; and 3° the long run management of network investment. Second in a new-institutional economics perspective we say that 1°monopoly design in a competitive policy cannot handle these three modules irrespective of the “institutional” definition and allocation of property rights on transmission; while 2°definition and allocation of property rights on transmission cannot ignore the existing electrical industry and transmission network structure: they basically have to complement each other. Third we apply this frame to compare PJM (USA) and NGC (UK) and we show it remarkably illuminates the reality.TSO; weak institutional complementarity; modular analysis

The EU Emissions Trading System and Climate Policy towards 2050: Real incentives to reduce emissions and drive innovation? CEPS Special Reports, 12 January 2011

With the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) now entering in its seventh year of operation, this report takes stock of the largest multi-sector greenhouse gas trading scheme in the world. It reviews the experiences of the pilot phase from 2005-07, assesses the adjustments introduced in the second phase (2008-12) and looks ahead to the radical changes that will come into effect in the third phase starting in 2013. The assessment is based on a literature review of recently published ex-post analyses and ex-ante studies and draws as well on our own calculations. It investigates the main controversies surrounding the EU ETS, such as its environmental effectiveness, economic rents, windfall profits and fairness, the role of CDM and JI and its impact of on industrial competitiveness. It also evaluates the scheme’s ability to promote innovation and low-carbon technology deployment. Finally, the study addresses the fundamental question of whether the ETS has lived up to its promise to “promote reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient manner”, and if not, what are the prospects of its doing so in the future and what additional changes will be required

Allocation and competitiveness in the EU emissions trading scheme: policy overview

The European emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) has an efficient and effective market design that risks being undermined by three interrelated problems: the approach to allocation; the absence of a credible commitment to post-2012 continuation; and concerns about its impact on the international competitiveness of key sectors. This special issue of Climate Policy explores these three factors in depth. This policy overview summarizes key insights from the individual studies in this issue, and draws overall policy conclusions about the next round of allocations and the design of the system for the longer term