51,231 research outputs found

    Truthful Assignment without Money

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    We study the design of truthful mechanisms that do not use payments for the generalized assignment problem (GAP) and its variants. An instance of the GAP consists of a bipartite graph with jobs on one side and machines on the other. Machines have capacities and edges have values and sizes; the goal is to construct a welfare maximizing feasible assignment. In our model of private valuations, motivated by impossibility results, the value and sizes on all job-machine pairs are public information; however, whether an edge exists or not in the bipartite graph is a job's private information. We study several variants of the GAP starting with matching. For the unweighted version, we give an optimal strategyproof mechanism; for maximum weight bipartite matching, however, we show give a 2-approximate strategyproof mechanism and show by a matching lowerbound that this is optimal. Next we study knapsack-like problems, which are APX-hard. For these problems, we develop a general LP-based technique that extends the ideas of Lavi and Swamy to reduce designing a truthful mechanism without money to designing such a mechanism for the fractional version of the problem, at a loss of a factor equal to the integrality gap in the approximation ratio. We use this technique to obtain strategyproof mechanisms with constant approximation ratios for these problems. We then design an O(log n)-approximate strategyproof mechanism for the GAP by reducing, with logarithmic loss in the approximation, to our solution for the value-invariant GAP. Our technique may be of independent interest for designing truthful mechanisms without money for other LP-based problems.Comment: Extended abstract appears in the 11th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), 201

    Generalized Assignment via Submodular Optimization with Reserved Capacity

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    We study a variant of the generalized assignment problem (GAP) with group constraints. An instance of (Group GAP) is a set I of items, partitioned into L groups, and a set of m uniform (unit-sized) bins. Each item i in I has a size s_i >0, and a profit p_{i,j} >= 0 if packed in bin j. A group of items is satisfied if all of its items are packed. The goal is to find a feasible packing of a subset of the items in the bins such that the total profit from satisfied groups is maximized. We point to central applications of Group GAP in Video-on-Demand services, mobile Device-to-Device network caching and base station cooperation in 5G networks. Our main result is a 1/6-approximation algorithm for Group GAP instances where the total size of each group is at most m/2. At the heart of our algorithm lies an interesting derivation of a submodular function from the classic LP formulation of GAP, which facilitates the construction of a high profit solution utilizing at most half the total bin capacity, while the other half is reserved for later use. In particular, we give an algorithm for submodular maximization subject to a knapsack constraint, which finds a solution of profit at least 1/3 of the optimum, using at most half the knapsack capacity, under mild restrictions on element sizes. Our novel approach of submodular optimization subject to a knapsack with reserved capacity constraint may find applications in solving other group assignment problems
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