Impossibilities of Paretian Social Welfare Functions for Infinite Utility Streams with Distributive Equity

This paper examines the logical relationship between distributive equity and efficiency in aggregating infinite utility streams. Our main results show that there exist social welfare functions which satisfy the axioms of Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle and a weak version of efficiency, but there exists no social welfare function which satisfies all of the distributive equity requirements and Weak Pareto Principle at the same time. Thus, we can prove that no Paretian ranking can satisfy the numerical representability and all of the distributive equity properties in the setting of intertemporal social choice.

Should we discount future generations’ welfare? A survey on the “pure” discount rate debate.

In A Mathematical Theory of Saving (1928), Frank Ramsey not only laid the foundations of the fruitful optimal growth literature, but also launched a major moral debate: should we discount future generations’ well-being? While Ramsey regarded such “pure” discounting as “ethically indefensible”, several philosophers and economists have developed arguments justifying the “pure” discounting practice since the early 1960s. This essay consists of a survey of those arguments. After a brief examination of the – often implicit – treatment of future generations’ welfare by utilitarian thinkers before Ramsey’s view was expressed, later arguments of various kinds are analysed. It is argued that, under the assumption of perfect certainty regarding future human life, the “pure” discounting practice seems ethically untenable. However, once we account for the uncertainty regarding future generations’ existence, “pure” discounting seems more acceptable, even if strong criticisms still remain, especially regarding the adequateness of the expected utility theory in such a normative context. those limits would be faced by any other consequences-based ethical theory in front of Different Number Choices.

How can pure social discounting be ethically justified?

The evaluation of long-term effects of climate change in cost-benefit analysis has a long tradition in environmental economics. Since the publication of the Stern Review in 2006 the debate about the "appropriate" discounting of future welfare and utility levels was revived and the most renowned scholars of the profession participated in this debate. In two recent contributions in Environmental and Resource Economics, there was dispute about intertemporal welfare economics between Partha Dasgupta and John Roemer about the correct interpretation of the topic. The aim of this work is to bring together economic and philosophical reasoning about justice and intergenerational equity in the context of climate change. So we adopt the normative view in order to present the most important ethical issues that, particularly in the context of climate policy, are most relevant for the choice of intertemporal discounting. Subsequently we explore whether ethical considerations may also be helpful to justify pure social discounting per se

Translation invariance when utility streams are infinite and unbounded

The axiom translation invariance consists in asserting the invariance of the ranking of two utility streams if one applies the same translation to both. This axiom is significant in the characterization of utilitarian criteria in finite dimension. This characterization is achieved thanks to the "weak weighted utilitarianism theorem".The objective here is to propose a generalization of this theorem in a space of infinite and unbounded utility streams. A consequence of the suggested generalization is that, in the context of intergenerational choice, every maximal point with respect to a paretian utilitarian order granting comparable considerations to the present and the future, is also a maximal point with respect to some future-oriented criterion.Translation invariance; Infinite utility streams; Utilitarianism; Intergenerational equity

Future Generations: economic, legal and institutional aspects

In economics, the issue of ‘future generations’ is mainly related to the environmental problems of resource consumption and pollution and their distribution over long time horizons. This paper critically discusses fundamental concepts in economics, such as efficiency and optimality, in relation to the incorporation of future generations in present day decision-making. Cost–benefit analysis (CBA) and discounting are used as a starting point and criticized for its inherent flaws such as incommensurability of values and its tendency to hide rather than reveal underlying values which are assumed to be fixed. We then investigate alternative approaches, in which, unlike in CBA, the preferences are not assumed to be a priori but must be constructed. Thus, interest groups or individuals must sit down together and figure out what things seem to be worth. The aim is to involve all interested parties in planning for the future. Similarly, on a national and regional level, increasingly stakeholder processes, deliberative and interest group procedures are used to develop strategies and visions for resource management and conservation. A similar case can be made for institutions at the international level. The legal examples provided in this paper show that rather than only installing an institution such as the guardian for the future on the global level, more ‘democratized’ bottom up approaches might be more appropriate