Consensus as a Nash Equilibrium of a Dynamic Game

Consensus formation in a social network is modeled by a dynamic game of a prescribed duration played by members of the network. Each member independently minimizes a cost function that represents his/her motive. An integral cost function penalizes a member's differences of opinion from the others as well as from his/her own initial opinion, weighted by influence and stubbornness parameters. Each member uses its rate of change of opinion as a control input. This defines a dynamic non-cooperative game that turns out to have a unique Nash equilibrium. Analytic explicit expressions are derived for the opinion trajectory of each member for two representative cases obtained by suitable assumptions on the graph topology of the network. These trajectories are then examined under different assumptions on the relative sizes of the influence and stubbornness parameters that appear in the cost functions.Comment: 7 pages, 9 figure, Pre-print from the Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Signal Image Technology and Internet-based Systems (SITIS), 201

Kinetic models of collective decision-making in the presence of equality bias

We introduce and discuss kinetic models describing the influence of the competence in the evolution of decisions in a multi-agent system. The original exchange mechanism, which is based on the human tendency to compromise and change opinion through self-thinking, is here modified to include the role of the agents' competence. In particular, we take into account the agents' tendency to behave in the same way as if they were as good, or as bad, as their partner: the so-called equality bias. This occurred in a situation where a wide gap separated the competence of group members. We discuss the main properties of the kinetic models and numerically investigate some examples of collective decision under the influence of the equality bias. The results confirm that the equality bias leads the group to suboptimal decisions

Generalized Opinion Dynamics from Local Optimization Rules

We study generalizations of the Hegselmann-Krause (HK) model for opinion dynamics, incorporating features and parameters that are natural components of observed social systems. The first generalization is one where the strength of influence depends on the distance of the agents' opinions. Under this setup, we identify conditions under which the opinions converge in finite time, and provide a qualitative characterization of the equilibrium. We interpret the HK model opinion update rule as a quadratic cost-minimization rule. This enables a second generalization: a family of update rules which possess different equilibrium properties. Subsequently, we investigate models in which a external force can behave strategically to modulate/influence user updates. We consider cases where this external force can introduce additional agents and cases where they can modify the cost structures for other agents. We describe and analyze some strategies through which such modulation may be possible in an order-optimal manner. Our simulations demonstrate that generalized dynamics differ qualitatively and quantitatively from traditional HK dynamics.Comment: 20 pages, under revie

Collective Decision Dynamics in the Presence of External Drivers

We develop a sequence of models describing information transmission and decision dynamics for a network of individual agents subject to multiple sources of influence. Our general framework is set in the context of an impending natural disaster, where individuals, represented by nodes on the network, must decide whether or not to evacuate. Sources of influence include a one-to-many externally driven global broadcast as well as pairwise interactions, across links in the network, in which agents transmit either continuous opinions or binary actions. We consider both uniform and variable threshold rules on the individual opinion as baseline models for decision-making. Our results indicate that 1) social networks lead to clustering and cohesive action among individuals, 2) binary information introduces high temporal variability and stagnation, and 3) information transmission over the network can either facilitate or hinder action adoption, depending on the influence of the global broadcast relative to the social network. Our framework highlights the essential role of local interactions between agents in predicting collective behavior of the population as a whole.Comment: 14 pages, 7 figure

Opinion dynamics: models, extensions and external effects

Recently, social phenomena have received a lot of attention not only from social scientists, but also from physicists, mathematicians and computer scientists, in the emerging interdisciplinary field of complex system science. Opinion dynamics is one of the processes studied, since opinions are the drivers of human behaviour, and play a crucial role in many global challenges that our complex world and societies are facing: global financial crises, global pandemics, growth of cities, urbanisation and migration patterns, and last but not least important, climate change and environmental sustainability and protection. Opinion formation is a complex process affected by the interplay of different elements, including the individual predisposition, the influence of positive and negative peer interaction (social networks playing a crucial role in this respect), the information each individual is exposed to, and many others. Several models inspired from those in use in physics have been developed to encompass many of these elements, and to allow for the identification of the mechanisms involved in the opinion formation process and the understanding of their role, with the practical aim of simulating opinion formation and spreading under various conditions. These modelling schemes range from binary simple models such as the voter model, to multi-dimensional continuous approaches. Here, we provide a review of recent methods, focusing on models employing both peer interaction and external information, and emphasising the role that less studied mechanisms, such as disagreement, has in driving the opinion dynamics. [...]Comment: 42 pages, 6 figure

The roundtable: an abstract model of conversation dynamics

Is it possible to abstract a formal mechanism originating schisms and governing the size evolution of social conversations? In this work a constructive solution to such problem is proposed: an abstract model of a generic N-party turn-taking conversation. The model develops from simple yet realistic assumptions derived from experimental evidence, abstracts from conversation content and semantics while including topological information, and is driven by stochastic dynamics. We find that a single mechanism - namely the dynamics of conversational party's individual fitness, as related to conversation size - controls the development of the self-organized schisming phenomenon. Potential generalizations of the model - including individual traits and preferences, memory effects and more elaborated conversational topologies - may find important applications also in other fields of research, where dynamically-interacting and networked agents play a fundamental role.Comment: 18 pages, 4 figures, to be published in Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulatio