Reformulations of mathematical programming problems as linear complementarity problems

A family of complementarity problems are defined as extensions of the well known Linear Complementarity Problem (LCP). These are (i.) Second Linear Complementarity Problem (SLCP) which is an LCP extended by introducing further equality restrictions and unrestricted variables, (ii.) Minimum Linear Complementarity Problem (MLCP) which is an LCP with additional variables not required to be complementary and with a linear objective function which is to be minimized, (iii.) Second Minimum Linear Complementarity Problem (SMLCP) which is an MLCP but the nonnegative restriction on one of each pair of complementary variables is relaxed so that it is allowed to be unrestricted in value. A number of well known mathematical programming problems, namely quadratic programming (convex, nonconvex, pseudoconvex nonconvex), bilinear programming, game theory, zero-one integer programming, the fixed charge problem, absolute value programming, variable separable programming are reformulated as members of this family of four complementarity problems

Equilibrium modeling and solution approaches inspired by nonconvex bilevel programming

This paper introduces the concept of optimization equilibrium as an equivalently versatile definition of a generalized Nash equilibrium for multi-agent non-cooperative games. Through this modified definition of equilibrium, we draw precise connections between generalized Nash equilibria, feasibility for bilevel programming, the Nikaido-Isoda function, and classic arguments involving Lagrangian duality and social welfare maximization. Significantly, this is all in a general setting without the assumption of convexity. Along the way, we introduce the idea of minimum disequilibrium as a solution concept that reduces to traditional equilibrium when equilibrium exists. The connections with bilevel programming and related semi-infinite programming permit us to adapt global optimization methods for those classes of problems, such as constraint generation or cutting plane methods, to the problem of finding a minimum disequilibrium solution. We show that this method works, both theoretically and with a numerical example, even when the agents are modeled by mixed-integer programs

Using EPECs to model bilevel games in restructured electricity markets with locational prices

CWPE0619 (EPRG0602) Xinmin Hu and Daniel Ralph (Feb 2006) Using EPECs to model bilevel games in restructured electricity markets with locational prices We study a bilevel noncooperative game-theoretic model of electricity markets with locational marginal prices. Each player faces a bilevel optimization problem that we remodel as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints, MPEC. This gives an EPEC, equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints. We establish sufficient conditions for existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria for this class of bilevel games and give some applications. We show by examples the effect of network transmission limits, i.e. congestion, on existence of equilibria. Then we study, for more general EPECs, the weaker pure strategy concepts of local Nash and Nash stationary equilibria. We model the latter via complementarity problems, CPs. Finally, we present numerical examples of methods that attempt to find local Nash or Nash stationary equilibria of randomly generated electricity market games. The CP solver PATH is found to be rather effective in this context

Design of of model-based controllers via parametric programming

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