Posthuman Creative Styling can a creative writer’s style of writing be described as procedural?

This thesis is about creative styling — the styling a creative writer might use to make their writing unique. It addresses the question as to whether such styling can be described as procedural. Creative styling is part of the technique a creative writer uses when writing. It is how they make the text more ‘lively’ by use of tips and tricks they have either learned or discovered. In essence these are rules, ones the writer accrues over time by their practice. The thesis argues that the use and invention of these rules can be set as procedures. and so describe creative styling as procedural. The thesis follows from questioning why it is that machines or algorithms have, so far, been incapable of producing creative writing which has value. Machine-written novels do not abound on the bookshelves and writing styled by computers is, on the whole, dull in comparison to human-crafted literature. It came about by thinking how it would be possible to reach a point where writing by people and procedural writing are considered to have equal value. For this reason the thesis is set in a posthuman context, where the differences between machines and people are erased. The thesis uses practice to inform an original conceptual space model, based on quality dimensions and dynamic-inter operation of spaces. This model gives an example of the procedures which a posthuman creative writer uses when engaged in creative styling. It suggests an original formulation for the conceptual blending of conceptual spaces, based on the casting of qualities from one space to another. In support of and informing its arguments are ninety-nine examples of creative writing practice which show the procedures by which style has been applied, created and assessed. It provides a route forward for further joint research into both computational and human-coded creative writing

Creative agency

This thesis is about the agency involved with creativity. I am concerned particularly with the process of Insight Based Problem Solving (IBPS). IBPS is a problem solving process that is associated with a particular phenomenal experience, of sudden enlightenment, where new content arrives when the individual problem solver is not intentionally considering the problem at hand. The moment of insight is intuitively involuntary and as I argue for in chapter 1, is not successfully incorporated into any current account of creative agency. In chapter 2 I examine the scientific credibility of the process of IBPS. With such an account in hand I turn to the question of whether the process of IBPs is agentive. In chapter 3 I examine whether IBPS can be understood in terms of intentional action. In chapter 4 I examine whether we can be morally responsible for the products of IBPS based on previous mental actions. Neither of these approaches provides a satisfactory account of agency for IBPS because neither gives us a claim of moral responsibility for the specific products of IBPS. In chapter 5 I present a new positive account of the personal activity of IBPS. I argue that the moment of insight itself is a deliberative judgement that the content that is being brought to mind answers the question at hand. This new understanding of IBPS has implications for our understanding of mental agency, and the agentive nature of creativity

Interference patterns: Literary study, scientific knowledge, and disciplinary autonomy after the two cultures

This project interrogates the claims made for the possibility of collapsing all the various disciplines into one discipline, probably physics, and surely a science, in the name of making clearer the relations between our various fields of knowledge. This is the aim of the radical reductionist, and I take E. O. Wilson's Consilience as exemplary of such attempts. Central to Wilson's method of achieving unity is the new science of evolutionary psychology - itself a re-working of the sociobiology with which Wilson first achieved notoriety. In the on-going project of explaining culture under a Darwinian description, the evolutionary psychologists have begun to suggest explanations for the popularity and content of narrative fiction. Because they are consonant with the rest of science, these biologistic accounts of fiction might be preferable to the accounts traditionally offered by Literary Studies. Consequently, there is a risk that the traditional practices of Literary Studies will be made redundant within the academy and gradually atrophy. The demand is that Literary Studies either makes itself rigorous like the sciences (as with such projects as Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism), or else forfeit its claims to produce knowledge. Aware of this threat, some literary critics embrace forms of relativism in an attempt to deny the unity or effectiveness of scientific knowledge and so neuter the threatened takeover. Among these forms of relativism, Richard Rorty's account seeks to collapse the hierarchy of disciplines and seemingly offers Literary Studies a means of retaining its distinctive approach without denying the effectiveness of scientific knowledge. I aim to show that Literary Studies need not become a science, and that such sciences as evolutionary psychology are neither as threatening as some had feared, nor as useful to literary study as some have hoped

How sketches work: a cognitive theory for improved system design

Evidence is presented that in the early stages of design or composition the mental processes used by artists for visual invention require a different type of support from those used for visualising a nearly complete object. Most research into machine visualisation has as its goal the production of realistic images which simulate the light pattern presented to the retina by real objects. In contrast sketch attributes preserve the results of cognitive processing which can be used interactively to amplify visual thought. The traditional attributes of sketches include many types of indeterminacy which may reflect the artist's need to be "vague". Drawing on contemporary theories of visual cognition and neuroscience this study discusses in detail the evidence for the following functions which are better served by rough sketches than by the very realistic imagery favoured in machine visualising systems. 1. Sketches are intermediate representational types which facilitate the mental translation between descriptive and depictive modes of representing visual thought. 2. Sketch attributes exploit automatic processes of perceptual retrieval and object recognition to improve the availability of tacit knowledge for visual invention. 3. Sketches are percept-image hybrids. The incomplete physical attributes of sketches elicit and stabilise a stream of super-imposed mental images which amplify inventive thought. 4. By segregating and isolating meaningful components of visual experience, sketches may assist the user to attend selectively to a limited part of a visual task, freeing otherwise over-loaded cognitive resources for visual thought. 5. Sequences of sketches and sketching acts support the short term episodic memory for cognitive actions. This assists creativity, providing voluntary control over highly practised mental processes which can otherwise become stereotyped. An attempt is made to unite the five hypothetical functions. Drawing on the Baddeley and Hitch model of working memory, it is speculated that the five functions may be related to a limited capacity monitoring mechanism which makes tacit visual knowledge explicitly available for conscious control and manipulation. It is suggested that the resources available to the human brain for imagining nonexistent objects are a cultural adaptation of visual mechanisms which evolved in early hominids for responding to confusing or incomplete stimuli from immediately present objects and events. Sketches are cultural inventions which artificially mimic aspects of such stimuli in order to capture these shared resources for the different purpose of imagining objects which do not yet exist. Finally the implications of the theory for the design of improved machine systems is discussed. The untidy attributes of traditional sketches are revealed to include cultural inventions which serve subtle cognitive functions. However traditional media have many short-comings which it should be possible to correct with new technology. Existing machine systems for sketching tend to imitate nonselectively the media bound properties of sketches without regard to the functions they serve. This may prove to be a mistake. It is concluded that new system designs are needed in which meaningfully structured data and specialised imagery amplify without interference or replacement the impressive but limited creative resources of the visual brain