16 research outputs found

    An efficient hardware implementation of SM4

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    Area-Efficient Hardware Architectures of MISTY1 Block Cipher

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    In this paper, state-of-the-art hardware implementations of MISTY1 block cipher are presented for area-constrained wireless applications. The proposed MISTY1 architectures are characterized of highly optimized transformation functions i.e. FL and {FO-XOR-EKG}. The FL function re-utilizes logic AND-OR-XOR combinations whereas {FO-XOR-EKG} function explores 2 × compact design schemes for s-boxes implementation. A Combined Substitution Unit (CSU) and threshold area implementation are proposed for s-boxes based on Boolean reductions and Common Sub-expression Eliminations (CSEs). Besides, {FO-XOR-EKG} function is designed for manifold operations of FO / FI functions, 32-bit XOR operation and extended key generation thereby reducing the area. Hardware implementations on ASIC 180nm, 1.8V standard library cell realized compact and threshold MISTY1 designs constituting 1853 and 1546 NAND gates with throughput values of 41.6 Mbps and 4.72 Mbps respectively. A comprehensive comparison with existing cryptographic hardware designs establishes that the proposed MISTY1 architectures are the most area-efficient implementations till date

    DEFAULT : cipher level resistance against differential fault attack

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    Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) is a well known cryptanalytic tech- nique that exploits faulty outputs of an encryption device. Despite its popularity and similarity with the classical Differential Analysis (DA), a thorough analysis explaining DFA from a designer’s point-of-view is missing in the literature. To the best of our knowledge, no DFA immune block cipher at an algorithmic level has been proposed so far. Furthermore, all known DFA countermeasures somehow depend on the device/protocol or on the implementation such as duplication/comparison. As all of these are outside the scope of the cipher designer, we focus on designing a primitive which can protect from DFA on its own. We present the first concept of cipher level DFA resistance which does not rely on any device/protocol related assumption, nor does it depend on any form of duplication. Our construction is simple, software/hardware friendly and DFA security scales up with the state size. It can be plugged before and/or after (almost) any symmetric key cipher and will ensure a non-trivial search complexity against DFA. One key component in our DFA protection layer is an SBox with linear structures. Such SBoxes have never been used in cipher design as they generally perform poorly against differential attacks. We argue that they in fact represent an interesting trade-off between good cryptographic properties and DFA resistance. As a proof of concept, we construct a DFA protecting layer, named DEFAULT-LAYER, as well as a full-fledged block cipher DEFAULT. Our solutions compare favorably to the state-of-the-art, offering advantages over the sophisticated duplication based solutions like impeccable circuits/CRAFT or infective countermeasures

    Cryptanalysis, Reverse-Engineering and Design of Symmetric Cryptographic Algorithms

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    In this thesis, I present the research I did with my co-authors on several aspects of symmetric cryptography from May 2013 to December 2016, that is, when I was a PhD student at the university of Luxembourg under the supervision of Alex Biryukov. My research has spanned three different areas of symmetric cryptography. In Part I of this thesis, I present my work on lightweight cryptography. This field of study investigates the cryptographic algorithms that are suitable for very constrained devices with little computing power such as RFID tags and small embedded processors such as those used in sensor networks. Many such algorithms have been proposed recently, as evidenced by the survey I co-authored on this topic. I present this survey along with attacks against three of those algorithms, namely GLUON, PRINCE and TWINE. I also introduce a new lightweight block cipher called SPARX which was designed using a new method to justify its security: the Long Trail Strategy. Part II is devoted to S-Box reverse-engineering, a field of study investigating the methods recovering the hidden structure or the design criteria used to build an S-Box. I co-invented several such methods: a statistical analysis of the differential and linear properties which was applied successfully to the S-Box of the NSA block cipher Skipjack, a structural attack against Feistel networks called the yoyo game and the TU-decomposition. This last technique allowed us to decompose the S-Box of the last Russian standard block cipher and hash function as well as the only known solution to the APN problem, a long-standing open question in mathematics. Finally, Part III presents a unifying view of several fields of symmetric cryptography by interpreting them as purposefully hard. Indeed, several cryptographic algorithms are designed so as to maximize the code size, RAM consumption or time taken by their implementations. By providing a unique framework describing all such design goals, we could design modes of operations for building any symmetric primitive with any form of hardness by combining secure cryptographic building blocks with simple functions with the desired form of hardness called plugs. Alex Biryukov and I also showed that it is possible to build plugs with an asymmetric hardness whereby the knowledge of a secret key allows the privileged user to bypass the hardness of the primitive

    Cryptanalysis and Secure Implementation of Modern Cryptographic Algorithms

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    Cryptanalytic attacks can be divided into two classes: pure mathematical attacks and Side Channel Attacks (SCAs). Pure mathematical attacks are traditional cryptanalytic techniques that rely on known or chosen input-output pairs of the cryptographic function and exploit the inner structure of the cipher to reveal the secret key information. On the other hand, in SCAs, it is assumed that attackers have some access to the cryptographic device and can gain some information from its physical implementation. Cold-boot attack is a SCA which exploits the data remanence property of Random Access Memory (RAM) to retrieve its content which remains readable shortly after its power has been removed. Fault analysis is another example of SCAs in which the attacker is assumed to be able to induce faults in the cryptographic device and observe the faulty output. Then, by careful inspection of faulty outputs, the attacker recovers the secret information, such as secret inner state or secret key. Scan-based Design-For-Test (DFT) is a widely deployed technique for testing hardware chips. Scan-based SCAs exploit the information obtained by analyzing the scanned data in order to retrieve secret information from cryptographic hardware devices that are designed with this testability feature. In the first part of this work, we investigate the use of an off-the-shelf SAT solver, CryptoMinSat, to improve the key recovery of the Advance Encryption Standard (AES-128) key schedules from its corresponding decayed memory images which can be obtained using cold-boot attacks. We also present a fault analysis on both NTRUEncrypt and NTRUSign cryptosystems. For this specific original instantiation of the NTRU encryption system with parameters (N,p,q)(N,p,q), our attack succeeds with probability 11p\approx 1-\frac{1}{p} and when the number of faulted coefficients is upper bounded by tt, it requires O((pN)t)O((pN)^t) polynomial inversions in Z/pZ[x]/(xN1)\mathbb Z/p\mathbb Z[x]/(x^{N}-1). We also investigate several techniques to strengthen hardware implementations of NTRUEncrypt against this class of attacks. For NTRUSign with parameters (NN, q=plq=p^l, B\mathcal{B}, \emph{standard}, N\mathcal{N}), when the attacker is able to skip the norm-bound signature checking step, our attack needs one fault to succeed with probability 11p\approx 1-\frac{1}{p} and requires O((qN)t)O((qN)^t) steps when the number of faulted polynomial coefficients is upper bounded by tt. The attack is also applicable to NTRUSign utilizing the \emph{transpose} NTRU lattice but it requires double the number of fault injections. Different countermeasures against the proposed attack are also investigated. Furthermore, we present a scan-based SCA on NTRUEncrypt hardware implementations that employ scan-based DFT techniques. Our attack determines the scan chain structure of the polynomial multiplication circuits used in the decryption algorithm which allows the cryptanalyst to efficiently retrieve the secret key. Several key agreement schemes based on matrices were recently proposed. For example, \'{A}lvarez \emph{et al.} proposed a scheme in which the secret key is obtained by multiplying powers of block upper triangular matrices whose elements are defined over Zp\mathbb{Z}_p. Climent \emph{et al.} identified the elements of the endomorphisms ring End(Zp×Zp2)End(\mathbb{Z}_p \times \mathbb{Z}_{p^2}) with elements in a set, EpE_p, of matrices of size 2×22\times 2, whose elements in the first row belong to Zp\mathbb{Z}_{p} and the elements in the second row belong to Zp2\mathbb{Z}_{p^2}. Keith Salvin presented a key exchange protocol using matrices in the general linear group, GL(r,Zn)GL(r,\mathbb{Z}_n), where nn is the product of two distinct large primes. The system is fully specified in the US patent number 7346162 issued in 2008. In the second part of this work, we present mathematical cryptanalytic attacks against these three schemes and show that they can be easily broken for all practical choices of their security parameters

    SAT-based preimage attacks on SHA-1

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    Hash functions are important cryptographic primitives which map arbitrarily long messages to fixed-length message digests in such a way that: (1) it is easy to compute the message digest given a message, while (2) inverting the hashing process (e.g. finding a message that maps to a specific message digest) is hard. One attack against a hash function is an algorithm that nevertheless manages to invert the hashing process. Hash functions are used in e.g. authentication, digital signatures, and key exchange. A popular hash function used in many practical application scenarios is the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1). In this thesis we investigate the current state of the art in carrying out preimage attacks against SHA-1 using SAT solvers, and we attempt to find out if there is any room for improvement in either the encoding or the solving processes. We run a series of experiments using SAT solvers on encodings of reduced-difficulty versions of SHA-1. Each experiment tests one aspect of the encoding or solving process, such as e.g. determining whether there exists an optimal restart interval or determining which branching heuristic leads to the best average solving time. An important part of our work is to use statistically sound methods, i.e. hypothesis tests which take sample size and variation into account. Our most important result is a new encoding of 32-bit modular addition which significantly reduces the time it takes the SAT solver to find a solution compared to previously known encodings. Other results include the fact that reducing the absolute size of the search space by fixing bits of the message up to a certain point actually results in an instance that is harder for the SAT solver to solve. We have also identified some slight improvements to the parameters used by the heuristics of the solver MiniSat; for example, contrary to assertions made in the literature, we find that using longer restart intervals improves the running time of the solver

    Cost effective technology applied to domotics and smart home energy management systems

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    Premio extraordinario de Trabajo Fin de Máster curso 2019/2020. Máster en Energías Renovables DistribuidasIn this document is presented the state of art for domotics cost effective technologies available on market nowadays, and how to apply them in Smart Home Energy Management Systems (SHEMS) allowing peaks shaving, renewable management and home appliance controls, always in cost effective context in order to be massively applied. Additionally, beyond of SHEMS context, it will be also analysed how to apply this technology in order to increase homes energy efficiency and monitoring of home appliances. Energy management is one of the milestones for distributed renewable energy spread; since renewable energy sources are not time-schedulable, are required control systems capable of the management for exchanging energy between conventional sources (power grid), renewable sources and energy storage sources. With the proposed approach, there is a first block dedicated to show an overview of Smart Home Energy Management Systems (SMHEMS) classical architecture and functional modules of SHEMS; next step is to analyse principles which has allowed some devices to become a cost-effective technology. Once the technology has been analysed, it will be reviewed some specific resources (hardware and software) available on marked for allowing low cost SHEMS. Knowing the “tools” available; it will be shown how to adapt classical SHEMS to cost effective technology. Such way, this document will show some specific applications of SHEMS. Firstly, in a general point of view, comparing the proposed low-cost technology with one of the main existing commercial proposals; and secondly, developing the solution for a specific real case.En este documento se aborda el estado actual de la domótica de bajo coste disponible en el mercado actualmente y cómo aplicarlo en los sistemas inteligentes de gestión energética en la vivienda (SHEMS) permitiendo el recorte de las puntas de demanda, gestión de energías renovables y control de electrodomésticos, siempre en el contexto del bajo coste, con el objetivo de lograr la máxima difusión de los SHEMS. Adicionalmente, más allá del contexto de la tecnología SHEMS, se analizará cómo aplicar esta tecnología para aumentar la eficiencia energética de los hogares y para la supervisión de los electrodomésticos. La gestión energética es uno de los factores principales para lograr la difusión de las energías renovables distribuidas; debido a que las fuentes de energía renovable no pueden ser planificadas, se requieren sistemas de control capaces de gestionar el intercambio de energía entre las fuentes convencionales (red eléctrica de distribución), energías renovables y dispositivos de almacenamiento energético. Bajo esta perspectiva, este documento presenta un primer bloque en el que se exponen las bases de la arquitectura y módulos funcionales de los sistemas inteligentes de gestión energética en la vivienda (SHEMS); el siguiente paso será analizar los principios que han permitido a ciertos dispositivos convertirse en dispositivos de bajo coste. Una vez analizada la tecnología, nos centraremos en los recursos (hardware y software) existentes que permitirán la realización de un SHEMS a bajo coste. Conocidas las “herramientas” a nuestra disposición, se mostrará como adaptar un esquema SHEMS clásico a la tecnología de bajo coste. Primeramente, comparando de modo genérico la tecnología de bajo coste con una de las principales propuestas comerciales de SHEMS, para seguidamente desarrollar la solución de bajo coste a un caso específico real

    6th International Conference on Mechanical Models in Structural Engineering

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    Producción CientíficaThis ebook contains the 37 full papers submitted to the 6th International Conference on Mechanical Models in Structural Engineering (CMMOST 2021) held in Valladolid on December 2021
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