11,257 research outputs found
On Simultaneous Two-player Combinatorial Auctions
We consider the following communication problem: Alice and Bob each have some
valuation functions and over subsets of items,
and their goal is to partition the items into in a way that
maximizes the welfare, . We study both the allocation
problem, which asks for a welfare-maximizing partition and the decision
problem, which asks whether or not there exists a partition guaranteeing
certain welfare, for binary XOS valuations. For interactive protocols with
communication, a tight 3/4-approximation is known for both
[Fei06,DS06].
For interactive protocols, the allocation problem is provably harder than the
decision problem: any solution to the allocation problem implies a solution to
the decision problem with one additional round and additional bits of
communication via a trivial reduction. Surprisingly, the allocation problem is
provably easier for simultaneous protocols. Specifically, we show:
1) There exists a simultaneous, randomized protocol with polynomial
communication that selects a partition whose expected welfare is at least
of the optimum. This matches the guarantee of the best interactive, randomized
protocol with polynomial communication.
2) For all , any simultaneous, randomized protocol that
decides whether the welfare of the optimal partition is or correctly with probability requires
exponential communication. This provides a separation between the attainable
approximation guarantees via interactive () versus simultaneous () protocols with polynomial communication.
In other words, this trivial reduction from decision to allocation problems
provably requires the extra round of communication
Learning a Partitioning Advisor with Deep Reinforcement Learning
Commercial data analytics products such as Microsoft Azure SQL Data Warehouse
or Amazon Redshift provide ready-to-use scale-out database solutions for
OLAP-style workloads in the cloud. While the provisioning of a database cluster
is usually fully automated by cloud providers, customers typically still have
to make important design decisions which were traditionally made by the
database administrator such as selecting the partitioning schemes.
In this paper we introduce a learned partitioning advisor for analytical
OLAP-style workloads based on Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL). The main idea
is that a DRL agent learns its decisions based on experience by monitoring the
rewards for different workloads and partitioning schemes. We evaluate our
learned partitioning advisor in an experimental evaluation with different
databases schemata and workloads of varying complexity. In the evaluation, we
show that our advisor is not only able to find partitionings that outperform
existing approaches for automated partitioning design but that it also can
easily adjust to different deployments. This is especially important in cloud
setups where customers can easily migrate their cluster to a new set of
(virtual) machines
Envy Freedom and Prior-free Mechanism Design
We consider the provision of an abstract service to single-dimensional
agents. Our model includes position auctions, single-minded combinatorial
auctions, and constrained matching markets. When the agents' values are drawn
from a distribution, the Bayesian optimal mechanism is given by Myerson (1981)
as a virtual-surplus optimizer. We develop a framework for prior-free mechanism
design and analysis. A good mechanism in our framework approximates the optimal
mechanism for the distribution if there is a distribution; moreover, when there
is no distribution this mechanism still performs well.
We define and characterize optimal envy-free outcomes in symmetric
single-dimensional environments. Our characterization mirrors Myerson's theory.
Furthermore, unlike in mechanism design where there is no point-wise optimal
mechanism, there is always a point-wise optimal envy-free outcome.
Envy-free outcomes and incentive-compatible mechanisms are similar in
structure and performance. We therefore use the optimal envy-free revenue as a
benchmark for measuring the performance of a prior-free mechanism. A good
mechanism is one that approximates the envy free benchmark on any profile of
agent values. We show that good mechanisms exist, and in particular, a natural
generalization of the random sampling auction of Goldberg et al. (2001) is a
constant approximation
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