Strong Stationarity Conditions for Optimal Control of Hybrid Systems

We present necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for finite time optimal control problems for a class of hybrid systems described by linear complementarity models. Although these optimal control problems are difficult in general due to the presence of complementarity constraints, we provide a set of structural assumptions ensuring that the tangent cone of the constraints possesses geometric regularity properties. These imply that the classical Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions of nonlinear programming theory are both necessary and sufficient for local optimality, which is not the case for general mathematical programs with complementarity constraints. We also present sufficient conditions for global optimality. We proceed to show that the dynamics of every continuous piecewise affine system can be written as the optimizer of a mathematical program which results in a linear complementarity model satisfying our structural assumptions. Hence, our stationarity results apply to a large class of hybrid systems with piecewise affine dynamics. We present simulation results showing the substantial benefits possible from using a nonlinear programming approach to the optimal control problem with complementarity constraints instead of a more traditional mixed-integer formulation.Comment: 30 pages, 4 figure

Reformulations of mathematical programming problems as linear complementarity problems

A family of complementarity problems are defined as extensions of the well known Linear Complementarity Problem (LCP). These are (i.) Second Linear Complementarity Problem (SLCP) which is an LCP extended by introducing further equality restrictions and unrestricted variables, (ii.) Minimum Linear Complementarity Problem (MLCP) which is an LCP with additional variables not required to be complementary and with a linear objective function which is to be minimized, (iii.) Second Minimum Linear Complementarity Problem (SMLCP) which is an MLCP but the nonnegative restriction on one of each pair of complementary variables is relaxed so that it is allowed to be unrestricted in value. A number of well known mathematical programming problems, namely quadratic programming (convex, nonconvex, pseudoconvex nonconvex), bilinear programming, game theory, zero-one integer programming, the fixed charge problem, absolute value programming, variable separable programming are reformulated as members of this family of four complementarity problems

An exact solution method for binary equilibrium problems with compensation and the power market uplift problem

We propose a novel method to find Nash equilibria in games with binary decision variables by including compensation payments and incentive-compatibility constraints from non-cooperative game theory directly into an optimization framework in lieu of using first order conditions of a linearization, or relaxation of integrality conditions. The reformulation offers a new approach to obtain and interpret dual variables to binary constraints using the benefit or loss from deviation rather than marginal relaxations. The method endogenizes the trade-off between overall (societal) efficiency and compensation payments necessary to align incentives of individual players. We provide existence results and conditions under which this problem can be solved as a mixed-binary linear program. We apply the solution approach to a stylized nodal power-market equilibrium problem with binary on-off decisions. This illustrative example shows that our approach yields an exact solution to the binary Nash game with compensation. We compare different implementations of actual market rules within our model, in particular constraints ensuring non-negative profits (no-loss rule) and restrictions on the compensation payments to non-dispatched generators. We discuss the resulting equilibria in terms of overall welfare, efficiency, and allocational equity