Configuring value networks based on subjective business values

Monetary profitability is an objective value essential to the sustainability of a value network. The analysis of this requirement continues to receive substantial attention by the e value research community thus far. However, subjective values such as privacy, security and trust might also play a key role on the configuration of a value network, especially when it is necessary to differentiate equivalent monetary value propositions. This paper describes an ontological proposition for configuring value networks based on subjective values. The ontology is aimed to be used as complement of the e value framework, blending concepts of Multiple Agency Theory, Enterprise Ontology, Value Modeling and Speech Acts Theory. We demonstrate our approach on a case scenario based on the Directive 2009/72/EC, which defines common rules for the liberalization of the European market of energy

Natural Language Ontology

The aim of natural language ontology is to uncover the ontological categories and structures that are implicit in the use of natural language, that is, that a speaker accepts when using a language. This article aims to clarify what exactly the subject matter of natural language ontology is, what sorts of linguistic data it should take into account, how natural language ontology relates to other branches of metaphysics, in what ways natural language ontology is important, and what may be distinctive of the ontological categories and structures reflected in natural language

The Negativity of Negative Propositions

The problem of truthmakers for negative propositions was introduced by Bertrand Russell in 1918. Since then the debate has mostly been concerned with whether to accept or reject their existence, and little has been said about what it is that makes a negative proposition negative. This is a problem as it is obvious that you cannot just read it off from the grammar of a sentence. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that propositions may be negative or positive in many ways: it offers a typology, and shows how the question of the existence of negative facts will receive a different answer depending on its relationship to that typology

Modelling Discourse-related terminology in OntoLingAnnot’s ontologies

Recently, computational linguists have shown great interest in discourse annotation in an attempt to capture the internal relations in texts. With this aim, we have formalized the linguistic knowledge associated to discourse into different linguistic ontologies. In this paper, we present the most prominent discourse-related terms and concepts included in the ontologies of the OntoLingAnnot annotation model. They show the different units, values, attributes, relations, layers and strata included in the discourse annotation level of the OntoLingAnnot model, within which these ontologies are included, used and evaluated

Speakable in Quantum Mechanics

At the 1927 Como conference Bohr spoke the now famous words "It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about nature." However, if the Copenhagen interpretation really holds on to this motto, why then is there this feeling of conflict when comparing it with realist interpretations? Surely what one can say about nature should in a certain sense be interpretation independent. In this paper I take Bohr's motto seriously and develop a quantum logic that avoids assuming any form of realism as much as possible. To illustrate the non-triviality of this motto a similar result is first derived for classical mechanics. It turns out that the logic for classical mechanics is a special case of the derived quantum logic. Finally, some hints are provided in how these logics are to be used in practical situations and I discuss how some realist interpretations relate to these logics

The Relevance of Rigour for Design Practise

Design is an inverted discipline. The concept of rigour, as understood within the natural sciences, cannot be applied to Design Practice. Rigour for the natural sciences is a quality assurance mechanism ensuring that the knowledge bases of the disciplines are developed to an accepted set of standards. Design’s ontology is not like the natural sciences and as such an understanding of rigour for Design must proceed from an appropriate standpoint about the nature of Design Practice. This paper builds upon Harfield’s [1] ontological assessment of Design, Schön’s [2] [3] work on Reflective Practice and Spencer’s [4] investigation into the experience and practise of designing to develop a standpoint about Design Practice and make a proposition about the relevance of rigour for Design Practise. This paper considers how individual Reflective Practice practitioners, within the context of Design Practice, manage and ensure quality control through the application of care and thoroughness. This paper argues that rigour for Design Practise is the personal and phenomenological quality control of a design inquiry: a process of managing expanding mental chaos and restricting order

Deflating Deflationary Truthmaking

In this paper we confront a challenge to truthmaker theory that is analogous to the objections raised by deflationists against substantive theories of truth. Several critics of truthmaker theory espouse a ‘deflationary’ attitude about truthmaking, though it has not been clearly presented as such. Our goal is to articulate and then object to the underlying rationale behind deflationary truthmaking. We begin by developing the analogy between deflationary truth and deflationary truthmaking, and then show how the latter can be found in the work of Dodd, Hornsby, Schnieder, Williamson, and others. These philosophers believe that the ambitions of truthmaker theory are easily satisfied, without recourse to ambitious ontological investigation—hence the analogy with deflationary truth. We argue that the deflationists’ agenda fails: there is no coherent deflationary theory of truthmaking. Truthmaking, once deflated, fails to address the questions at the heart of truthmaking investigation. Truthmaking cannot be had on the cheap

Assessing Ontological Arguments

Part I argues that ontological arguments, like other classical proofs of the existence of God, are parts of larger arguments in which they are embedded. These larger arguments include reasons supporting the proofs’ premises and responses to them, and to the proofs’ claims to validity and non-circularity, since, in the final analysis, our assessment of the proofs will express our best judgment of the cumulative force of all the considerations bearing on their overall adequacy. Part II illustrates these points by examining contemporary defences of, and attacks on, one of the ontological argument’s central premises, namely, that God’s existence is logically possible

What Makes Logical Truths True?

The concern of deductive logic is generally viewed as the systematic recognition of logical principles, i.e., of logical truths. This paper presents and analyzes different instantiations of the three main interpretations of logical principles, viz. as ontological principles, as empirical hypotheses, and as true propositions in virtue of meanings. I argue in this paper that logical principles are true propositions in virtue of the meanings of the logical terms within a certain linguistic framework. Since these principles also regulate and control the process of deduction in inquiry, i.e., they are prescriptive for the use of language and thought in inquiry, I argue that logic may, and should, be seen as an instrument or as a way of proceeding (modus procedendi) in inquiry

Construct redundancy in process modelling grammars: Improving the explanatory power of ontological analysis

Conceptual modelling supports developers and users of information systems in areas of documentation, analysis or system redesign. The ongoing interest in the modelling of business processes has led to a variety of different grammars, raising the question of the quality of these grammars for modelling. An established way of evaluating the quality of a modelling grammar is by means of an ontological analysis, which can determine the extent to which grammars contain construct deficit, overload, excess or redundancy. While several studies have shown the relevance of most of these criteria, predictions about construct redundancy have yielded inconsistent results in the past, with some studies suggesting that redundancy may even be beneficial for modelling in practice. In this paper we seek to contribute to clarifying the concept of construct redundancy by introducing a revision to the ontological analysis method. Based on the concept of inheritance we propose an approach that distinguishes between specialized and distinct construct redundancy. We demonstrate the potential explanatory power of the revised method by reviewing and clarifying previous results found in the literature