158 research outputs found

    A Socially-Aware Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing Service Market

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    Mobile Crowdsensing has shown a great potential to address large-scale problems by allocating sensing tasks to pervasive Mobile Users (MUs). The MUs will participate in a Crowdsensing platform if they can receive satisfactory reward. In this paper, in order to effectively and efficiently recruit sufficient MUs, i.e., participants, we investigate an optimal reward mechanism of the monopoly Crowdsensing Service Provider (CSP). We model the rewarding and participating as a two-stage game, and analyze the MUs' participation level and the CSP's optimal reward mechanism using backward induction. At the same time, the reward is designed taking the underlying social network effects amid the mobile social network into account, for motivating the participants. Namely, one MU will obtain additional benefits from information contributed or shared by local neighbours in social networks. We derive the analytical expressions for the discriminatory reward as well as uniform reward with complete information, and approximations of reward incentive with incomplete information. Performance evaluation reveals that the network effects tremendously stimulate higher mobile participation level and greater revenue of the CSP. In addition, the discriminatory reward enables the CSP to extract greater surplus from this Crowdsensing service market.Comment: 7 pages, accepted by IEEE Globecom'1

    Privacy Management and Optimal Pricing in People-Centric Sensing

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    With the emerging sensing technologies such as mobile crowdsensing and Internet of Things (IoT), people-centric data can be efficiently collected and used for analytics and optimization purposes. This data is typically required to develop and render people-centric services. In this paper, we address the privacy implication, optimal pricing, and bundling of people-centric services. We first define the inverse correlation between the service quality and privacy level from data analytics perspectives. We then present the profit maximization models of selling standalone, complementary, and substitute services. Specifically, the closed-form solutions of the optimal privacy level and subscription fee are derived to maximize the gross profit of service providers. For interrelated people-centric services, we show that cooperation by service bundling of complementary services is profitable compared to the separate sales but detrimental for substitutes. We also show that the market value of a service bundle is correlated with the degree of contingency between the interrelated services. Finally, we incorporate the profit sharing models from game theory for dividing the bundling profit among the cooperative service providers.Comment: 16 page

    Seamless Service Provisioning for Mobile Crowdsensing: Towards Integrating Forward and Spot Trading Markets

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    The challenge of exchanging and processing of big data over Mobile Crowdsensing (MCS) networks calls for the new design of responsive and seamless service provisioning as well as proper incentive mechanisms. Although conventional onsite spot trading of resources based on real-time network conditions and decisions can facilitate the data sharing over MCS networks, it often suffers from prohibitively long service provisioning delays and unavoidable trading failures due to its reliance on timely analysis of complex and dynamic MCS environments. These limitations motivate us to investigate an integrated forward and spot trading mechanism (iFAST), which entails a new hybrid service trading protocol over the MCS network architecture. In iFAST, the sellers (i.e., mobile users with sensing resources) can provide long-term or temporary sensing services to the buyers (i.e., sensing task owners). iFast enables signing long-term contracts in advance of future transactions through a forward trading mode, via analyzing historical statistics of the market, for which the notion of overbooking is introduced and promoted. iFAST further enables the buyers with unsatisfying service quality to recruit temporary sellers through a spot trading mode, upon considering the current market/network conditions. We analyze the fundamental blocks of iFAST, and provide a case study to demonstrate its superior performance as compared to existing methods. Finally, future research directions on reliable service provisioning for next-generation MCS networks are summarized

    A Stackelberg Game Approach Towards Socially-Aware Incentive Mechanisms for Mobile Crowdsensing (Online report)

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    Mobile crowdsensing has shown a great potential to address large-scale data sensing problems by allocating sensing tasks to pervasive mobile users. The mobile users will participate in a crowdsensing platform if they can receive satisfactory reward. In this paper, to effectively and efficiently recruit sufficient number of mobile users, i.e., participants, we investigate an optimal incentive mechanism of a crowdsensing service provider. We apply a two-stage Stackelberg game to analyze the participation level of the mobile users and the optimal incentive mechanism of the crowdsensing service provider using backward induction. In order to motivate the participants, the incentive is designed by taking into account the social network effects from the underlying mobile social domain. For example, in a crowdsensing-based road traffic information sharing application, a user can get a better and accurate traffic report if more users join and share their road information. We derive the analytical expressions for the discriminatory incentive as well as the uniform incentive mechanisms. To fit into practical scenarios, we further formulate a Bayesian Stackelberg game with incomplete information to analyze the interaction between the crowdsensing service provider and mobile users, where the social structure information (the social network effects) is uncertain. The existence and uniqueness of the Bayesian Stackelberg equilibrium are validated by identifying the best response strategies of the mobile users. Numerical results corroborate the fact that the network effects tremendously stimulate higher mobile participation level and greater revenue of the crowdsensing service provider. In addition, the social structure information helps the crowdsensing service provider to achieve greater revenue gain.Comment: Submitted for possible journal publication. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1711.0105

    Incentive Mechanisms for Participatory Sensing: Survey and Research Challenges

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    Participatory sensing is a powerful paradigm which takes advantage of smartphones to collect and analyze data beyond the scale of what was previously possible. Given that participatory sensing systems rely completely on the users' willingness to submit up-to-date and accurate information, it is paramount to effectively incentivize users' active and reliable participation. In this paper, we survey existing literature on incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing systems. In particular, we present a taxonomy of existing incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing systems, which are subsequently discussed in depth by comparing and contrasting different approaches. Finally, we discuss an agenda of open research challenges in incentivizing users in participatory sensing.Comment: Updated version, 4/25/201

    Incentive Mechanism Design in Mobile Crowdsensing Systems

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    In the past few years, the popularity of Mobile Crowdsensing Systems (MCSs) has been greatly prompted, in which sensory data can be ubiquitously collected and shared by mobile devices in a distributed fashion. Typically, a MCS consists of a cloud platform, sensing tasks, and mobile users equipped with mobile devices, in which the mobile users carry out sensing tasks and receive monetary rewards as compensation for resource consumption ( e.g., energy, bandwidth, and computation) and risk of privacy leakage ( e.g., location exposure). Compared with traditional mote-class sensor networks, MCSs can reduce the cost of deploying specialized sensing infrastructures and enable many applications that require resources and sensing modalities beyond the current mote-class sensor processes as today’s mobile devices (smartphones (iPhones, Sumsung Galaxy), tablets (iPad) and vehicle-embedded sensing devices (GPS)) integrate more computing, communication, and storage resources than traditional mote-class sensors. The current applications of MCSs include traffic congestion detection, wireless indoor localization, pollution monitoring, etc . There is no doubt that one of the most significant characteristics of MCSs is the active involvement of mobile users to collect and share sensory data. In this dissertation, we study the incentive mechanism design in mobile crowdsensing system with consideration of economic properties. Firstly, we investigate the problem of joining sensing task assignment and scheduling in MCSs with the following three considerations: i) partial fulfillment, ii) attribute diversity, and iii) price diversity. Then, we design a distributed auction framework to allow each task owner to independently process its local auction without collecting global information in a MCS, reducing communication cost. Next, we propose a cost-preferred auction scheme (CPAS) to assign each winning mobile user one or more sub- working time durations and a time schedule-preferred auction scheme (TPAS) to allocate each winning mobile user a continuous working time duration. Secondly, we focus on the design of an incentive mechanism for an MCS to minimize the social cost. The social cost represents the total cost of mobile devices when all tasks published by the MCS are finished. We first present the working process of a MCS, and then build an auction market for the MCS where the MCS platform acts as an auctioneer and users with mobile devices act as bidders. Depending on the different requirements of the MCS platform, we design a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)-based auction mechanism for the continuous working pattern and a suboptimal auction mechanism for the discontinuous working pattern. Both of them can ensure that the bidding of users are processed in a truthful way and the utilities of users are maximized. Through rigorous theoretical analysis and comprehensive simulations, we can prove that these incentive mechanisms satisfy economic properties and can be implemented in reasonable time complexcity. Next, we discuss the importance of fairness and unconsciousness of MCS surveillance applications. Then, we propose offline and online incentive mechanisms with fair task scheduling based on the proportional share allocation rules. Furthermore, to have more sensing tasks done over time dimension, we relax the truthfulness and unconsciousness property requirements and design a (ε, μ)-unconsciousness online incentive mechanism. Real map data are used to validate these proposed incentive mechanisms through extensive simulations. Finally, future research topics are proposed to complete the dissertation

    Understanding the current trends in mobile crowdsensing - a business model perspective: case MyGeo Trust

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    Crowdsensing and personal data markets that have emerged around it have rapidly gained momentum in parallel with the appearance of mobile devices. Collecting information via mobile sensors and the applications relying on these, the privacy of mobile users can be threatened, especially in the case of location-related data. In 2015, a research project called MyGeoTrust was initiated to investigate this issue. One aim of the project was to study the potential business models for a trusted, open-source crowdsourcing platform. This study, carried within the MyGeoTrust project, reviews existing literature about business models, location-based services, and open-source software development. It then investigates the relationship between these topics and mobile crowdsensing. As a whole, this thesis provides an overview on the development of location-based services, as well as the current trends and business models in crowdsensing. The empirical part of the thesis employs embedded case study methodology, acquiring empirical data from several sources. The analyzed case is the MyGeoTrust project itself, and other empirical data is collected via market analysis, interim reports, a user survey, and semi-structured interviews. This material forms the baseline for the empirical study and project-specific recommendations. The findings suggest that creating a two- or multisided platform is the most robust business model for mobile crowdsensing. The identified benefits of platform-based business models include facilitating the value exchange between self-governing groups and possibilities to build positive network effects. This is especially the case with open-source software and open data since the key value for users - or “the crowd” in other terms - is created through network effects. In the context of open business models, strategic planning, principally licensing, plays a central role. Also, for a differentiated platform like MyGeoTrust finding the critical mass of users is crucial, in order to create an appealing alternative to current market leaders. Lastly, this study examines how transformational political or legal factors may shape the scene and create requirements for novel, privacy-perceiving solutions. In the present case study, the upcoming European Union (EU) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) legislation is a central example of such a factor

    Integration of Blockchain and Auction Models: A Survey, Some Applications, and Challenges

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    In recent years, blockchain has gained widespread attention as an emerging technology for decentralization, transparency, and immutability in advancing online activities over public networks. As an essential market process, auctions have been well studied and applied in many business fields due to their efficiency and contributions to fair trade. Complementary features between blockchain and auction models trigger a great potential for research and innovation. On the one hand, the decentralized nature of blockchain can provide a trustworthy, secure, and cost-effective mechanism to manage the auction process; on the other hand, auction models can be utilized to design incentive and consensus protocols in blockchain architectures. These opportunities have attracted enormous research and innovation activities in both academia and industry; however, there is a lack of an in-depth review of existing solutions and achievements. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive state-of-the-art survey of these two research topics. We review the existing solutions for integrating blockchain and auction models, with some application-oriented taxonomies generated. Additionally, we highlight some open research challenges and future directions towards integrated blockchain-auction models
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