Extended Linial Hyperplane Arrangements for Root Systems and a Conjecture of Postnikov and Stanley

A hyperplane arrangement is said to satisfy the ``Riemann hypothesis'' if all roots of its characteristic polynomial have the same real part. This property was conjectured by Postnikov and Stanley for certain families of arrangements which are defined for any irreducible root system and was proved for the root system $A_{n-1}$. The proof is based on an explicit formula for the characteristic polynomial, which is of independent combinatorial significance. Here our previous derivation of this formula is simplified and extended to similar formulae for all but the exceptional root systems. The conjecture follows in these cases

Hyperplane arrangements in negatively curved manifolds and relative hyperbolicity

We show that certain aspherical manifolds arising from hyperplane arrangements in negatively curved manifolds have relatively hyperbolic fundamental group.Comment: 27 pages, minor changes, to appear in Groups, Geometry, and Dynamic

Social choice among complex objects: Mathematical tools

Here the reader can find some basic definitions and notations in order to better understand the model for social choise described by L. Marengo and S. Settepanella in their paper: Social choice among complex objects. The interested reader can refer to [Bou68], [Massey] and [OT92] to go into more depth.Arrangements, simplicial complexes, CW complexes,fundamental group, Salvetti's complex.

Social choice on complex objects: A geometric approach

Marengo and Pasquali (2008) present a model of object construction in majority voting and show that, in general, by appropriate changes of such bundles, different social outcomes may be obtained. In this paper we extend and generalize this approach by providing a geometric model of individual preferences and social aggregation based on hyperplanes and their arrangements. As an application of this model we give a necessary condition for existence of a local social optimum. Moreover we address the question if a social decision rule depends also upon the number of voting agents. More precisely: are there social decision rules that can be obtained by an odd (even) number of voting agent which cannot be obtained by only three (two) voting agent? The answer is negative. Indeed three (or two) voting agent can produce all possible social decision rules.Social choice; object construction power; agenda power; intransitive cycles; arrangements; graph theory.

Optimal strong stationary times for random walks on the chambers of a hyperplane arrangement

This paper studies Markov chains on the chambers of real hyperplane arrangements, a model that generalizes famous examples, such as the Tsetlin library and riffle shuffles. We discuss cutoff for the Tsetlin library for general weights, and we give an exact formula for the separation distance for the hyperplane arrangement walk. We introduce lower bounds, which allow for the first time to study cutoff for hyperplane arrangement walks under certain conditions. Using similar techniques, we also prove a uniform lower bound for the mixing time of Glauber dynamics on a monotone system.Comment: 13 pages. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1605.0833