Automatic goal allocation for a planetary rover with DSmT

In this chapter, we propose an approach for assigning aninterest level to the goals of a planetary rover. Assigning an interest level to goals, allows the rover to autonomously transform and reallocate the goals. The interest level is defined by data-fusing payload and navigation information. The fusion yields an 'interest map',that quantifies the level of interest of each area around the rover. In this way the planner can choose the most interesting scientific objectives to be analysed, with limited human intervention, and reallocates its goals autonomously. The Dezert-Smarandache Theory of Plausible and Paradoxical Reasoning was used for information fusion: this theory allows dealing with vague and conflicting data. In particular, it allows us to directly model the behaviour of the scientists that have to evaluate the relevance of a particular set of goals. This chaptershows an application of the proposed approach to the generation of a reliable interest map

Paradoxical Desires

I present a paradoxical combination of desires. I show why it's paradoxical, and consider ways of responding. The paradox saddles us with an unappealing trilemma: either we reject the possibility of the case by placing surprising restrictions on what we can desire, or we deny plausibly constitutive principles linking desires to the conditions under which they are satisfied, or we revise some bit of classical logic. I argue that denying the possibility of the case is unmotivated on any reasonable way of thinking about mental content, and rejecting those desire-satisfaction principles leads to revenge paradoxes. So the best response is a non-classical one, according to which certain desires are neither determinately satisfied nor determinately not satisfied. Thus, theorizing about paradoxical propositional attitudes helps constrain the space of possibilities for adequate solutions to semantic paradoxes more generally

The Sorites Paradox in Practical Philosophy

The first part of the chapter surveys some of the main ways in which the Sorites Paradox has figured in arguments in practical philosophy in recent decades, with special attention to arguments where the paradox is used as a basis for criticism. Not coincidentally, the relevant arguments all involve the transitivity of value in some way. The second part of the chapter is more probative, focusing on two main themes. First, I further address the relationship between the Sorites Paradox and the main arguments discussed in the first part, by elucidating in what sense they rely on (something like) tolerance principles. Second, I briefly discuss the prospect of rejecting the respective principles, aiming to show that we can do so for some of the arguments but not for others. The reason is that in the latter cases the principles do not function as independent premises in the reasoning but, rather, follow from certain fundamental features of the relevant scenarios. I also argue that not even adopting what is arguably the most radical way to block the Sorites Paradox – that of weakening the consequence relation – suffices to invalidate these arguments

Out of nothing

Graham Priest proposed an argument for the conclusion that \u2018nothing\u2019 occurs as a singular term and not as a quantifier in a sentence like (1) \u2018The cosmos came into existence out of nothing\u2019. Priest\u2019s point is that, intuitively, (1) entails (C) \u2018The cosmos came into existence at some time\u2019, but this entailment relation is left unexplained if \u2018nothing\u2019 is treated as a quantifier. If Priest is right, the paradoxical notion of an object that is nothing plays a role in our very understanding of reality. In this note, we argue that Priest\u2019s argument is unsound: the intuitive entailment relation between (1) and (C) does not offer convincing evidence that \u2018nothing\u2019 occurs as a term in (1). Moreover, we provide an explanation of why (1) is naturally taken to entail (C), which is both plausible and consistent with the standard, quantificational treatment of \u2018nothing\u2019