On sharing and synchronizing groupware calendars under android platform

(c) 2016 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other users, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted components of this work in other works.Sharing a calendar of tasks and events is a cornerstone in collaborative group work. Indeed, the individual work of the members of the group as well as the group work as a whole need the calendar to guide their activity and to meet the deadlines, milestones, deliverables of a project, etc. Additionally the members of the group should be able to work both offline and online, which arises when members of the group use smartphones and can eventually run out of Internet connection from time to time, or simply want to develop some activities locally. In the former case, they should have access to the calendar locally, while in the later case they should access the calendar online, shared by all members of the group. In both cases they should be able to see eventually the same information, namely the local calendars of the members should be synchronized with the group calendar. For the case of smartphones under Android system, one solution could be using the Google calendar, however, that is not easily tailorable to collaborative group work. In this paper we present an analysis, design and implementation of group work calendar that meets several requirements such as 1) sharing among all of members of the group, 2) synchronization among local calendars of members and global group calendar, 3) conflict resolution through a voting system, 4) awareness of changes in the entries (tasks, members, events, etc.) of the calendar and 5) all these requirements under proper privacy, confidentiality and security mechanisms. Moreover, we extend the sharing of calendars among different groups, a situation which often arises in enterprises when different groups need to be aware of other projects' development, or, when some members participate in more than one project at the same time.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Explanation and trust: what to tell the user in security and AI?

There is a common problem in artificial intelligence (AI) and information security. In AI, an expert system needs to be able to justify and explain a decision to the user. In information security, experts need to be able to explain to the public why a system is secure. In both cases, the goal of explanation is to acquire or maintain the users' trust. In this paper, we investigate the relation between explanation and trust in the context of computing science. This analysis draws on literature study and concept analysis, using elements from system theory as well as actor-network theory. We apply the conceptual framework to both AI and information security, and show the benefit of the framework for both fields by means of examples. The main focus is on expert systems (AI) and electronic voting systems (security). Finally, we discuss consequences of our analysis for ethics in terms of (un)informed consent and dissent, and the associated division of responsibilities

Untuned Keyboards: Online Campaigners, Citizens, and Portals in the 2002 Elections

Presents findings from a survey conducted in October and November 2002. Looks at the role that the major portals of Web traffic, online campaigners, and Internet users who got political news online played at the highlight of the 2002 mid-term elections

Seeking Anonymity in an Internet Panopticon

Obtaining and maintaining anonymity on the Internet is challenging. The state of the art in deployed tools, such as Tor, uses onion routing (OR) to relay encrypted connections on a detour passing through randomly chosen relays scattered around the Internet. Unfortunately, OR is known to be vulnerable at least in principle to several classes of attacks for which no solution is known or believed to be forthcoming soon. Current approaches to anonymity also appear unable to offer accurate, principled measurement of the level or quality of anonymity a user might obtain. Toward this end, we offer a high-level view of the Dissent project, the first systematic effort to build a practical anonymity system based purely on foundations that offer measurable and formally provable anonymity properties. Dissent builds on two key pre-existing primitives - verifiable shuffles and dining cryptographers - but for the first time shows how to scale such techniques to offer measurable anonymity guarantees to thousands of participants. Further, Dissent represents the first anonymity system designed from the ground up to incorporate some systematic countermeasure for each of the major classes of known vulnerabilities in existing approaches, including global traffic analysis, active attacks, and intersection attacks. Finally, because no anonymity protocol alone can address risks such as software exploits or accidental self-identification, we introduce WiNon, an experimental operating system architecture to harden the uses of anonymity tools such as Tor and Dissent against such attacks.Comment: 8 pages, 10 figure