Constraints and autonomy for creativity in extracurricular gamejams and curricular assessment

The engagement observed by the players of the games that they play is a desirable quality that has not gone unnoticed in the field of education, leading to concepts such as gamification of education, game-based learning and serious games for training. Game designer Sid Meier is often cited as defining games as being ‘a series of interesting decisions’. The concept of choice implies an autonomous selection from a constrained set of options. This article reflects on the impact of autonomy and constraints, and extrinsic and intrinsic motivators on students’ software development work during both curricular and extracurricular activities. Finally, a model for the design of games for game-based learning is proposed in terms of autonomy and constraints with respect to learning outcomes

Gathering the Voices: disseminating the message of the Holocaust for the digital generation by applying an interdisciplinary approach

The aim of the Gathering the Voices project is to gather testimonies from Holocaust survivors who have made their home in Scotland and to make these testimonies available on the World Wide Web. The project commenced in 2012, and a key outcome of the project is to educate current and future generations about the resilience of these survivors. Volunteers from the Jewish community are collaborating with staff and undergraduate students in Glasgow Caledonian University in developing innovative approaches to engage with school children. These multimedia approaches are essential, as future generations will be unable to interact in person with Holocaust survivors. By students being active participants in the project, they will learn more about the Holocaust and recognize the relevance of these testimonies in today’s society. Although some of the survivors have been interviewed about their journeys in fleeing from the Nazi atrocities, for all of the interviewees, this is the first time that they have been asked about their lives once they arrived in the United Kingdom. The interviews have also focused on citizenship and integration into society. The project is not yet completed, and an evaluation will be taking place to measure the effectiveness of the project in communicating its message to the public

Arena: A General Evaluation Platform and Building Toolkit for Multi-Agent Intelligence

Learning agents that are not only capable of taking tests, but also innovating is becoming a hot topic in AI. One of the most promising paths towards this vision is multi-agent learning, where agents act as the environment for each other, and improving each agent means proposing new problems for others. However, existing evaluation platforms are either not compatible with multi-agent settings, or limited to a specific game. That is, there is not yet a general evaluation platform for research on multi-agent intelligence. To this end, we introduce Arena, a general evaluation platform for multi-agent intelligence with 35 games of diverse logics and representations. Furthermore, multi-agent intelligence is still at the stage where many problems remain unexplored. Therefore, we provide a building toolkit for researchers to easily invent and build novel multi-agent problems from the provided game set based on a GUI-configurable social tree and five basic multi-agent reward schemes. Finally, we provide Python implementations of five state-of-the-art deep multi-agent reinforcement learning baselines. Along with the baseline implementations, we release a set of 100 best agents/teams that we can train with different training schemes for each game, as the base for evaluating agents with population performance. As such, the research community can perform comparisons under a stable and uniform standard. All the implementations and accompanied tutorials have been open-sourced for the community at https://sites.google.com/view/arena-unity/

A bi-level model of dynamic traffic signal control with continuum approximation

This paper proposes a bi-level model for traffic network signal control, which is formulated as a dynamic Stackelberg game and solved as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). The lower-level problem is a dynamic user equilibrium (DUE) with embedded dynamic network loading (DNL) sub-problem based on the LWR model (Lighthill and Whitham, 1955; Richards, 1956). The upper-level decision variables are (time-varying) signal green splits with the objective of minimizing network-wide travel cost. Unlike most existing literature which mainly use an on-and-off (binary) representation of the signal controls, we employ a continuum signal model recently proposed and analyzed in Han et al. (2014), which aims at describing and predicting the aggregate behavior that exists at signalized intersections without relying on distinct signal phases. Advantages of this continuum signal model include fewer integer variables, less restrictive constraints on the time steps, and higher decision resolution. It simplifies the modeling representation of large-scale urban traffic networks with the benefit of improved computational efficiency in simulation or optimization. We present, for the LWR-based DNL model that explicitly captures vehicle spillback, an in-depth study on the implementation of the continuum signal model, as its approximation accuracy depends on a number of factors and may deteriorate greatly under certain conditions. The proposed MPEC is solved on two test networks with three metaheuristic methods. Parallel computing is employed to significantly accelerate the solution procedure

Misinformative advertising

This paper analyzes how advertising can be used to mislead rivals in an oligopoly environment with demand uncertainty. In particular, we examine a two-period game in which two firms each sell a differentiated product whose attractiveness vis-à-vis the competitor's product is unknown. In each period, a firm sets prices for its product and exerts an advertising effort that is imperfectly observed by the rival later on. Advertising is persuasive in that it enhances willingness to pay, but it can also be used to manipulate rivals' beliefs about initially unobservable differences in consumers' quality perceptions. In equilibrium, each firm uses advertising to persuade consumers and to interfere with the rival's learning about this unknown dimension of demand. This can be done because the effect of imperfectly observed advertising cannot be separated out of the effect of the unknown quality differential, which creates a signal extraction problem for the competitor. There always exists acontinuum of (symmetric) equilibria, but refining the equilibrium set selects out a unique one in which firms price in the first-period as in the static equilibrium, whereas the misinformative usage of advertising makes firms under advertise if and only if the marginal cost of advertising is high enough.Firms; Productivity; Catalonia; Innovation;

Public Transit Capacity and Users' Choice: AnExperiment on Downs-Thomson Paradox

We study the Downs-Thomson paradox, a situation where an additional road capacitycan cause an overall increase in transport generalized cost and therefore a decrease in welfarefor transport users. To this end, we build an experiment based on a double market-entrygame (DMEG) where users have to choose between road and public transit after that the op-erator has choosen public transit capacity. The optimal strategy for operator is to minimizecapacity, and the equilibrium for users depend on the endogeneous public transit capacitycompared to exogeneous road capacity. The most important result is that we observe theDowns-Thomson paradox empirically in the laboratory: An increase in road capacity causesshift from road to rail and, at the end, increases total travel costs. But the contrary isnot true: A decrease in road capacity does not cause lower total travel costs, which is incontradiction with our theoretical model. Results also show that the capacity chosen byoperator di¤ers from Nash prediction, levels being signi…cantly higher than those predictedby our model. Moreover, users coordinate remarkably well on Nash equilibrium entry ratewhile capacity has been chosen by operator.traffic equilibrium, congestion, market entry game, coordination, experimental economics

Public Transit Capacity and Users Choice: AnExperiment on Downs-Thomson Paradox

We study the Downs-Thomson paradox, a situation where an additional road capacitycan cause an overall increase in transport generalized cost and therefore a decrease in welfarefor transport users. To this end, we build an experiment based on a double market-entrygame (DMEG) where users have to choose between road and public transit after that the op-erator has choosen public transit capacity. The optimal strategy for operator is to minimizecapacity, and the equilibrium for users depend on the endogeneous public transit capacitycompared to exogeneous road capacity. The most important result is that we observe theDowns-Thomson paradox empirically in the laboratory: An increase in road capacity causesshift from road to rail and, at the end, increases total travel costs. But the contrary isnot true: A decrease in road capacity does not cause lower total travel costs, which is incontradiction with our theoretical model. Results also show that the capacity chosen byoperator di¤ers from Nash prediction, levels being signi…cantly higher than those predictedby our model. Moreover, users coordinate remarkably well on Nash equilibrium entry ratewhile capacity has been chosen by operator.traffic equilibrium, public transit, congestion, experimental economics, market entry game

Game Jams as a Space to Tackle Social Issues: an Approach Based on the Critical Pedagogy

This paper introduces a framework to guide the design of educational games during game jams based on Critical Pedagogy, an educational theory grounded on the democratisation of knowledge, critical reflection and collaboration for empowering people to tackle social issues. The process and resources that compose the framework are discussed based on a case study exploring everyday sexism. The framework design has been supported by participatory activities and a trial, suggesting the adequacy of the methods and resources in engaging diverse participants with both the educational game design and the social issue. It is expected that the design process introduced here will boost the potential of game jams as a space for learning, collaboration and critical thinking