A hybrid algorithm for coalition structure generation

The current state-of-the-art algorithm for optimal coalition structure generation is IDP-IP—an algorithm that combines IDP (a dynamic programming algorithm due to Rahwan and Jennings, 2008b) with IP (a tree-search algorithm due to Rahwan et al., 2009). In this paper we analyse IDP-IP, highlight its limitations, and then develop a new approach for combining IDP with IP that overcomes these limitations

Correlation Clustering Based Coalition Formation For Multi-Robot Task Allocation

In this paper, we study the multi-robot task allocation problem where a group of robots needs to be allocated to a set of tasks so that the tasks can be finished optimally. One task may need more than one robot to finish it. Therefore the robots need to form coalitions to complete these tasks. Multi-robot coalition formation for task allocation is a well-known NP-hard problem. To solve this problem, we use a linear-programming based graph partitioning approach along with a region growing strategy which allocates (near) optimal robot coalitions to tasks in a negligible amount of time. Our proposed algorithm is fast (only taking 230 secs. for 100 robots and 10 tasks) and it also finds a near-optimal solution (up to 97.66% of the optimal). We have empirically demonstrated that the proposed approach in this paper always finds a solution which is closer (up to 9.1 times) to the optimal solution than a theoretical worst-case bound proved in an earlier work

Computational Aspects of Extending the Shapley Value to Coalitional Games with Externalities

Until recently, computational aspects of the Shapley value were only studied under the assumption that there are no externalities from coalition formation, i.e., that the value of any coalition is independent of other coalitions in the system. However, externalities play a key role in many real-life situations and have been extensively studied in the game-theoretic and economic literature. In this paper, we consider the issue of computing extensions of the Shapley value to coalitional games with externalities proposed by Myerson [21], Pham Do and Norde [23], and McQuillin [17]. To facilitate efficient computation of these extensions, we propose a new representation for coalitional games with externalities, which is based on weighted logical expressions. We demonstrate that this representation is fully expressive and, sometimes, exponentially more concise than the conventional partition function game model. Furthermore, it allows us to compute the aforementioned extensions of the Shapley value in time linear in the size of the input

Coalition structure generation in cooperative games with compact representations

This paper presents a new way of formalizing the coalition structure generation problem (CSG) so that we can apply constraint optimization techniques to it. Forming effective coalitions is a major research challenge in AI and multi-agent systems. CSG involves partitioning a set of agents into coalitions to maximize social surplus. Traditionally, the input of the CSG problem is a black-box function called a characteristic function, which takes a coalition as input and returns the value of the coalition. As a result, applying constraint optimization techniques to this problem has been infeasible. However, characteristic functions that appear in practice often can be represented concisely by a set of rules, rather than treating the function as a black box. Then we can solve the CSG problem more efficiently by directly applying constraint optimization techniques to this compact representation. We present new formalizations of the CSG problem by utilizing recently developed compact representation schemes for characteristic functions. We first characterize the complexity of CSG under these representation schemes. In this context, the complexity is driven more by the number of rules than by the number of agents. As an initial step toward developing efficient constraint optimization algorithms for solving the CSG problem, we also develop mixed integer programming formulations and show that an off-the-shelf optimization package can perform reasonably well

Resource Allocation for Device-to-Device Communications Underlaying Heterogeneous Cellular Networks Using Coalitional Games

Heterogeneous cellular networks (HCNs) with millimeter wave (mmWave) communications included are emerging as a promising candidate for the fifth generation mobile network. With highly directional antenna arrays, mmWave links are able to provide several-Gbps transmission rate. However, mmWave links are easily blocked without line of sight. On the other hand, D2D communications have been proposed to support many content based applications, and need to share resources with users in HCNs to improve spectral reuse and enhance system capacity. Consequently, an efficient resource allocation scheme for D2D pairs among both mmWave and the cellular carrier band is needed. In this paper, we first formulate the problem of the resource allocation among mmWave and the cellular band for multiple D2D pairs from the view point of game theory. Then, with the characteristics of cellular and mmWave communications considered, we propose a coalition formation game to maximize the system sum rate in statistical average sense. We also theoretically prove that our proposed game converges to a Nash-stable equilibrium and further reaches the near-optimal solution with fast convergence rate. Through extensive simulations under various system parameters, we demonstrate the superior performance of our scheme in terms of the system sum rate compared with several other practical schemes.Comment: 13 pages, 12 figure

Cloud Compute-and-Forward with Relay Cooperation

We study a cloud network with M distributed receiving antennas and L users, which transmit their messages towards a centralized decoder (CD), where M>=L. We consider that the cloud network applies the Compute-and-Forward (C&F) protocol, where L antennas/relays are selected to decode integer equations of the transmitted messages. In this work, we focus on the best relay selection and the optimization of the Physical-Layer Network Coding (PNC) at the relays, aiming at the throughput maximization of the network. Existing literature optimizes PNC with respect to the maximization of the minimum rate among users. The proposed strategy maximizes the sum rate of the users allowing nonsymmetric rates, while the optimal solution is explored with the aid of the Pareto frontier. The problem of relay selection is matched to a coalition formation game, where the relays and the CD cooperate in order to maximize their profit. Efficient coalition formation algorithms are proposed, which perform joint relay selection and PNC optimization. Simulation results show that a considerable improvement is achieved compared to existing results, both in terms of the network sum rate and the players' profits.Comment: Submitted to IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communication

Complexity of coalition structure generation

We revisit the coalition structure generation problem in which the goal is to partition the players into exhaustive and disjoint coalitions so as to maximize the social welfare. One of our key results is a general polynomial-time algorithm to solve the problem for all coalitional games provided that player types are known and the number of player types is bounded by a constant. As a corollary, we obtain a polynomial-time algorithm to compute an optimal partition for weighted voting games with a constant number of weight values and for coalitional skill games with a constant number of skills. We also consider well-studied and well-motivated coalitional games defined compactly on combinatorial domains. For these games, we characterize the complexity of computing an optimal coalition structure by presenting polynomial-time algorithms, approximation algorithms, or NP-hardness and inapproximability lower bounds.Comment: 17 page

Status-Seeking in Hedonic Games with Heterogeneous Players

We study hedonic games with heterogeneous player types that reflect her nationality, ethnic background, or skill type. Agents' preferences are dictated by status-seeking where status can be either local or global. The two dimensions of status define the two components of a generalized constant elasticity of substitution utility function. In this setting, we characterize the core as a function of the utility's parameter values and show that in all cases the corresponding cores are non-empty. We further discuss the core stable outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties.Coalitions, Core, Stability, Status-seeking

Cooperative Games with Bounded Dependency Degree

Cooperative games provide a framework to study cooperation among self-interested agents. They offer a number of solution concepts describing how the outcome of the cooperation should be shared among the players. Unfortunately, computational problems associated with many of these solution concepts tend to be intractable---NP-hard or worse. In this paper, we incorporate complexity measures recently proposed by Feige and Izsak (2013), called dependency degree and supermodular degree, into the complexity analysis of cooperative games. We show that many computational problems for cooperative games become tractable for games whose dependency degree or supermodular degree are bounded. In particular, we prove that simple games admit efficient algorithms for various solution concepts when the supermodular degree is small; further, we show that computing the Shapley value is always in FPT with respect to the dependency degree. Finally, we note that, while determining the dependency among players is computationally hard, there are efficient algorithms for special classes of games.Comment: 10 pages, full version of accepted AAAI-18 pape