Implementing direct consumption taxes in developing countries

This report examines the possibility of using a direct tax on consumption as a replacement for an existing income tax within the context of a developing country. The structural differences between income and consumption taxes are described, and some simple examples are used to illustrate the basic differences in the taxation of businesses and individuals under the two approaches. The report includesa brief survey of the extensive literature on the choice between income and consumption as the basis for a system of direct taxation. After a detailed discussion of the choice between cash flow and tax prepayment treatment at the individual level under a direct consumption tax, the analysis concludes that for simplicity reasons the individual tax prepayment approach is the more appropriate one in the developing country context. The report then describes the structure and implementation of such a direct consumption tax. The discussion includes an examination of international and transitional issues, and also comments on the desirability and feasibility of supplementary wealth taxes and taxation on a presumptive basis.Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Banks&Banking Reform,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism

Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory

This is an Invited paper for the World Congress of the Econometric Society held in Seattle in August 2000. We discuss the strong connections between auction theory and "standard" economic theory, and argue that auction-theoretic tools and intuitions can provide useful arguments and insights in a broad range of mainstream economic settings that do not, at first sight, look like auctions. We also discuss some more obvious applications, especially to industrial organization.Auctions, Bidding, Auction Theory, Private Values, Common Values, Mechanism Design, Litigation, Stock Markets, Queues, Financial Crashes, Brand Loyalty, War of Attrition, Bertrand, Perfect Competition, E-Commerce, Spectrum Auctions, Treasury Auctions, Electricity

The Allocation and Dissipation of Resource Rents: Implications for Fishery Reform

In the move to adopt rights based arrangements for renewable resources to avoid the losses of open access and the inefficiencies of prescriptive regulation, we argue that grandfathering the allotments of local users can be the most efficient distribution mechanism. We differ from the standard support among economists for auctions which contends that auctions allocate rights to the highest valued users and thereby maximize rents. Our contention is that rents are not a fixed stock as is commonly assumed, but rather depend upon the actions of those who use the natural resource and convert it into valuable goods and services. First-possession allocation assigns ownership and rents to existing users, reinforcing their incentives for stewardship and rent maximization. Resource rents are an important source of wealth and well being, especially in developing countries. By contrast the alternative, auction allocation, assigns ownership to winning bidders, but the rents are captured by the auctioneer, often the state, not local agents. We argue that there can be important efficiency effects. Our empirical focus is on fisheries, but the implications extend to other settings.

Channels of Firm Adjustment: Theory and Empirical Evidence

We provide a comprehensive analysis of how firms choose between different expansion and contraction forms, unifying existing approaches from the industrial organization and corporate finance literature. Using novel data covering almost the entire universe of UK firms, we document firms� use of internal adjustment, greenfield investment and mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We describe frequency and aggregate importance of the different channels, and show that their use varies systematically with observable firm characteristics, in particular firm size and the magnitude of adjustment. We also demonstrate that there is positive assortative matching on the UK merger market. Based on these facts, we propose a theoretical framework which accommodates all three adjustment channels in a unified setting, and is able to replicate the adjustment and matching patterns found in the data.

Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform-Price Auctions

Uniform-price auctions of a divisible good in fixed supply admit underpricing equilibria, where bidders submit high inframarginal bids to prevent competition on prices. The seller can obstruct this behavior by tilting her supply schedule and making the amount of divisible good on offer change endogenously with its (uniform) price. Precommitting to an increasing supply curve is a strategic instrument to reward aggressive bidding and enhance expected revenue. A fixed supply may not be optimal even when accounting for the cost to the seller of issuing a quantity different from her target supply.Uniform-price auction, divisible good, strategic role of the seller, endogenous supply, Treasury and IPO auctions

Channels of Firm Adjustment: Theory and Empirical Evidence

We provide a comprehensive analysis of how firms choose between different expansion and contraction forms, unifying existing approaches from the industrial organization and corporate finance literature. Using novel data covering almost the entire universe of UK firms, we document firms? use of internal adjustment, greenfield investment and mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We describe frequency and aggregate importance of the different channels, and show that their use varies systematically with observable firm characteristics, in particular firm size and the magnitude of adjustment. We also demonstrate that there is positive assortative matching on the UK merger market. Based on these facts, we propose a theoretical framework which accommodates all three adjustment channels in a unified setting, and is able to replicate the adjustment and matching patterns found in the data

(Mis)allocation of Renewable Energy Sources

Policies to incentivize the adoption of renewable energy sources (RES) usually offer little flexibility to adapt to the varying benefits of those sources at different locations within the same jurisdiction. In this paper, we propose a general framework to evaluate the geographical misallocation of RES that is potentially caused by the uniform nature of feed-in-tariffs (FiT). After estimating the dispersion of the marginal benefits from solar production in Germany, we compute the social and private costs from the current configuration of residential solar photovoltaic (PV) plants relative to a reallocation scenario in which regions with a higher PV average productivity are given higher amounts of solar capacity, while keeping the system's total capacity fixed. We find that a 20% solar installation rate and with a conservative value for the social cost of carbon, the total value of solar PV would increase by about 5% relative to the current allocation. In addition, we estimate the size of the transmission capacity between the North and the South of Germany implied by the differences in marginal costs across those regions. Reallocating solar capacity with the possibility of exporting surpluses from the South to the North would yield gains that range from 14 to 22% depending on the rate of solar penetration. A benefit-cost analysis shows that additional transmission can be beneficial if there is sufficient RES capacity reallocated across regions