Selfish Bin Covering

In this paper, we address the selfish bin covering problem, which is greatly related both to the bin covering problem, and to the weighted majority game. What we mainly concern is how much the lack of coordination harms the social welfare. Besides the standard PoA and PoS, which are based on Nash equilibrium, we also take into account the strong Nash equilibrium, and several other new equilibria. For each equilibrium, the corresponding PoA and PoS are given, and the problems of computing an arbitrary equilibrium, as well as approximating the best one, are also considered.Comment: 16 page

Approximation algorithms for distributed and selfish agents

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Mathematics, 2005.Includes bibliographical references (p. 157-165).Many real-world systems involve distributed and selfish agents who optimize their own objective function. In these systems, we need to design efficient mechanisms so that system-wide objective is optimized despite agents acting in their own self interest. In this thesis, we develop approximation algorithms and decentralized mechanisms for various combinatorial optimization problems in such systems. First, we investigate the distributed caching and a general set of assignment problems. We develop an almost tight LP-based ... approximation algorithm and a local search ... approximation algorithm for these problems. We also design efficient decentralized mechanisms for these problems and study the convergence of the corresponding games. In the following chapters, we study the speed of convergence to high quality solutions on (random) best-response paths of players. First, we study the average social value on best response paths in basic-utility, market sharing, and cut games. Then, we introduce the sink equilibrium as a new equilibrium concept. We argue that, unlike Nash equilibria, the selfish behavior of players converges to sink equilibria and all strategic games have a sink equilibrium. To illustrate the use of this new concept, we study the social value of sink equilibria in weighted selfish routing (or weighted congestion) games and valid-utility (or submodular-utility) games. In these games, we bound the average social value on random best-response paths for sink equilibria.. Finally, we study cross-monotonic cost sharings and group-strategyproof mechanisms.(cont.) We study the limitations imposed by the cross-monotonicity property on cost-sharing schemes for several combinatorial optimization games including set cover and metric facility location. We develop a novel technique based on the probabilistic method for proving upper bounds on the budget-balance factor of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes, deriving tight or nearly-tight bounds for these games. At the end, we extend some of these results to group-strategyproof mechanisms.by Vahab S. Mirrokni.Ph.D

Multiple Motives: Selfishness, altruism and reciprocal exchange in a Scottish charity shop

No abstract

Performance evaluation of cooperation strategies for m-health services and applications

Health telematics are becoming a major improvement for patients’ lives, especially for disabled, elderly, and chronically ill people. Information and communication technologies have rapidly grown along with the mobile Internet concept of anywhere and anytime connection. In this context, Mobile Health (m-Health) proposes healthcare services delivering, overcoming geographical, temporal and even organizational barriers. Pervasive and m-Health services aim to respond several emerging problems in health services, including the increasing number of chronic diseases related to lifestyle, high costs in existing national health services, the need to empower patients and families to self-care and manage their own healthcare, and the need to provide direct access to health services, regardless the time and place. Mobile Health (m- Health) systems include the use of mobile devices and applications that interact with patients and caretakers. However, mobile devices have several constraints (such as, processor, energy, and storage resource limitations), affecting the quality of service and user experience. Architectures based on mobile devices and wireless communications presents several challenged issues and constraints, such as, battery and storage capacity, broadcast constraints, interferences, disconnections, noises, limited bandwidths, and network delays. In this sense, cooperation-based approaches are presented as a solution to solve such limitations, focusing on increasing network connectivity, communication rates, and reliability. Cooperation is an important research topic that has been growing in recent years. With the advent of wireless networks, several recent studies present cooperation mechanisms and algorithms as a solution to improve wireless networks performance. In the absence of a stable network infrastructure, mobile nodes cooperate with each other performing all networking functionalities. For example, it can support intermediate nodes forwarding packets between two distant nodes. This Thesis proposes a novel cooperation strategy for m-Health services and applications. This reputation-based scheme uses a Web-service to handle all the nodes reputation and networking permissions. Its main goal is to provide Internet services to mobile devices without network connectivity through cooperation with neighbor devices. Therefore resolving the above mentioned network problems and resulting in a major improvement for m-Health network architectures performances. A performance evaluation of this proposal through a real network scenario demonstrating and validating this cooperative scheme using a real m-Health application is presented. A cryptography solution for m-Health applications under cooperative environments, called DE4MHA, is also proposed and evaluated using the same real network scenario and the same m-Health application. Finally, this work proposes, a generalized cooperative application framework, called MobiCoop, that extends the incentive-based cooperative scheme for m-Health applications for all mobile applications. Its performance evaluation is also presented through a real network scenario demonstrating and validating MobiCoop using different mobile applications

Social norms and corruption

We explore theoretically and empirically whether corruption is contagious and whether conditional cooperation matters. We argue that the decision to bribe bureaucrats depends on the frequency of corruption within a society. We provide a behavioral model to explain this conduct: engaging in corruption results in a disutility of guilt. This disutility depends negatively on the number of people engaging in corruption. The empirical section presents evidence using two international panel data data sets, one at the micro and one at the macro level. Results indicate that corruption is influenced by the perceived activities of peers. Moreover, macro level data indicates that past levels of corruption impact current corruption levels