Consciousness and intentionality

Philosophers traditionally recognize two main features of mental states: intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. To a first approximation, intentionality is the aboutness of mental states, and phenomenal consciousness is the felt, experiential, qualitative, or "what it's like" aspect of mental states. In the past few decades, these features have been widely assumed to be distinct and independent. But several philosophers have recently challenged this assumption, arguing that intentionality and consciousness are importantly related. This article overviews the key views on the relationship between consciousness and intentionality and describes our favored view, which is a version of the phenomenal intentionality theory, roughly the view that the most fundamental kind of intentionality arises from phenomenal consciousness

Debunking Logical Ground: Distinguishing Metaphysics from Semantics

Many philosophers take purportedly logical cases of ground ) to be obvious cases, and indeed such cases have been used to motivate the existence of and importance of ground. I argue against this. I do so by motivating two kinds of semantic determination relations. Intuitions of logical ground track these semantic relations. Moreover, our knowledge of semantics for first order logic can explain why we have such intuitions. And, I argue, neither semantic relation can be a species of ground even on a quite broad conception of what ground is. Hence, without a positive argument for taking so-called ‘logical ground’ to be something distinct from a semantic determination relation, we should cease treating logical cases as cases of ground

Debunking logical grounding: distinguishing metaphysics from semantics

Many philosophers take purportedly logical cases of ground (such as a true disjunction being grounded in its true disjunct(s)) to be obvious cases, and indeed such cases have been used to motivate the existence of and importance of ground. I argue against this. I do so by motivating two kinds of semantic determination relations. Intuitions of logical ground track these semantic relations. Moreover, our knowledge of semantics for (e.g.) first order logic can explain why we have such intuitions. And, I argue, neither semantic relation can be a species of ground, even on a quite broad conception of what ground is. Hence, without a positive argument for taking so-called ‘logical ground’ to be something distinct from a semantic determination relation, we should cease treating logical cases as cases of ground.Accepted manuscrip

Difference-making grounds

We define a notion of difference-making for partial grounds of a fact in rough analogy to existing notions of difference-making for causes of an event. Using orthodox assumptions about ground, we show that it induces a non-trivial division with examples of partial grounds on both sides. We then demonstrate the theoretical fruitfulness of the notion by applying it to the analysis of a certain kind of putative counter-example to the transitivity of ground recently described by Jonathan Schaffer. First, we show that our conceptual apparatus of difference-making enables us to give a much clearer description than Schaffer does of what makes the relevant instances of transitivity appear problematic. Second, we suggest that difference-making is best seen as a mark of good grounding-based explanations rather than a necessary condition on grounding, and argue that this enables us to deal with the counter-example in a satisfactory way. Along the way, we show that Schaffer's own proposal for salvaging a form of transitivity by moving to a contrastive conception of ground is unsuccessful. We conclude by sketching some natural strategies for extending our proposal to a more comprehensive account of grounding-based explanations

How to be naïve about the mind

This dissertation defends common-sense views of the mind by com- bating two widespread tendencies among philosophers. One such tendency is to eliminate: to resolve puzzles about the mind by denying the existence of or- dinary mental features. For instance, many think that while we can experience the shape, color, and texture of a baseball, we cannot experience the time it takes for a baseball to fall to the ground or the number of times it bounces — indeed, we cannot experience any temporal features. The other tendency is to inflate: to resolve puzzles about the mind by positing new and unusual mental features. For instance, it is almost universally accepted among philosophers that to allow for the rationality of agents, especially those like Lois Lane and Oedipus, we must posit guises (or senses, or modes of presentation) under which agents think. Against these tendencies, I argue that we can resolve puzzles about the mind without invoking new features or denying ordinary ones. In chapter one I confront ‘Frege puzzles’ concerning Lois Lane and show that there several distinct yet often-conflated issues at play. Moreover, the plausibility of such puzzles depends on an equivocation between them. Once disentangled, it is clear there are simple explanations of Lois’ rationality that do not employ guises. In chapter two I confront the Knowledge Argument, which aims to establish that Mary the color scientist learns a non-physical fact upon seeing red for the first time, and by extension that the mind is not physical. The most popular responses to this argument invoke special mental features, including so-called phenomenal concepts, knowledge by acquaintance, and certain mental abilities. I argue for a simple response to the argument which does not invoke any special mental features. On the simple response, Mary is simply misled into thinking she’s learned something when she has not. In chapter three I confront a puzzle about temporal experience that many take to suggest we do not experience temporal features. I argue that experiencing is a process rather than a state (more like running than like being tall) and that this distinction resolves the puzzle: we experience temporal features over periods of time but not in virtue of experiencing them at instants during that time (just as one runs over periods of time but not in virtue of running at instants during that time).Philosoph

Landscapes of architectural education -architecture, knowledge and existential wisdom

The very essence of learning also in any creative field is embedded more in the student’s sense of self and his/her image of the world than in information and facts. The promoters of a professionalist education seem to entirely dismiss this essential mental and existential perspective. This area of learning can appropriately be called personal growth. Education and learning in any creative field has to aim at the student’s individual and unique self, and the content of education is bound to be more existential than factual, related more with experiences and values than information. The essence of learning is the gradual construction of an inner sense of goal, responsibility, ethical stance, and a combined sense of humility and pride. In my view, this polar attitude is most difficult to acquire. Paradoxically, the essence of learning is essentially “un-learning”, or forgetting the learned facts. One must be able to forget them when they are many and one must have the great patience to wait until they come again.Peer Reviewe