Erasmus Syllogisms in Cognition and Facilitation of Organizational Innovation

By use of an empirical example from a planned organizational change program within an international company, we examine how specific characteristics of objects (forms) used to represent ideas –  in interaction with “hard-wired” aspects of human cognition –  may contribute to explain outcomes of translation processes and the extent of alteration of the design of the future organization.  We argue that a type of syllogism judged as invalid by criteria of formal logics – denoted as Erasmus syllogism – could be rather common in reasoning, and that these logically invalid interferences may contribute to significant innovations. Situations where syllogisms are not recognized as invalid by the involved actors seem to be more prevalent when e.g. the actors are unfamiliar with the semantic content (as e.g. abstract symbols). We argue that understanding of semiotic conditions for occurrence of formal logically invalid syllogism, as well as of the neglect of their invalidity by involved actors in ongoing discourses and reasoning, may contribute to a better understanding of how ideas and objects are translated, within organizations as well as in general. The discussion is a contribution to better understanding of why and how ideas are altered as part of ongoing sense making processes within organizations

ISIPTA'07: Proceedings of the Fifth International Symposium on Imprecise Probability: Theories and Applications

B

A Scalable Backward Chaining-Based Reasoner for a Semantic Web

In this paper we consider knowledge bases that organize information using ontologies. Specifically, we investigate reasoning over a semantic web where the underlying knowledge base covers linked data about science research that are being harvested from the Web and are supplemented and edited by community members. In the semantic web over which we want to reason, frequent changes occur in the underlying knowledge base, and less frequent changes occur in the underlying ontology or the rule set that governs the reasoning. Interposing a backward chaining reasoner between a knowledge base and a query manager yields an architecture that can support reasoning in the face of frequent changes. However, such an interposition of the reasoning introduces uncertainty regarding the size and effort measurements typically exploited during query optimization. We present an algorithm for dynamic query optimization in such an architecture. We also introduce new optimization techniques to the backward-chaining algorithm. We show that these techniques together with the query-optimization reported on earlier, will allow us to actually outperform forward-chaining reasoners in scenarios where the knowledge base is subject to frequent change. Finally, we analyze the impact of these techniques on a large knowledge base that requires external storage

Logical models for bounded reasoners

This dissertation aims at the logical modelling of aspects of human reasoning, informed by facts on the bounds of human cognition. We break down this challenge into three parts. In Part I, we discuss the place of logical systems for knowledge and belief in the Rationality Debate and we argue for systems that formalize an alternative picture of rationality -- one wherein empirical facts have a key role (Chapter 2). In Part II, we design logical models that encode explicitly the deductive reasoning of a single bounded agent and the variety of processes underlying it. This is achieved through the introduction of a dynamic, resource-sensitive, impossible-worlds semantics (Chapter 3). We then show that this type of semantics can be combined with plausibility models (Chapter 4) and that it can be instrumental in modelling the logical aspects of System 1 (“fast”) and System 2 (“slow”) cognitive processes (Chapter 5). In Part III, we move from single- to multi-agent frameworks. This unfolds in three directions: (a) the formation of beliefs about others (e.g. due to observation, memory, and communication), (b) the manipulation of beliefs (e.g. via acts of reasoning about oneself and others), and (c) the effect of the above on group reasoning. These questions are addressed, respectively, in Chapters 6, 7, and 8. We finally discuss directions for future work and we reflect on the contribution of the thesis as a whole (Chapter 9)

Denotational proof languages

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2000.Includes bibliographical references (p. [417]-421).by Konstantinos Arkoudas.Ph.D

A Hybrid intelligent system for diagnosing and solving financial problems

Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro Tecnologico. Programa de Pós-Graduação em Engenharia de Produção2012-10-16T09:55:39