A critique of the newly proposed model of decentralisation in Lesotho

The Government of Lesotho has drafted the Local Government Bill 2016. The Bill is supposed to be a reformist piece of legislation to transform not only the model of decentralisation established by the Local Government Act of 1997, but to also undo the colonial legacy of de-concentration. To this end, the government adopted a new decentralisation policy in 2014, which unequivocally provides that the model of decentralisation in Lesotho shall be ‘devolution’. Hence, the 2016 Bill is assessed in this light: whether it implements this policy decision. This paper contends that, while an attempt is made by the Bill to introduce some semblance of autonomy for local authorities, the model of devolution it introduces is in fact very weak and needs significant strengthening if decentralisation is to succeed

What Choices Do Democracies Have in Globalizing Economies? Technochratic Policy Making and Democratization

This document is part of a digital collection provided by the Martin P. Catherwood Library, ILR School, Cornell University, pertaining to the effects of globalization on the workplace worldwide. Special emphasis is placed on labor rights, working conditions, labor market changes, and union organizing.UNRISD_DemocraciesGlobalizingEconomies.pdf: 39 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020

How Theoretically Opposite Models of Interethnic Power-Sharing Can Complement Each Other and Contribute to Political Stabilization: The Case of Nigeria

The aim of this article is to demonstrate the thesis that the stabilization of Nigeria’s complicated political situation is furthered by the functioning in that country of institutions based on two models of interethnic power-sharing – consociationalism and centripetalism – and that the two are to some extent complementary in Nigerian practice, despite the fact that political theory sees the two as opposites of each other. The article begins with a short analysis of the political situation in Nigeria. This is followed by a presentation of the problem of defining the notion of political stability and an assessment of the same in the Nigerian context. The article then goes on to discuss the nature of centripetalism and consociationalism and specific centripetal and consociational institutions involved in the stabilization of the political situation in Nigeria. The article ends with the author’s conclusions about the initial thesis. The article has been published in "Politeja" 2016, vol. 42, no. 3, pp. 53-73. For more on combining institutions of different models of power-sharing see: Krzysztof Trzcinski, Hybrid Power Sharing: On How to Stabilize the Political Situation in Multi-Segmental Societies, "Politeja" 2018, vol. 56, no. 5, pp. 86-107

Does one trust judgement fit all? Linking theory and empirics

Copyright @ 2010 The Authors. This is the accepted version of the following article: Fisher, J., Van Heerde, J. and Tucker, A. (2010), Does One Trust Judgement Fit All? Linking Theory and Empirics. The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 12: 161–188, which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2009.00401.x/abstract.Few questions in political science have received more attention in recent times than the role of trust in democracy, democratic government and political participation. In Britain this has become a particular concern as levels of democratic engagement in traditional politics have declined, exacerbated by media reports of politicians' untrustworthy behaviour. A common feature of previous empirical work on political trust is that trust is treated as a single theoretical concept. Scholars have assumed that trust operates in a similar fashion across different political institutions—that citizens' trust mechanisms are the same for trusting parliament, the prime minister or the European Union. As a consequence, the operationalisation of trust has generally been through a single measure. In this article we draw on recent research from political theory, where different forms of judgements whether to trust—strategic, moral and deliberative—have been conceptualised, to argue that trust judgements may vary in application and significance depending upon the institution under examination. Using specially designed data sets generated from YouGov's weekly omnibus and the British Election Study's Continuous Monitoring Panel, we operationalise these three forms of trust judgements to examine trust in two British institutions—political parties and politicians. We find, as hypothesised, that different forms of trust judgements are of differing significance depending upon the institution under consideration

Fiscal transparency and policy rules in Poland

This paper assesses the current stance and desirable progress in the implementation of fiscal transparency and rules in Poland. An index of transparency based on Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), with some modifications, is also constructed in this paper, followed by proposals for making transparency and fiscal rules more efficient within Poland's fiscal policy. This study attempts to answer the following questions: Firstly, to what extent is fiscal policy transparent in the context of the standards set by the EU's regulations and the IMF's ROSC? Secondly, have the fiscal rules adopted by Poland proved to be successful in establishing fiscal policy discipline? Finally, what still needs to be changed to make both transparency and fiscal rules more efficient for the conduct of fiscal policy? To set the work in context we also provide an overview of recent advances in both the theoretical and empirical literature on fiscal transparency and rules

The Economics of Young Democracies: Policies and Performance

Since the “third wave” of democratization began in 1974, nearly 100 states have adopted democratic forms of government, including, of course, most of the former Soviet bloc nations. Policy-makers in the west have expressed the hope that this democratic wave will extend even further, to the Middle East and onward to China. But the durability of this new democratic age remains an open question. By some accounts, at least half of the world’s young democracies—often referred to in the academic literature as being “unconsolidated” or “fragile”—are still struggling to develop their political institutions, and several have reverted back to authoritarian rule. Among the countries in the early stages of democratic institution building are states vital to U.S. national security interests, including Afghanistan and Iraq. The ability of fledgling democracies to maintain popular support depends in part on the ability of their governments to deliver economic policies that meet with widespread approval. But what sorts of economic policies are these, and are they necessarily the same as the policies required for tackling difficult issues of economic stabilization and reform? Conversely, what sorts of economic policies are most likely to spark a backlash against young and fragile democratic regimes? Do the leaders of young democracies face trade-offs as they ponder their electoral and economic strategies? These are among the questions we explore in this paper, which provides an overview of the monograph we are currently writing on the economics of young democracies. We do so first by exploring the hypothesized relationships between democratic politics and economic policy, as well as the findings of several important empirical studies with respect to the economic performance of young democracies around the world. We then provide some descriptive statistics on how the new democracies have fared in practice, making use of a new dataset that we have compiled (and which, among other things, is more up-to-date than most others cited herein). Do the data reveal any distinctive economic patterns with respect to democratic consolidation and reversal? We will show that they do. In particular, we find that deteriorating or stagnant economic performance constitutes a red flag or warning signal that the country is at risk of democratic reversal. Moreover, we find considerable variation in economic performance, suggesting that the design of political institutions in new democracies may have a significant influence on the probability of their survival.democracy; economic growth; inflation; political development

The Economics of Young Democracies: Policies and Performance

Since the “third wave” of democratization began in 1974, nearly 100 states have adopted democratic forms of government, including, of course, most of the former Soviet bloc nations. Policy-makers in the west have expressed the hope that this democratic wave will extend even further, to the Middle East and onward to China. But the durability of this new democratic age remains an open question. By some accounts, at least half of the world’s young democracies—often referred to in the academic literature as being “unconsolidated” or “fragile”—are still struggling to develop their political institutions, and several have reverted back to authoritarian rule. Among the countries in the early stages of democratic institution building are states vital to U.S. national security interests, including Afghanistan and Iraq. The ability of fledgling democracies to maintain popular support depends in part on the ability of their governments to deliver economic policies that meet with widespread approval. But what sorts of economic policies are these, and are they necessarily the same as the policies required for tackling difficult issues of economic stabilization and reform? Conversely, what sorts of economic policies are most likely to spark a backlash against young and fragile democratic regimes? Do the leaders of young democracies face trade-offs as they ponder their electoral and economic strategies? These are among the questions we explore in this paper, which provides an overview of the monograph we are currently writing on the economics of young democracies. We do so first by exploring the hypothesized relationships between democratic politics and economic policy, as well as the findings of several important empirical studies with respect to the economic performance of young democracies around the world. We then provide some descriptive statistics on how the new democracies have fared in practice, making use of a new dataset that we have compiled (and which, among other things, is more up-to-date than most others cited herein). Do the data reveal any distinctive economic patterns with respect to democratic consolidation and reversal? We will show that they do. In particular, we find that deteriorating or stagnant economic performance constitutes a red flag or warning signal that the country is at risk of democratic reversal. Moreover, we find considerable variation in economic performance, suggesting that the design of political institutions in new democracies may have a significant influence on the probability of their survival.Democratic transition

Building Sustainable Partnerships to Promote Women's Political Representation in Southeast Asian Region

In a democratic country, gender equality is an element that needs to be guaranteed by the government, particularly in political positions such as in government offices, political parties, and other decision-making institutions. Unfortunately, such condition faces a significant obstacle that comes in the form of patriarchy system in the society, especially in the parliament as an institution representing the society. Currently, there is already an internationally recognized minimum target of 30% women as political representatives in the legislature bodies, as part of the initiative to promote women representation in the parliament. It is expected that with this target, women would have a starting point to claim their rights and to have a significant influence in the decision-making process