Epistemic Logic with Partial Dependency Operator

In this paper, we introduce $\textit{partial}$ dependency modality $\mathcal{D}$ into epistemic logic so as to reason about $\textit{partial}$ dependency relationship in Kripke models. The resulted dependence epistemic logic possesses decent expressivity and beautiful properties. Several interesting examples are provided, which highlight this logic's practical usage. The logic's bisimulation is then discussed, and we give a sound and strongly complete axiomatization for a sub-language of the logic

Application of Single-Station Sigma and Site-Response Characterization in a Probabilistic Seismic-Hazard Analysis for a New Nuclear Site

Aleatory variability in ground-motion prediction, represented by the standard deviation (sigma) of a ground-motion prediction equation, exerts a very strong influence on the results of probabilistic seismic-hazard analysis (PSHA). This is especially so at the low annual exceedance frequencies considered for nuclear facilities; in these cases, even small reductions in sigma can have a marked effect on the hazard estimates. Proper separation and quantification of aleatory variability and epistemic uncertainty can lead to defensible reductions in sigma. One such approach is the single-station sigma concept, which removes that part of sigma corresponding to repeatable site-specific effects. However, the site-to-site component must then be constrained by site-specific measurements or else modeled as epistemic uncertainty and incorporated into the modeling of site effects. The practical application of the single-station sigma concept, including the characterization of the dynamic properties of the site and the incorporation of site-response effects into the hazard calculations, is illustrated for a PSHA conducted at a rock site under consideration for the potential construction of a nuclear power plant.Civil, Architectural, and Environmental Engineerin

Propositional dynamic logic for searching games with errors

We investigate some finitely-valued generalizations of propositional dynamic logic with tests. We start by introducing the (n+1)-valued Kripke models and a corresponding language based on a modal extension of {\L}ukasiewicz many-valued logic. We illustrate the definitions by providing a framework for an analysis of the R\'enyi - Ulam searching game with errors. Our main result is the axiomatization of the theory of the (n+1)-valued Kripke models. This result is obtained through filtration of the canonical model of the smallest (n+1)-valued propositional dynamic logic

Modal Ω-Logic: Automata, Neo-Logicism, and Set-Theoretic Realism

This essay examines the philosophical significance of $\Omega$-logic in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice (ZFC). The duality between coalgebra and algebra permits Boolean-valued algebraic models of ZFC to be interpreted as coalgebras. The modal profile of $\Omega$-logical validity can then be countenanced within a coalgebraic logic, and $\Omega$-logical validity can be defined via deterministic automata. I argue that the philosophical significance of the foregoing is two-fold. First, because the epistemic and modal profiles of $\Omega$-logical validity correspond to those of second-order logical consequence, $\Omega$-logical validity is genuinely logical, and thus vindicates a neo-logicist conception of mathematical truth in the set-theoretic multiverse. Second, the foregoing provides a modal-computational account of the interpretation of mathematical vocabulary, adducing in favor of a realist conception of the cumulative hierarchy of sets

LOGICAL ANALYSIS AND LATER MOHIST LOGIC: SOME COMPARATIVE REFLECTIONS [abstract]

Any philosophical method that treats the analysis of the meaning of a sentence or expression in terms of a decomposition into a set of conceptually basic constituent parts must do some theoretical work to explain the puzzles of intensionality. This is because intensional phenomena appear to violate the principle of compositionality, and the assumption of compositionality is the principal justification for thinking that an analysis will reveal the real semantical import of a sentence or expression through a method of decomposition. Accordingly, a natural strategy for dealing with intensionality is to argue that it is really just an isolable, aberrant class of linguistic phenomena that poses no general threat to the thesis that meaning is basically compositional. On the other hand, the later Mohists give us good reason to reject this view. What we learn from them is that there may be basic limitations in any analytical technique that presupposes that meaning is perspicuously represented only when it has been fully decomposed into its constituent parts. The purpose of this paper is to (a) explain why the Mohists found the issue of intensionality to be so important in their investigations of language, and (b) defend the view that Mohist insights reveal basic limitations in any technique of analysis that is uncritically applied with a decompositional approach in mind, as are those that are often pursued in the West in the context of more general epistemological and metaphysical programs