An Antitrust Economic Analysis of Stop & Shop's Proposed Acquisition of the Big V Shop Rite Supermarket Chain

In early 2002, the Royal Ahold subsidiary, Stop & Shop Supermarkets, offered to purchase the Big V supermarket chain, which was in bankruptcy court after three successive, unsuccessful leveraged buyouts over the past ten years. At a later date, Pathmark Supermarkets joined the offer to purchase. Big V was Wakefern Food Corporations largest member. The acquisition was a horizontal merger in at least three local markets, Newburgh NJ, Poughkeepsie NY, and Trenton NJ. This research was conducted for the Wakefern Food Corporation who provided much of the underlying data and information. We presented this report to the Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission in March 2002 and to the New Jersey and New York Attorney Generals, Antitrust Section in April 2002. Thereafter, the Federal Trade Commission issued a second request in its merger review, and the bankruptcy judge ruled against the Stop & Shop/Pathmark offer. Big V subsequently was purchased by Wakefern and remains in the Shop Rite supermarket cooperative system.horizontal merger, market power, predation, Agribusiness, Industrial Organization,

Retail price levels and concentration of wholesalers, retailers, and hypermarkets

This paper examines retail grocery price levels with a very large (unbalanced) panel of stores that operate in well-defined local markets. We explain price variation across grocery retailers by the concentration of wholesalers and retailers, and the market share of hypermarkets (and control for a number of store and region specific factors). Our most important result is that concentration at the wholesale level is an important determinant of retail prices. The price effect of retail concentration and hypermarket market share are statistically significant but small in economic terms.Firm concentration; market structure; price competition; grocery retail; grocery wholesale

Dynamic Explanations of Industry Structure and Performance

Industrial Organization,

Spatial Competition in Private Labels

Previous studies find that private labels increase retailers' bargaining power with manufacturers and allow retailers to price discriminate. We use a spatial discrete choice model to show that retailers also use store brands to create market power through store differentiation, but not as a means of building market share.Marketing,

Economics of Change in Market Structure, Conduct, and Performance The Baking Industry 1947-1958

Baking is one of the largest industries in the United States. Its sales, which exceed $4 billion annually, rank it third among the food processing industries, and thirteenth among all manufacturing industries. Bakery products account for nearly$1 out of every $10 spent by American consumers for food. Almost half of the domestic consumption of wheat flour is in the form of bread, rolls, cake, pie, doughnuts, sweet goods, and other perishable bakery products. While this study encompasses the perishable bakery products industry as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau, it focuses primarily on wholesale markets for white bread. Since World War II, important changes have occurred in the bread baking industry. A decline in the per capita demand for bread products coupled with changes in technology and costs has affected the relationships between baking companies, their market behavior, and the resulting level of efficiency and price performance. In an industrial economy, the farming, milling, baking, retailing, and consuming functions are integrally related. Changes in the organization and practices in one may induce changes in others. The baking industry occupies a strategic position in this process, and as a result, consumers, farmers, millers, and retailers, as well as bakers themselves, have a vital interest in the way the baking industry performs. Changes in market structure and firm behavior in the baking industry have been the subject of study and concern by several interested individuals and groups. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has followed with increased concern the widening of the market margin and the declining farmer share of consumer bread prices. The Senate Agricultural Committee has completed a study of average cost and returns of bakery operations.The Federal Trade Commission has followed the pricing practices of many baking companies with frequent cease and desist orders. I\u3e The Justice Department, through periodic prosecutions, has kept baking firms aware of the limitation imposed by the antitrust laws. The Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly has studied the impact of discriminatory pricing by large baking companies on small independent bakers.7 The industry has encouraged economic study of the historic development of baking and changes in market organization and practices.s Most recently, the F.T.C. studied buyer concentration and the integration of retail grocery organizations into baking and other food processing industries

The Effects of Retail Regulations on Prices Evidence form the Loi Galland

In 1997, a new legislation banning below-invoice retail prices came into force in France. Individually negotiated discounts could no longer be passed on to consumers, which is equivalent to allowing industry-wide price oors. The anti-competitive effects of such practices are well-known. The elimination of intra-brand competition is expected to lead to a sharp increase in the retail prices. Using CPI raw data, we nd evidence supporting this claim. The modification or revocation of the existing legislation (as it has been done in Ireland in December 2005) would then be expected to reduce retail prices.retail prices, pricing regulations, resale price maintenance

Local Competition and Impact of Entry by a Dominant Retailer

This paper analyzes the competition between two spatially differentiated multi-product retailers who encounter entry from a dominant discount retailer. Our primary objective is to determine how entry affects the pricing and relative profits of the incumbent stores and the role played by the location of the entrant. The new entrant has partial overlap in product assortment with the incumbents and is assumed to have lower procurement costs for the common goods. Consumers are heterogeneous in their location, economic status (shopping costs and valuations), as well as purchase basket or the types of products demanded. Results show that in the post entry equilibrium, the prices for the products not offered by the discounter are higher than the pre entry prices. More interestingly, contrary to the conventional wisdom we find that the store that is closer to the new entrant is better off compared to the incumbent located further away. The intuition for these results is that the discounter with its low price draws away the poor consumers – the price sensitive segment – out of the market for the items it carries. This in turn softens price competition between the incumbents for these items. Furthermore, the new entrant’s unique product offering attracts more consumers to visit the location it occupies, which introduces positive demand externalities to the neighboring retailer, leading to an increase in sales for the non-competing products. We provide empirical evidence for our results and discuss implications for retailers facing competition from large discount stores.entry; retail competition; agglomeration

Supermarket Competition through Price Promotions: A Cross Category Analysis

This study takes an important first step at quantifying the nature of competition between major supermarket chains through price promotions. Using data that covers virtually the entire product menus of supermarkets representing two major chains in 18 cities, I examine both the effect of direct competition on promotional intensity and the nature of promotional competition itself. In a counterintuitive finding, there appears to slightly less promotional activity in cities in which both chains compete directly, as compared to cities in which only one chain operates. Moreover, most promotional activity tends to be retaliatory, rather than accommodating, in nature. This study takes an important first step at quantifying the nature of competition between major supermarket chains through price promotions. Using data that covers virtually the entire product menus of supermarkets representing two major chains in 18 cities, I examine both the effect of direct competition on promotional intensity and the nature of promotional competition itself. In a counterintuitive finding, there appears to slightly less promotional activity in cities in which both chains compete directly, as compared to cities in which only one chain operates. Moreover, most promotional activity tends to be retaliatory, rather than accommodating, in nature.Agribusiness, Demand and Price Analysis,