A Value-Sensitive Design Approach to Intelligent Agents

This chapter proposed a novel design methodology called Value-Sensitive Design and its potential application to the field of artificial intelligence research and design. It discusses the imperatives in adopting a design philosophy that embeds values into the design of artificial agents at the early stages of AI development. Because of the high risk stakes in the unmitigated design of artificial agents, this chapter proposes that even though VSD may turn out to be a less-than-optimal design methodology, it currently provides a framework that has the potential to embed stakeholder values and incorporate current design methods. The reader should begin to take away the importance of a proactive design approach to intelligent agents

Building machines that learn and think about morality

Lake et al. propose three criteria which, they argue, will bring artificial intelligence (AI) systems closer to human cognitive abilities. In this paper, we explore the application of these criteria to a particular domain of human cognition: our capacity for moral reasoning. In doing so, we explore a set of considerations relevant to the development of AI moral decision-making. Our main focus is on the relation between dual-process accounts of moral reasoning and model-free/model-based forms of machine learning. We also discuss how work in embodied and situated cognition could provide a valu- able perspective on future research

Vertical integration and firm boundaries : the evidence

Since Ronald H. Coase's (1937) seminal paper, a rich set of theories has been developed that deal with firm boundaries in vertical or input–output structures. In the last twenty-five years, empirical evidence that can shed light on those theories also has been accumulating. We review the findings of empirical studies that have addressed two main interrelated questions: First, what types of transactions are best brought within the firm and, second, what are the consequences of vertical integration decisions for economic outcomes such as prices, quantities, investment, and profits. Throughout, we highlight areas of potential cross-fertilization and promising areas for future work

A model for structured document retrieval : empirical investigations

Documents often display a structure, e.g., several sections, each with several subsections and so on. Taking into account the structure of a document allows the retrieval process to focus on those parts of the document that are most relevant to an information need. In previous work, we developed a model for the representation and the retrieval of structured documents. This paper reports the first experimental study of the effectiveness and applicability of the model

Uncertainty explicit assessment of off-the-shelf software: Selection of an optimal diverse pair

Assessment of software COTS components is an essential part of component-based software development. Sub-optimal selection of components may lead to solutions with low quality. The assessment is based on incomplete knowledge about the COTS components themselves and other aspects, which may affect the choice such as the vendor's credentials, etc. We argue in favor of assessment methods in which uncertainty is explicitly represented (`uncertainty explicit' methods) using probability distributions. We have adapted a model (developed elsewhere by Littlewood, B. et al. (2000)) for assessment of a pair of COTS components to take account of the fault (bug) logs that might be available for the COTS components being assessed. We also provide empirical data from a study we have conducted with off-the-shelf database servers, which illustrate the use of the method

Risk and Insurance in Sharecropping

This essay summarizes some recent empirical contributions on two aspects of sharecropping: (i) the effects of the contractual form (incentive power and contract length) on resource allocation and farm performance; and (ii) the exogenous elements behind the choice of different contractual forms.Empirical, Sharecropping, Survey

Insurance and Incentives in Sharecropping

This essay surveys some recent empirical works about sharecropping. The basic theoretical trade-offs are discussed in the introduction. Section 1 discusses the empirical research on resource allocation. This section is divided in two subsections: one studying the effects of tenure stability on land improvements, and another comparing the impact of different share rates on input use and farm productivity. Section 2 surveys works testing different arguments raised to explain the design of tenancy contracts. The essay then concludes with a brief summary discussing some important policy implications.

Managerial Compensations and Information Sharing under Moral Hazard: Is Transparency Good?

We study the effects of information sharing on optimal contracting in a vertical hierarchies model with moral hazard and effort externalities. The paper has three main objectives. First, we determine and compare the equilibrium contracts with and without communication. We identify how each principal relates her agent’s wage to the opponent’s performance when they share information about agents’ performances. It turns out that the type of effort externalities across organizations is the main determinant of the responsiveness of each agent’s reward to the opponent’s performance. Second, in order to throw novel light on the emergence of information sharing agreements, we characterize the equilibria of a non- cooperative game where principals first decide whether to share information and then offer contracts to their exclusive agents. We explore the implications of introducing certification costs and show that three types of equilibria may emerge depending on the nature and (relative) strength of effort externalities: principals bilaterally share information if agents’ effort choices exhibit strong complementarity; only the principal with stronger monitoring power discloses information in equilibrium for intermediate levels of effort’s complementarity; principals do not share information if efforts are substitutes and for low values of effort’s complementarity. Moreover, differently from the common agency framework studied in Maier and Ottaviani (2009), in our model a prisoner’s dilemma may occur when efforts are substitutes and certification costs are negligible: if a higher effort by one agent reduces the opponent’s marginal productivity of effort the equilibrium involves no communication although principals would jointly be better off by sharing information. Finally, the model also offers novel testable predictions on the impact of competition on the basic trade-off between risk and incentives, the effects of organizations’ asymmetries on information disclosure policies as well as on the link between corporate control and the power of incentives.Competing Hierarchies, Information Sharing, Moral Hazard