11,233 research outputs found
An Efficient Protocol for the Commit-Prove-Fair-Open functionality
In TCC 2006, Garay et al. introduced the notion of commit-prove-fair-open functionality in order to achieve what they called resource fairness of secure multi-party computation(MPC) with corrupted majority. The protocol realizing this notion of fairness follows the gradual release approach and, further, it can be proven secure in the simulation paradigm and enjoys composition properties.
In this paper, we show a more efficient resource-fair protocol of FCPFO based on a new variant of Garay et al. time-lines and simplified Camenisch-Shoup(sCS) commitment,whose communication and computation complexity are less than 1/5 of Garay et al. construction. In addition, our new protocol allows commitment to value 0, which is not possible in the plain Garay et al. construction
Efficient UC Commitment Extension with Homomorphism for Free (and Applications)
Homomorphic universally composable (UC) commitments allow for the sender to reveal the result of additions and multiplications of values contained in commitments without revealing the values themselves while assuring the receiver of the correctness of such computation on committed values.
In this work, we construct essentially optimal additively homomorphic UC commitments from any (not necessarily UC or homomorphic) extractable commitment. We obtain amortized linear computational complexity in the length of the input messages and rate 1.
Next, we show how to extend our scheme to also obtain multiplicative homomorphism at the cost of asymptotic optimality but retaining low concrete complexity for practical parameters.
While the previously best constructions use UC oblivious transfer as the main building block, our constructions only require extractable commitments and PRGs, achieving better concrete efficiency and offering new insights into the sufficient conditions for obtaining homomorphic UC commitments.
Moreover, our techniques yield public coin protocols, which are compatible with the Fiat-Shamir heuristic.
These results come at the cost of realizing a restricted version of the homomorphic commitment functionality where the sender is allowed to perform any number of commitments and operations on committed messages but is only allowed to perform a single batch opening of a number of commitments.
Although this functionality seems restrictive, we show that it can be used as a building block for more efficient instantiations of recent protocols for secure multiparty computation and zero knowledge non-interactive arguments of knowledge
Dragoon: Private Decentralized HITs Made Practical
With the rapid popularity of blockchain, decentralized human intelligence
tasks (HITs) are proposed to crowdsource human knowledge without relying on
vulnerable third-party platforms. However, the inherent limits of blockchain
cause decentralized HITs to face a few "new" challenges. For example, the
confidentiality of solicited data turns out to be the sine qua non, though it
was an arguably dispensable property in the centralized setting. To ensure the
"new" requirement of data privacy, existing decentralized HITs use generic
zero-knowledge proof frameworks (e.g. SNARK), but scarcely perform well in
practice, due to the inherently expensive cost of generality.
We present a practical decentralized protocol for HITs, which also achieves
the fairness between requesters and workers. At the core of our contributions,
we avoid the powerful yet highly-costly generic zk-proof tools and propose a
special-purpose scheme to prove the quality of encrypted data. By various
non-trivial statement reformations, proving the quality of encrypted data is
reduced to efficient verifiable decryption, thus making decentralized HITs
practical. Along the way, we rigorously define the ideal functionality of
decentralized HITs and then prove the security due to the ideal-real paradigm.
We further instantiate our protocol to implement a system called Dragoon, an
instance of which is deployed atop Ethereum to facilitate an image annotation
task used by ImageNet. Our evaluations demonstrate its practicality: the
on-chain handling cost of Dragoon is even less than the handling fee of
Amazon's Mechanical Turk for the same ImageNet HIT.Comment: small differences from a version accepted to appear in ICDCS 2020 (to
fix a minor bug
Instantaneous Decentralized Poker
We present efficient protocols for amortized secure multiparty computation
with penalties and secure cash distribution, of which poker is a prime example.
Our protocols have an initial phase where the parties interact with a
cryptocurrency network, that then enables them to interact only among
themselves over the course of playing many poker games in which money changes
hands.
The high efficiency of our protocols is achieved by harnessing the power of
stateful contracts. Compared to the limited expressive power of Bitcoin
scripts, stateful contracts enable richer forms of interaction between standard
secure computation and a cryptocurrency.
We formalize the stateful contract model and the security notions that our
protocols accomplish, and provide proofs using the simulation paradigm.
Moreover, we provide a reference implementation in Ethereum/Solidity for the
stateful contracts that our protocols are based on.
We also adopt our off-chain cash distribution protocols to the special case
of stateful duplex micropayment channels, which are of independent interest. In
comparison to Bitcoin based payment channels, our duplex channel implementation
is more efficient and has additional features
Insured MPC: Efficient Secure Computation with Financial Penalties
Fairness in Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) is known to be impossible to achieve in the presence of a dishonest majority. Previous works have proposed combining MPC protocols with Cryptocurrencies in order to financially punish aborting adversaries, providing an incentive for parties to honestly follow the protocol. This approach also yields privacy-preserving Smart Contracts, where private inputs can be processed with MPC in order to determine the distribution of funds given to the contract. The focus of existing work is on proving that this approach is possible and unfortunately they present monolithic and mostly inefficient constructions. In this work, we put forth the first modular construction of ``Insured MPC\u27\u27, where either the output of the private computation (which describes how to distribute funds) is fairly delivered or a proof that a set of parties has misbehaved is produced, allowing for financial punishments. Moreover, both the output and the proof of cheating are publicly verifiable, allowing third parties to independently validate an execution.
We present a highly efficient compiler that uses any MPC protocol with certain properties together with a standard (non-private) Smart Contract and a publicly verifiable homomorphic commitment scheme to implement Insured MPC. As an intermediate step, we propose the first construction of a publicly verifiable homomorphic commitment scheme achieving composability guarantees and concrete efficiency. Our results are proven in the Global Universal Composability framework using a Global Random Oracle as the setup assumption. From a theoretical perspective, our general results provide the first characterization of sufficient properties that MPC protocols must achieve in order to be efficiently combined with Cryptocurrencies, as well as insights into publicly verifiable protocols. On the other hand, our constructions have highly efficient concrete instantiations, allowing for fast implementations
Secure and fair two-party computation
Consider several parties that do not trust each other, yet they wish to correctly compute some common function of their local inputs while keeping these inputs private. This problem is known as "Secure Multi-Party Computation", and was introduced by Andrew Yao in 1982. Secure multi-party computations have some real world examples like electronic auctions, electronic voting or fingerprinting. In this thesis we consider the case where there are only two parties involved. This is known as "Secure Two-Party Computation". If there is a trusted third party called Carol, then the problem is pretty straightforward. The participating parties could hand their inputs in Carol who can compute the common function correctly and could return the outputs to the corresponding parties. The goal is to achieve (almost) the same result when there is no trusted third party. Cryptographic protocols are designed in order to solve these kinds of problems. These protocols are analyzed within an appropriate model in which the behavior of parties is structured. The basic level is called the Semi-Honest Model where parties are assumed to follow the protocol specification, but later can derive additional information based on the messages which have been received so far. A more realistic model is the so-called Malicious Model. The common approach is to first analyze a protocol in the semi-honest model and then later extend it into the malicious model. Any cryptographic protocol for secure two-party computation must satisfy the following security requirements: correctness, privacy and fairness. It must guarantee the correctness of the result while preserving the privacy of the partiesâ inputs, even if one of the parties is malicious and behaves arbitrarily throughout the protocol. It must also guarantee fairness. This roughly means that whenever a party aborts the protocol prematurely, he or she should not have any advantage over the other party in discovering the output. The main question for researchers is to construct new protocols that achieve the above mentioned goals for secure multi-party computation. Of course, such protocols must be secure in a given model, as well as be as efficient as possible. In 1986, Yao presented the first general protocol for secure two-party computation which was applicable only to the semi-honest model. He uses a tool called "Garbled Circuit". Yaoâs protocol uses the underlying primitives ("Pseudorandom Generator" and "Oblivious Transfer") as blackboxes which lead to efficient results. After Yaoâs work many variants and improvements have been proposed for the malicious model. In this thesis, we design several new protocols for secure two-party computation based on Yaoâs garbled circuit. Before we present the details of our new designs, we first show several weaknesses, security flaws or problems with the existing protocols in the literature. We first work in the semi-honest model and then extend it into the malicious model by presenting new protocols. Finally we add fairness to our protocol. Oblivious transfer (OT) is a fundamental primitive in modern cryptography which is useful for implementing protocols for secure multi-party computation. We study several variants of oblivious transfer in this thesis. We present a new protocol for the so-called "Committed OT". This protocol is very efficient in the sense that it is quite good in comparison to the most efficient committed OT protocols in the literature. The abovementioned flaw with the use of OT can be fixed with our committed oblivious transfer protocol. Furthermore, it is more general than all previous protocols, and, therefore, it is of independent interest. We also deal with fairness in this thesis. For protocols based on garbled circuit, so far only Benny Pinkas has presented a protocol in the literature for achieving fairness. We show a subtle problem with this protocol where the privacy of the inputs of one party can be compromised. We also describe this problem in detail which is in fact related to the fairness, and finally propose a more efficient scheme that does achieve fairness
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