Public Evidence from Secret Ballots

Elections seem simple---aren't they just counting? But they have a unique, challenging combination of security and privacy requirements. The stakes are high; the context is adversarial; the electorate needs to be convinced that the results are correct; and the secrecy of the ballot must be ensured. And they have practical constraints: time is of the essence, and voting systems need to be affordable and maintainable, and usable by voters, election officials, and pollworkers. It is thus not surprising that voting is a rich research area spanning theory, applied cryptography, practical systems analysis, usable security, and statistics. Election integrity involves two key concepts: convincing evidence that outcomes are correct and privacy, which amounts to convincing assurance that there is no evidence about how any given person voted. These are obviously in tension. We examine how current systems walk this tightrope.Comment: To appear in E-Vote-Id '1

End-to-end verifiable elections in the standard model

We present the cryptographic implementation of “DEMOS”, a new e-voting system that is end-to-end verifiable in the standard model, i.e., without any additional “setup” assumption or access to a random oracle (RO). Previously known end-to-end verifiable e-voting systems required such additional assumptions (specifically, either the existence of a “randomness beacon” or were only shown secure in the RO model). In order to analyze our scheme, we also provide a modeling of end-to-end verifiability as well as privacy and receipt-freeness that encompasses previous definitions in the form of two concise attack games. Our scheme satisfies end-to-end verifiability information theoretically in the standard model and privacy/receipt-freeness under a computational assumption (subexponential Decisional Diffie Helman). In our construction, we utilize a number of techniques used for the first time in the context of e-voting schemes that include utilizing randomness from bit-fixing sources, zero-knowledge proofs with imperfect verifier randomness and complexity leveraging

DRE-ip : A Verifiable E-Voting Scheme without Tallying Authorities

Nearly all verifiable e-voting schemes require trustworthy authorities to perform the tallying operations. An exception is the DRE-i system which removes this requirement by pre-computing all encrypted ballots before the election using random factors that will later cancel out and allow the public to verify the tally after the election. While the removal of tallying authorities significantly simplifies election management, the pre-computation of ballots necessitates secure ballot storage, as leakage of precomputed ballots endangers voter privacy. In this paper, we address this problem and propose DRE-ip (DRE-i with enhanced privacy). Adopting a different design strategy, DRE-ip is able to encrypt ballots in real time in such a way that the election tally can be publicly verified without decrypting the cast ballots. As a result, DRE-ip achieves end-to-end verifiability without tallying authorities, similar to DRE-i, but with a significantly stronger guarantee on voter privacy. In the event that the voting machine is fully compromised, the assurance on tallying integrity remains intact and the information leakage is limited to the minimum: only the partial tally at the time of compromise is leaked

Design and Implementation of Cast-as-Intended Verifiability for a Blockchain-Based Voting System

Digitization of electoral processes depends on confident systems that produce verifiable evidence. The design and implementation of voting systems has been widely studied in prior research, bringing together expertise in many fields. Switzerland is organized in a federal, decentralized structure of independent governmental entities. Thus, its decentralized structure is a real-world example for implementing an electronic voting system, where trust is distributed among multiple authorities. This work outlines the design and implementation of a blockchain-based electronic voting system providing cast-as-intended verifiability. The generation of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge enables every voter to verify the encrypted vote, while maintaining the secrecy of the ballot. The Public Bulletin Board (PBB) is a crucial component of every electronic voting system, serving as a publicly verifiable log of communication and ballots - here a blockchain is used as the PBB. Also, the required cryptographic operations are in linear relation to the number of voters, making the outlined system fit for large-scale elections

Democracy Enhancing Technologies: Toward deployable and incoercible E2E elections

End-to-end verifiable election systems (E2E systems) provide a provably correct tally while maintaining the secrecy of each voter's ballot, even if the voter is complicit in demonstrating how they voted. Providing voter incoercibility is one of the main challenges of designing E2E systems, particularly in the case of internet voting. A second challenge is building deployable, human-voteable E2E systems that conform to election laws and conventions. This dissertation examines deployability, coercion-resistance, and their intersection in election systems. In the course of this study, we introduce three new election systems, (Scantegrity, Eperio, and Selections), report on two real-world elections using E2E systems (Punchscan and Scantegrity), and study incoercibility issues in one deployed system (Punchscan). In addition, we propose and study new practical primitives for random beacons, secret printing, and panic passwords. These are tools that can be used in an election to, respectively, generate publicly verifiable random numbers, distribute the printing of secrets between non-colluding printers, and to covertly signal duress during authentication. While developed to solve specific problems in deployable and incoercible E2E systems, these techniques may be of independent interest

DEMOS-2:scalable E2E verifiable elections without random oracles

Recently, Kiayias, Zacharias and Zhang-proposed a new E2E verifiable e-voting system called 'DEMOS' that for the first time provides E2E verifiability without relying on external sources of randomness or the random oracle model; the main advantage of such system is in the fact that election auditors need only the election transcript and the feedback from the voters to pronounce the election process unequivocally valid. Unfortunately, DEMOS comes with a huge performance and storage penalty for the election authority (EA) compared to other e-voting systems such as Helios. The main reason is that due to the way the EA forms the proof of the tally result, it is required to {\em precompute} a number of ciphertexts for each voter and each possible choice of the voter. This approach clearly does not scale to elections that have a complex ballot and voters have an exponential number of ways to vote in the number of candidates. The performance penalty on the EA appears to be intrinsic to the approach: voters cannot compute an enciphered ballot themselves because there seems to be no way for them to prove that it is a valid ciphertext. In contrast to the above, in this work, we construct a new e-voting system that retains the strong E2E characteristics of DEMOS (but against computational adversaries) while completely eliminating the performance and storage penalty of the EA. We achieve this via a new cryptographic construction that has the EA produce and prove, using voters' coins, the security of a common reference string (CRS) that voters subsequently can use to affix non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs to their ciphertexts. The EA itself uses the CRS to prove via a NIZK the tally correctness at the end. Our construction has similar performance to Helios and is practical. The privacy of our construction relies on the SXDH assumption over bilinear groups via complexity leveraging

The DEMOS family of e-voting systems: End-to-end verifiable elections in the standard model

Η παρούσα διδακτορική διατριβή εισάγει τα συστήματα ηλεκτρονικής ψηφοφορίας DEMOS-A και DEMOS-2 τα οποία επιτυγχάνουν άμεση επαληθευσιμότητα (end-to-end verifiability) για πρώτη φορά. Προγενέστερα της διατριβής, όλα τα κορυφαία συστήματα ηλεκτρονικής ψηφοφορίας (π.χ. SureVote, JCJ, Pret a Voter, Helios, Scantegrity, etc.) προϋπέθεταν το αδιάβλητο των συσκευών ψηφοφορίας, το μοντέλο τυχαίου μαντείου, ή την ύπαρξη μια έμπιστης πηγής τυχαιότητας για την επίτευξη άμεσης επαληθευσιμότητας. Στον πυρήνα των DEMOS-A και DEMOS-2 , βρίσκεται ένας νέος μηχανισμός εξαγωγής τυχαιότητας απαιτούμενης για την επαλήθευση από την εντροπία που παράγουν οι ψηφοφόροι κατά τη συμμετοχή τους στην ψηφοφορία. Η εν λόγω εντροπία είναι εσωτερική ως προς το εκλογικό περιβάλλον, επομένως απαλείφεται η ανάγκη για εμπιστοσύνη σε μία εξωτερική πηγή τυχαιότητας. Η ανάλυση ασφάλειας διεξάγεται υπό ένα νέο κρυπτογραφικό πλαίσιο το οποίο συνιστά επιπρόσθετη συνεισφορά της διατριβής. Τα θεωρήματα άμεσης επαλήθευσιμότητας των DEMOS-A και DEMOS-2 μαρτυρούν μία στενή συσχέτιση του επιπέδου ασφάλειας με την συμπεριφορά του εκλογικού σωμάτος κατά την επαλήθευση. Βάσει αυτού του ευρήματος και της εργασίας του Ellison το 2007, η παρούσα διατριβή επεκτείνει το πλαίσιο μοντελοποιώντας τα συστήματα ηλεκτρονικής ψηφοφορίας ως ceremonies. Ως υπόδειγμα μελέτης ενός ceremony ηλεκτρονικής ψηφοφορίας, η παρούσα διατριβή μελετά την ασφάλεια του καθιερωμένου συστήματος ηλεκτρονικής ψηφοφορίας Helios.This PhD thesis introduces the DEMOS-A and DEMOS-2 e-voting systems that achieve end-to-end verifiability in the standard model for the first time. Prior to this thesis, all top-tier e-voting systems (e.g. SureVote, JCJ, Pret a Voter, Helios, Scantegrity, etc.) assumed honesty of the voting clients, the random oracle model, or the existence a randomness beacon to achieve end-to-end verifiability. In the core of DEMOS-A and DEMOS-2, is a novel mechanism that extracts the randomness required for verification from the entropy generated by the voters, when they engage in the voting phase. This entropy is internal with respect to the election environment, therefore the need for trusting an outer source of randomness is removed. The security analysis is performed under a novel cryptographic framework that constitutes an additional contribution of this thesis. The end-to-end verifiability theorems for DEMOS-A and DEMOS-2 reveal that the security level is in high correlation with the auditing behaviour of the electorate. Motivated by this finding, this thesis extends the framework by modelling e-voting systems as ceremonies, inspired by the work of Ellison in 2007. As a case study of an e-voting ceremony, this thesis investigates the security of the well-known Helios e-voting system

Blockchain, consensus, and cryptography in electronic voting

Motivated by the recent trends to conduct electronic elections using blockchain technologies, we review the vast literature on cryptographic voting and assess the status of the field. We analyze the security requirements for voting systems and describe the major ideas behind the most influential cryptographic protocols for electronic voting. We focus on the great importance of consensus in the elimination of trusted third parties. Finally, we examine whether recent blockchain innovations can satisfy the strict requirements set for the security of electronic voting