Policy Issues in U.S. Transportation Public-Private Partnerships: Lessons from Australia, Research Report 09-15

In this report, the authors examine Australia’s experience with transportation public-private partnerships (PPPs) and the lessons that experience holds for the use of PPPs in the United States. Australia now has decades of experience in PPP use in transportation, and has used the approach to deliver billions of dollars in project value. Although this report explores a range of issues, the authors focus on four policy issues that have been salient in the United States: (1) how the risks inherent in PPP contracts should be distributed across public and private sector partners; (2) when and how to use non-compete (or compensation) clauses in PPP contracts; (3) how concerns about monopoly power are best addressed; and (4) the role and importance of concession length. The study examines those and other questions by surveying the relevant literature on PPP international use. The authors also interviewed 23 Australian PPP experts from the academic, public and private sectors, and distilled lessons from those interviews

Collaborative Engagement Approaches For Delivering Sustainable Infrastructure Projects In The AEC Sector: A Review

The public sector has traditionally financed and operated infrastructure projects using resources from taxes and various levies (e.g. fuel taxes, road user charges). However, the rapid increase in human population growth coupled with extended globalisation complexities and associated social/political/economic challenges have placed new demands on the purveyors and operators of infrastructure projects. The importance of delivering quality infrastructure has been underlined by the United Nations declaration of the Millennium Development Goals; as has the provision of ‘adequate’ basic structures and facilities necessary for the well-being of urban populations in developing countries. Thus, in an effort to finance developing countries’ infrastructure needs, most countries have adopted some form of public-private collaboration strategy. This paper critically reviews these collaborative engagement approaches, identifies and highlights 10 critical themes that need to be appropriately captured and aligned to existing business models in order to successfully deliver sustainable infrastructure projects. Research findings show that infrastructure services can be delivered in many ways, and through various routes. For example, a purely public approach can cause problems such as slow and ineffective decision-making, inefficient organisational and institutional augmentation, and lack of competition and inefficiency (collectively known as government failure). On the other hand, adopting a purely private approach can cause problems such as inequalities in the distribution of infrastructure services (known as market failure). Thus, to overcome both government and market failures, a collaborative approach is advocated which incorporates the strengths of both of these polarised positions

Parallel Continuous Double Auction for Service Allocation in Cloud Computing

Cloud Computing is a service oriented architecture in which every computing resources is delivered to users as a service. Nowadays market-oriented approach has attracted a lot of researchers because of its great ability to manage Cloud services efficiently and dynamically. Each service consists of various resources which all should be allocated to utilize the service. In this paper a parallel continuous double auction method for efficient service allocation in cloud computing is presented in which by using a novel parallel sorting algorithm at auctioneer, enables consumers to order various resources as workflow for utilizing requested services efficiently. Also in the presented method consumers and providers make bid and offer prices based on time factor. Experimental results show that proposed method is efficient in success rate, resource utilization and average connection time and also overall performance of system is improved by parallel approach

The Needs of the Poor in Infraestructure Privatization. The Role of Universal Service Obligations. The Case of Argentina

El cambio estructural derivado de la privatización y regulación puede inducir una reconsideración de las regulaciones definidas al momento de iniciar el proceso privatizador. El cambio en la organización vertical del mercado y los tecnológicos, entre otros, cambian las reglas de formación de precios y de asignación de recursos. Las características d ela distribución personal y factorial del ingreso y la estructura social son también datos que influencian el diseño tarifario y la especificación de los planes de inversión necesarios así como la definición de las obligaciones de provisión de carácter social por parte de los prestadores. En general, las obligaciones sociales se refieren a los requerimientos de provisión de un conjunto de servicios bajo ciertos términos y condiciones los cuales en muchos casos en forma de transacciones involuntarias.Privatization; regulatory

Regulating privatized rail transport

Traditionally, transport regulation has been viewed as an exercise in second-best optimization, acknowledging the existence of huge information problems. Then the rail industry was deeply restructured worldwide to halt erosion of the sector's share of transportation markets. Restructuring took different forms in different countries, ranging from simple reorganization measures to extreme restructuring -with the private sector increasingly participating in the sector and with the provision of infrastructure separated from the provision of services. The authors argue that regulation of the rail industry cannot remain unaffected by these changes. New regulatory scenarios and issues have emerged. For example, contracts have to be defined for private participation and quality surveillance instruments must be defined. Traditional price controls have to be adapted to, and mechanisms designed to manage and plan infrastructure investments in, the new environment. Restructuring has brought new problems, too. Where licenses have been used, for example, several concessionaires have been unable to meet the objectives spelled out in the concession contract. Contracts should be flexible enough to take account of novel situations that may affect company performance. And yet, for the system to be credible, there cannot be systematic, unjustified deviations from the franchise objectives. Regulation of the sector should be simple and flexible, with license contracts designed to include the private sector and with industry organization adapted to local circumstances. Regulation should be governed by principles that foster competition and market mechanisms, wherever possible. At the same time, it should provide a stable legal and institutional framework for economic activity. Otherwise, regulators should refrain from intervening in the market-unless the goal of economic efficiency (subject to the socially demanded levelof equity) is in jeopardy.Municipal Financial Management,Banks&Banking Reform,Decentralization,Enterprise Development&Reform,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Railways Transport,Banks&Banking Reform,Municipal Financial Management,Water and Industry,Public Sector Economics&Finance

Regulating privatized infrastructures and airport services

For a World Bank Institute course on transport privatization, the authors cover basic issues associated with the regulation of privatized airport infrastructure and services: 1) Economic characteristics of airport. Three types of activities are carried out in airports: essential operational services (aeronautical and non-aeronautical), handling services (aeronautical and non-aeronautical), and commercial activities. Demand for basic airport services is directly influenced by trip purpose. The two types of airline customers (business and leisure travelers) need different levels of flexibility and tend to travel at different times. Analyzing airport capacity (practical and saturation) under peak demand is essential to airport success. Among other important issues: runway cost, level and volume of service, pollution, congestion, and air traffic control. 2) Recent trends in the airport industry. The movement toward privatization may involve public ownership and private operation, including joint ventures; partial or majority divestiture; management contracts; and BOT (build-operate-transfer) schemes and variants, including BOOT (build-own-operate-transfer) schemes and LDO (lease-develop-operate) schemes. Or it may involve private ownership and operation. 3) Price regulation. Topics covered include traditional pricing policies'price regulation through an RPI-X formula; charges for congestion, noise, and other externalities; investment plans; and design of the regulatory system. 4) Regulation of quality in the industry. Topics covered: regulation of services to passengers (as measured by targets for check-in queues, immigration queues, baggage reclaim queues, concourse crowding, shopping, parking, and so on); fault repair times; average levels of passenger boarding and disembarkation and baggage delivery; safety; and investment obligation. 5) Performance indicators in the industry. Topics covered: strategic indicators and other financial indicators (including revenues), as well as indicators of cost, productivity, and quality of service.Transport and Trade Logistics,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Banks&Banking Reform,Environmental Economics&Policies,Decentralization,Roads&Highways,Airports and Air Services,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Banks&Banking Reform,Transport and Trade Logistics

Revisiting the strengths and limitations of regulatory contracts in infrastructure industries

This paper evaluates regulation by contract in public-private partnerships (PPPs) in infrastructure services. Although the benefits of competition for the market and of regulatory contracts are widely acknowledged, the literature indentifies several failures in their design. These ‘flaws’ are present in both developed and developing countries and arise in all types of contracts. This study analyses both short and long term contracts, focusing on purely contractual PPPs and institutionalized PPPs (mixed companies). The evidence suggests that for all kinds of contracts, the major problems tend to arise in the preparation of public tender documents: the ‘best’ bidder is not often the winner. The likely results include redistribution in favor of the private partner, weak incentives for high performance, and renegotiation of contracts. Moreover, risks are not allocated correctly nor is effective monitoring ensured. This review of contract procedures and design allows us to draw several implications for policy-makers and to present suggestions and recommendations for improving regulatory contracts.regulation by contract; bidding documents; contract design; risk; monitoring

Performance Evaluation - Annual Report Year 3

This report describes the work done and results obtained in third year of the CATNETS project. Experiments carried out with the different configurations of the prototype are reported and simulation results are evaluated with the CATNETS metrics framework. The applicability of the Catallactic approach as market model for service and resource allocation in application layer networks is assessed based on the results and experience gained both from the prototype development and simulations. --Grid Computing

Processes, information, and accounting gaps in the regulation of Argentina's private railways

Almost a decade after Argentina began privatizing its railways, resolution of conflicts between regulators, users, and operators continues to take longer, and to be more difficult, than expected. The authors contend that many of these conflicts arose because there are no rules for interactions between the key stakeholders: government, regulators, users, unions, and the media. One result of inexperience in setting up concession agreement has been that the agreements did not clearly define the information needed for oversight and regulation. Argentine rail concession contracts were supposed to be specific about the way tariffs, quality, investment, exclusivity, and so on, would change over time. And the newly created regulatory bodies were given some discretion about adjusting the contracts in the face of unforeseen developments. However, initial privatization were carried out in such a way that there was no time to refine terms, so many loopholes remained. Those unforeseen events have happened, and the regulatory agency, the National Commission for Transport Regulation (CNRT), has had to adapt its procedures and decisions to available information. In some cases, alleged modifications of the operating environment have led to renegotiations. Changes have been introduced in the approach to furnishing information to the government for oversight and regulatory accounting. The changes center on clearer definitions in connection with four major issues: a) The measurement of efficiency; b) access prices; and c) the financial model. Circumstances in the Argentine rail industry early in 2001 did not favor dramatic changes, but current renegotiations could be used to adjust information requirements to reflect what has been learned through six yearsof experience.Environmental Economics&Policies,Knowledge Economy,Labor Policies,Decentralization,Financial Intermediation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Financial Intermediation,Banks&Banking Reform,Education for the Knowledge Economy,Knowledge Economy