312 research outputs found
Data Minimisation in Communication Protocols: A Formal Analysis Framework and Application to Identity Management
With the growing amount of personal information exchanged over the Internet,
privacy is becoming more and more a concern for users. One of the key
principles in protecting privacy is data minimisation. This principle requires
that only the minimum amount of information necessary to accomplish a certain
goal is collected and processed. "Privacy-enhancing" communication protocols
have been proposed to guarantee data minimisation in a wide range of
applications. However, currently there is no satisfactory way to assess and
compare the privacy they offer in a precise way: existing analyses are either
too informal and high-level, or specific for one particular system. In this
work, we propose a general formal framework to analyse and compare
communication protocols with respect to privacy by data minimisation. Privacy
requirements are formalised independent of a particular protocol in terms of
the knowledge of (coalitions of) actors in a three-layer model of personal
information. These requirements are then verified automatically for particular
protocols by computing this knowledge from a description of their
communication. We validate our framework in an identity management (IdM) case
study. As IdM systems are used more and more to satisfy the increasing need for
reliable on-line identification and authentication, privacy is becoming an
increasingly critical issue. We use our framework to analyse and compare four
identity management systems. Finally, we discuss the completeness and
(re)usability of the proposed framework
Proof Theory, Transformations, and Logic Programming for Debugging Security Protocols
We define a sequent calculus to formally specify, simulate, debug and verify security protocols. In our sequents we distinguish between the current knowledge of principals and the current global state of the session. Hereby, we can describe the operational semantics of principals and of an intruder in a simple and modular way. Furthermore, using proof theoretic tools like the analysis of permutability of rules, we are able to find efficient proof strategies that we prove complete for special classes of security protocols including Needham-Schroeder. Based on the results of this preliminary analysis, we have implemented a Prolog meta-interpreter which allows for rapid prototyping and for checking safety properties of security protocols, and we have applied it for finding error traces and proving correctness of practical examples
An Experiment in Ping-Pong Protocol Verification by Nondeterministic Pushdown Automata
An experiment is described that confirms the security of a well-studied class
of cryptographic protocols (Dolev-Yao intruder model) can be verified by
two-way nondeterministic pushdown automata (2NPDA). A nondeterministic pushdown
program checks whether the intersection of a regular language (the protocol to
verify) and a given Dyck language containing all canceling words is empty. If
it is not, an intruder can reveal secret messages sent between trusted users.
The verification is guaranteed to terminate in cubic time at most on a
2NPDA-simulator. The interpretive approach used in this experiment simplifies
the verification, by separating the nondeterministic pushdown logic and program
control, and makes it more predictable. We describe the interpretive approach
and the known transformational solutions, and show they share interesting
features. Also noteworthy is how abstract results from automata theory can
solve practical problems by programming language means.Comment: In Proceedings MARS/VPT 2018, arXiv:1803.0866
Assessment of Threats to the Security of the Cryptographic Authentication Mechanisms of the Monitor Devices of Vehicles
In accordance with the legislation on transport security, a number of vehicles must be equipped with on-Board control devices containing a cryptographic means of authentication, registration and storage of control data, including key information of the electronic signature. This paper presents a solution to the problem of justification of the adequacy of measures to counter known attacks and methods of discrediting the suggested cryptographic mechanisms and the corresponding protocol, drawn up in the form of a draft national standard and presented in the previous work of the authors devoted to study of its security properties. The solution presented is limited to the consideration of attacks divided into two large classes: passive and active attacks, including temporary attacks based on the study of the response time of one or more participants of the protocol. The analysis of the security threat model of the Protocol generating a common key with the authentication of subscribers intended for use in tachographs installed on vehicles shows that the protocol provides sufficient measures to counter known attacks. The found possible attacks are of a formal nature, not allowing the offender to obtain any additional information in order to discredit the protocol
Visual Model-Driven Design, Verification and Implementation of Security Protocols
A novel visual model-driven approach to security protocol design, verification, and implementation is presented in this paper. User-friendly graphical models are combined with rigorous formal methods to enable protocol verification and sound automatic code generation. Domain-specific abstractions keep the graphical models simple, yet powerful enough to represent complex, realistic protocols such as SSH. The main contribution is to bring together aspects that were only partially available or not available at all in previous proposal
Verifying privacy by little interaction and no process equivalence
While machine-assisted verification of classical security goals such as confidentiality and authentication is
well-established, it is less mature for recent ones. Electronic voting protocols claim properties such as voter
privacy. The most common modelling involves indistinguishability, and is specified via trace equivalence in cryptographic extensions of process calculi. However, it has shown restrictions. We describe a novel model, based on unlinkability between two pieces of information. Specifying it as an extension to the Inductive Method allows us to establish voter privacy without the need for approximation or session bounding. The two
models and their latest specifications are contrasted
Automated Cryptographic Analysis of the Pedersen Commitment Scheme
Aiming for strong security assurance, recently there has been an increasing
interest in formal verification of cryptographic constructions. This paper
presents a mechanised formal verification of the popular Pedersen commitment
protocol, proving its security properties of correctness, perfect hiding, and
computational binding. To formally verify the protocol, we extended the theory
of EasyCrypt, a framework which allows for reasoning in the computational
model, to support the discrete logarithm and an abstraction of commitment
protocols. Commitments are building blocks of many cryptographic constructions,
for example, verifiable secret sharing, zero-knowledge proofs, and e-voting.
Our work paves the way for the verification of those more complex
constructions.Comment: 12 pages, conference MMM-ACNS 201
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