1,159 research outputs found
Using quantum key distribution for cryptographic purposes: a survey
The appealing feature of quantum key distribution (QKD), from a cryptographic
viewpoint, is the ability to prove the information-theoretic security (ITS) of
the established keys. As a key establishment primitive, QKD however does not
provide a standalone security service in its own: the secret keys established
by QKD are in general then used by a subsequent cryptographic applications for
which the requirements, the context of use and the security properties can
vary. It is therefore important, in the perspective of integrating QKD in
security infrastructures, to analyze how QKD can be combined with other
cryptographic primitives. The purpose of this survey article, which is mostly
centered on European research results, is to contribute to such an analysis. We
first review and compare the properties of the existing key establishment
techniques, QKD being one of them. We then study more specifically two generic
scenarios related to the practical use of QKD in cryptographic infrastructures:
1) using QKD as a key renewal technique for a symmetric cipher over a
point-to-point link; 2) using QKD in a network containing many users with the
objective of offering any-to-any key establishment service. We discuss the
constraints as well as the potential interest of using QKD in these contexts.
We finally give an overview of challenges relative to the development of QKD
technology that also constitute potential avenues for cryptographic research.Comment: Revised version of the SECOQC White Paper. Published in the special
issue on QKD of TCS, Theoretical Computer Science (2014), pp. 62-8
Time- and Amplitude-Controlled Power Noise Generator against SPA Attacks for FPGA-Based IoT Devices
Power noise generation for masking power traces is a powerful countermeasure against
Simple Power Analysis (SPA), and it has also been used against Differential Power Analysis (DPA) or
Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) in the case of cryptographic circuits. This technique makes use of
power consumption generators as basic modules, which are usually based on ring oscillators when
implemented on FPGAs. These modules can be used to generate power noise and to also extract
digital signatures through the power side channel for Intellectual Property (IP) protection purposes.
In this paper, a new power consumption generator, named Xored High Consuming Module (XHCM),
is proposed. XHCM improves, when compared to others proposals in the literature, the amount of
current consumption per LUT when implemented on FPGAs. Experimental results show that these
modules can achieve current increments in the range from 2.4 mA (with only 16 LUTs on Artix-7
devices with a power consumption density of 0.75 mW/LUT when using a single HCM) to 11.1 mA
(with 67 LUTs when using 8 XHCMs, with a power consumption density of 0.83 mW/LUT). Moreover,
a version controlled by Pulse-Width Modulation (PWM) has been developed, named PWM-XHCM,
which is, as XHCM, suitable for power watermarking. In order to build countermeasures against
SPA attacks, a multi-level XHCM (ML-XHCM) is also presented, which is capable of generating
different power consumption levels with minimal area overhead (27 six-input LUTS for generating
16 different amplitude levels on Artix-7 devices). Finally, a randomized version, named RML-XHCM,
has also been developed using two True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) to generate current
consumption peaks with random amplitudes at random times. RML-XHCM requires less than
150 LUTs on Artix-7 devices. Taking into account these characteristics, two main contributions
have been carried out in this article: first, XHCM and PWM-XHCM provide an efficient power
consumption generator for extracting digital signatures through the power side channel, and on the
other hand, ML-XHCM and RML-XHCM are powerful tools for the protection of processing units
against SPA attacks in IoT devices implemented on FPGAs.Junta de AndaluciaEuropean Commission B-TIC-588-UGR2
Side Channel Leakage Analysis - Detection, Exploitation and Quantification
Nearly twenty years ago the discovery of side channel attacks has warned the world that security is more than just a mathematical problem. Serious considerations need to be placed on the implementation and its physical media. Nowadays the ever-growing ubiquitous computing calls for in-pace development of security solutions. Although the physical security has attracted increasing public attention, side channel security remains as a problem that is far from being completely solved. An important problem is how much expertise is required by a side channel adversary. The essential interest is to explore whether detailed knowledge about implementation and leakage model are indispensable for a successful side channel attack. If such knowledge is not a prerequisite, attacks can be mounted by even inexperienced adversaries. Hence the threat from physical observables may be underestimated. Another urgent problem is how to secure a cryptographic system in the exposure of unavoidable leakage. Although many countermeasures have been developed, their effectiveness pends empirical verification and the side channel security needs to be evaluated systematically. The research in this dissertation focuses on two topics, leakage-model independent side channel analysis and security evaluation, which are described from three perspectives: leakage detection, exploitation and quantification. To free side channel analysis from the complicated procedure of leakage modeling, an observation to observation comparison approach is proposed. Several attacks presented in this work follow this approach. They exhibit efficient leakage detection and exploitation under various leakage models and implementations. More importantly, this achievement no longer relies on or even requires precise leakage modeling. For the security evaluation, a weak maximum likelihood approach is proposed. It provides a quantification of the loss of full key security due to the presence of side channel leakage. A constructive algorithm is developed following this approach. The algorithm can be used by security lab to measure the leakage resilience. It can also be used by a side channel adversary to determine whether limited side channel information suffices the full key recovery at affordable expense
Quantum forgery attacks on COPA,AES-COPA and marble authenticated encryption algorithms
The classic forgery attacks on COPA, AES-COPA and Marble authenticated
encryption algorithms need to query about 2^(n/2) times, and their success
probability is not high. To solve this problem, the corresponding quantum
forgery attacks on COPA, AES-COPA and Marble authenticated encryption
algorithms are presented. In the quantum forgery attacks on COPA and AES-COPA,
we use Simon's algorithm to find the period of the tag generation function in
COPA and AES-COPA by querying in superposition, and then generate a forged tag
for a new message. In the quantum forgery attack on Marble, Simon's algorithm
is used to recover the secret parameter L, and the forged tag can be computed
with L. Compared with classic forgery attacks on COPA, AES-COPA and Marble, our
attack can reduce the number of queries from O(2^(n/2)) to O(n) and improve
success probability close to 100%.Comment: 21 pages, 11 figure
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