Leadership in Multi-sided Markets

I analyze the role of leadership in multi-sided markets as online advertising. Search and display advertising are better characterized by (respectively) quantity and price competition. A platform that reached dominance in search may have an incentive to limit services to consumers to be aggressive with the advertisers, to exploit its scale in search to build barriers to entry, or to adopt click-weighted auctions to manipulate the pricing of sponsored links. On the other side, a dominant platform in display advertising may increase the rewards of content providers to increase prices on advertisers, or may adopt exclusive clauses to predate on other platforms.Multisided markets, Leadership, Dominance

Does European competition law need to take a new approach to zero-price markets in the digital economy? – a study of the application of Article 102 to zero-price markets.

More and more often in the digitalised world, consumers come into contact with undertakings operating within the zero-price market. That is, where the product or service is offered to the consumer at a price of zero. Examples of zero-priced markets are numerous, from shopping malls, to social media and credit cards. This market type is not an insignificant one, with Facebook and Google, two of the largest internet companies offering zero price goods, having a market capitalisation of $1,645 billion as of June 2020. The topic of data driven digital zero-price markets has been receiving increasing amounts of attention in recent years. The OECD, Commission, national competition law authorities and academics have increasingly been considering this market type. It is often said that the consumer pays to use these digital services with their person data. In online transactions, essentially all transactions require at least some disclosure of the user’s personal data. This personal data is highly valuable to undertakings, with companies willing to receive consumers data instead of being paid by them with money. Overall, the question which I pose is whether EU competition law can deal with the unique characteristics of these digital zero-price markets. The economic and consumer welfare grounding of Article 102 means that it is adaptable to zero-price markets, and the special characteristics of zero-price markets are to an extent already considered in a competition law analysis. This market type is unique and significantly different to the traditional market types that EU competition law has been faced with in the past. For one, these markets operate largely on the digital sphere, meaning that they are characterised by competition for the market, exceedingly fast innovation and unique barriers to entry. These markets are multisided, with consumers, advertisers, merchants and the undertaking all operating on unique parameters but interacting with one-another. Finally, the goods/services are provided at zero-price, which traditional economic analysis struggles to adapt to, whilst consumers are faced with alternative costs through their attention and information (data) and reduction of quality. The Google Search (Shopping) case shows these characteristics in action, and demonstrates the challenges which EU competition law faces when applied to this market type. It also shows the current capabilities of the law in dealing with this market type. There are ways that the law can be adapted, utilising new tests which focus on other cost parameters than price, putting more weighting on factors other than monetary price and looking at different competitive parameters such as quality. This thesis does not seek to criticise EU competition law as a whole. It is limited to considering specifically digital zero-priced markets. It is concluded that more can be done to ensure that its unique characteristics can be included in a competition law analysis. In this respect, the EU can become a leader, laying the groundwork for the future competition law treatment of these undertakings, and ensuring that it is properly recognised that consumers can face competitive harms even if it is not based upon a monetary price

Governance, Issuance Restrictions, And Competition In Payment Card Networks

I discuss the antitrust suit brought by the U.S. Department of Justice against Visa and MasterCard in 1998. Banks that issue Visa cards are free to also issue MasterCard cards, and vice versa, and many banks issue the cards of both networks. However, both Visa and MasterCard had rules prohibiting member banks from also issuing the cards of other networks, in particular American Express and Discover. In addition, most banks are members of both the Visa and MasterCard networks, so governance is to some extent shared. The DOJ claimed that restrictions on issuance and shared governance were anticompetitive and should be prohibited. Visa and MasterCard argued that these practices were procompetitive. The case raised important questions: Given that many banks issue both Visa and MasterCard, and that most merchants that accept one also accept the other, do the two networks really compete, and if so, how? And do Visa and/or MasterCard have market power, if so, in what market, and how is it exercised?

Reassessing competition concerns in electronic communications markets

Central features of today’s electronic communications markets are complementarities between the different layers of the value chain, substitutability between some applications, network effects in the provision of content and services, two-sided business models that partly involve indirect revenue generation (such as advertising and data profiling), and a patchwork of regulated and unregulated segments of the market. This complexity requires a fresh look at the market forces shaping the industry and a rethinking of market definitions and of the assessment of market power. This article presents the state of play in European electronic communication markets, with a particular emphasis on the recent development of “over the tops”. We also use a stylised model of an electronic communications market to draw some central lessons from economic theory and to elaborate on market definition and market power

The Endogenous Market Structures Approach. A Non-technical Survey with Applications to the Crisis and Future Scenarios for the New Economy

The EMSs approach to macroeconomics introduces strategic interactions and endogenous entry decisions in the analysis of aggregate phenomena as business cycle, international trade and growth. This survey provides a non-technical discussion of the applications of the EMSs approach to positive and normative issues, and relates these with recent debates on the current recession, future scenarios for glabalization, policymaking and the New Economy.

Networks, Standards and Intellectual Property Rights

This paper reviews issues that lie at the intersection between intellectual property rights (IPR) and network effects, especially in the context of the global economy. Some of the relevant questions are: (1) How do IPR influence the provision of goods exhibiting network effects? (2) How do network effects in turn influence the creation of intellectual property? And (3) how do aspects of the global economy interact with both IPR and network effects? We synthesize what is known from the existing literature to answer these questions.Intellectual Property Rights, Network Effects, Globalization, Standards, Social Networks, Software Piracy

The Application of EC Competition Policy to the Media Industry

This article examines whether EC competition policy and merger control provisions can prevent excessive market power and safeguard open access and consumer choice in the European media and communications industry. The study looks at the structure of the media industry and points to the amalgamation of corporate power. It assesses whether EC competition law and merger provisions can effectively address the dangers of ownership concentration and safeguard diversity of sources. A number of merger cases either blocked or allowed by the EC are reviewed in order to establish the level of competition. The article suggests that a more rigorous competition policy is required to guarantee competition and prevent domination in merger activity

Strategic timing of entry : evidence from video games

This paper investigates how video game publishers’ choice of game release date is affected by the expected level of competition within the game’s product niche. We identify game niches by genre, age-appropriateness, a four week window cohort, publisher and console system. Our analysis is based on two different video game data sets, one based on industry sales data and the other featuring extensive consumer usage information. We show that consumer substitution across games is stronger within most of the dimensions describing product niches. Sales volumes decay quickly after the opening weekend, so at any point in time, a niche will typically be served by few current titles. Thus, publishers have incentives to avoid releasing during periods of fierce intra-niche competition. We show that games are more likely to be released so as to avoid weeks when their niche is relatively well served