3,918 research outputs found

    Congestion, Private Peering and Capacity Investment on the Internet.

    Get PDF
    This paper presents a model of private bilateral and multilateral peering arrangements between Internet backbone providers when the network is congested. We study how different forms of interconnection and the competitive conditions of the market affect backbones' investments in network and peering point capacities. We show that network and peering point capacities are equilibrium complements; increasing competition reduces capacity investments (under-investment), thus worsening the quality of service both with multilateral and bilateral peering; under bilateral peering the inefficiency is less severe. Because of under-investment, welfare may be lower when the market is more competitive. We also show that asymmetries between backbones, which can take the form of uneven content distribution or product differentiation, may reduce under-investment and improve the quality of service. The introduction of an "inverse capacity interconnection fee" where providers pay each other a fee which is negatively correlated with their installed capacity may play the role of a coordinating mechanism towards a Pareto superior outcome.Internet, peering, congestion, QoS, capacity investment, interconnection

    Private Peering Among Internet Backbone Providers

    Get PDF
    We develop a model, in which Internet backbone providers decide on private peering agreements, comparing the benefits of private peering relative to being connected only through National Access Points. Backbone providers compete by setting capacities for their networks, capacities on the private peering links, if they choose to peer privately, and access prices. The model is formulated as a multistage game. We examine the model from two alternative modelling perspectives - a purely non-cooperative game, where we solve for Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria through backward induction, and a network theoretic perspective, where we examine pairwise stable and efficient networks. While there are a large number of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria, both the pairwise stable and the efficient network are unique and the stable network is not efficient and vice versa. The stable network is the complete network, where all the backbone providers choose to peer with each other, while the efficient network is the one, where the backbone providers are connected to each other only through the National Access Points.Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, networks, pairwise stability, efficiency

    Private Peering Among Internet Backbone Providers

    Get PDF
    We develop a model, in which Internet backbone providers decide on private peering agreements, comparing the benefits of private peering relative to being connected only through National Access Points. Backbone providers compete by setting capacities for their networks, capacities on the private peering links, if they choose to peer privately, and access prices. The model is formulated as a multistage game. We examine the model from two alternative modelling perspectives - a purely non-cooperative game, where we solve for Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria through backward induction, and a network theoretic perspective, where we examine pairwise stable and efficient networks. While there are a large number of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria, both the pairwise stable and the efficient network are unique and the stable network is not efficient and vice versa. The stable network is the complete network, where all the backbone providers choose to peer with each other, while the efficient network is the one, where the backbone providers are connected to each other only through the National Access Points.Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, networks, pairwise stability, efficiency

    Network Neutrality or Internet Innovation?

    Get PDF
    Over the past two decades, the Internet has undergone an extensive re-ordering of its topology that has resulted in increased variation in the price and quality of its services. Innovations such as private peering, multihoming, secondary peering, server farms, and content delivery networks have caused the Internet’s traditionally hierarchical architecture to be replaced by one that is more heterogeneous. Relatedly, network providers have begun to employ an increasingly varied array of business arrangements and pricing. This variation has been interpreted by some as network providers attempting to promote their self interest at the expense of the public. In fact, these changes reflect network providers’ attempts to reduce cost, manage congestion, and maintain quality of service. Current policy proposals to constrain this variation risk harming these beneficial developments.

    Information and communication technologies in Germany : Is there a remaining role for sector-specific regulation?

    Get PDF
    In order to analyze the remaining role for sector-specific regulation the focus of this paper is on those elements of the Internet periphery and Internet service provision, which are strongly based on telecommunications, in particular Internet access and Internet backbone. Section 2 deals with the role of telecommunications for the Internet, differentiating between local network access and long distance network capacity. In section 3 the new regulatory arrangements for communications services within Europe, with particular emphasis on Germany, are explained. In order to analyze the future role of sector-specific regulation from a normative point of view, in section 4 the network economic concept of a disaggregated regulatory approach is provided. Section 5 deals with phasing-out potentials for sector-specific regulation due to increasing competition within the local loop. In section 6 the role of technology-neutral regulation is considered, which implies that in an environment of competing network infrastructures sector- specific regulation should not be extended, but removed. Finally, section 7 explains the role of competition in the markets for backbone interconnectivity. --

    Regulatory Approaches to NGNs: An International Comparison

    Get PDF
    The emergence of Next Generation Networks (NGNs) raises profound challenges for regulators everywhere. Different regulatory authorities have approached these problems in strikingly different ways, depending in part on the overall regulatory milieu in which they operate, and in part on the nature of the NGN migration envisioned by major market players. Also, the NGN core network raises significantly different issues from those of the NGN access network. The migration to NGN raises many of the same issues that were already on the table as a result of the broader migration to IP-based services, notably in regard to the de-coupling of the service from the underlying network. To these concerns are added profound questions related to the nature of market power. Will NGNs enable new forms of competition? Will competitive bottlenecks remain, especially in the last mile? Will NGN enable new forms of bottlenecks to emerge, especially in the upper layers of the network, perhaps as a result of new IMS capabilities? Regulators in the UK, Netherlands, Germany, Japan and the United States have been forced to deal with these issues due to relatively rapid migration to NGNs proposed by their respective incumbent telecoms operators. Many of the same issues are also visible in the recommendations that the European Commission finalised on 13 November 2007 as part of the ongoing review of the European regulatory framework for electronic communications. In this paper, we compare and contrast the many regulatory proceedings that have been produced by these regulatory authorities.Regulation; Next Generation Networks; access network; core network; all-IP; competition; market power; international comparison

    Regulatory Approaches to NGNs: An International Comparison

    Get PDF
    The emergence of Next Generation Networks (NGNs) raises profound challenges for regulators everywhere. Different regulatory authorities have approached these problems in strikingly different ways, depending in part on the overall regulatory milieu in which they operate, and in part on the nature of the NGN migration envisioned by major market players. Also, the NGN core network raises significantly different issues from those of the NGN access network. The migration to NGN raises many of the same issues that were already on the table as a result of the broader migration to IP-based services,notably in regard to the de-coupling of the service from the underlying network. To these concerns are added profound questions related to the nature of market power. Will NGNs enable new forms of competition? Will competitive bottlenecks remain, especially in the last mile? Will NGN enable new forms of bottlenecks to emerge, especially in the upper layers of the network, perhaps as a result of new IMS capabilities? Regulators in the UK, Netherlands, Germany, Japan and the United States have been forced to deal with these issues due to relatively rapid migration to NGNs proposed by their respective incumbent telecoms operators. Many of the same issues are also visible in the recommendations that the European Commission finalised on 13 November 2007 as part of the ongoing review of the European regulatory framework for electronic communications. In this paper, we compare and contrast the many regulatory proceedings that have been produced by these regulatory authorities.Regulation; Next Generation Networks; access network; core network; all-IP; competition; market power; international comparison.

    IP-based NGNs and Interconnection: The Debate in Europe

    Get PDF
    Historically, interconnection in the world of the Internet has been approached significantly differently from interconnection in the fixed Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) and the mobile Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN). As fixed and mobile networks evolve to Next Generation Networks (NGNs) based on the Internet Protocol (IP), it becomes increasingly necessary to merge these perspectives in order to achieve a unified and integrated approach to network interconnection. There is a rich history of economic analysis of IP-based and of conventional switched networks that began to converge early in this decade. In 2008, this issue is coming to a boil, as regulators seek to provide regulatory certainty for the build-out of NGNs, even in the face of substantial uncertainties, and even though practical experience with NGNs is still in a very preliminary state. What can we learn from the historical evolution of the theory of interconnection for Internet, NGN, PSTN and PLMN? What issues are "in play" today? What is the appropriate destination in the long term? What nearer term measures are appropriate?interconnection, NGN, Internet Protocol (IP), bill and keep, Calling Party's Network Pays (CPNP), peering, transit.

    Asymmetry and Discrimination in Internet Peering Evidence from the LINX

    Get PDF
    Is the quality of interconnection between Internet operators affected by their asymmetry? While recent game theoretic literature provides contrasting answers to this question, there is a lack of empirical research. We introduce a novel dataset based on Internet routing policies, and study the interconnection decisions amongst the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) members of the London Internet Exchange Point (LINX). Our results show that interconnection quality degradation can be significantly explained by asymmetry between providers. We also show that Competition Authorities should focus more on the role played by the ñ€Ɠcentrality of an operatorñ€, rather than on its market share.Internet Peering, Two-sided Markets, Network Industries, Antitrust, Net Neutrality

    Internet economics and policy: An Australian perspective

    Get PDF
    Publicly available information indicates that the demand and supply of Internet and Internet-related services are continuing to expand at a rapid pace. Since 1997 the number of Internet service providers (facilities-based and resellers) has increased by nearly 40 per cent; the number of points-of-presence per Internet service provider has increased by five times; the number of hosts connected to the Internet has more than quadrupled; and Internet traffic has increased from six to 10 times. The emergence of electronic commerce (e-commerce), driven by this rapid adoption of Internet services and continual technological innovation, is likely to have profound economic and social impacts on Australian society. This paper provides a detailed analysis of the impact of the Internet and e-commerce, ranging from the changes in the market structure of the telecommunications industry, its role in changing the organisation of traditional markets, the emergence of new markets, and the structural shifts to employment, productivity and trade. The paper also analyses contemporary Australian regulatory responses. IIe-commerce; internet economics
    • 

    corecore